University of Alberta

Manufacturing the Enemy: The Discourse of Fear in Democratic Societies

by

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requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Pour papa:

Qui m'inspire toujours, et que j'admire sans détour

Abronck, Piags, Axl et Un dernier p'tit' coup

ABSTRACT

The forms of discipline that democratic societies are subjected to are subtle. Baring invocation of Martial Law or States of Emergency, government control of the people is constrained by democratic principles, and must therefore take less overt forms. This thesis, entitled "Manufacturing the Enemy: The Discourse of Fear in Democratic Societies," develops a framework for understanding more clearly the relationship between what Michel Foucault calls 'techniques of governing' and the idea of a 'common enemy'. Therefore, my study of the use of fear by the modern state will focus on the construction and maintenance of the perception of an 'Other', and attempts to show the role that the control of official narrative, representation, media framing, and regimes of truth, among others, has played in the mollifying of the people in post-9/11 America, and resulted in the 'manufacture of consent' so necessary to modern democratic governance.

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Portions of this thesis draw on unpublished papers written for seminar courses taken during my Masters, and also on several conference papers presented at the University of Alberta. Chapter One is based in part on a seminar taken on the history of writing History and the development and uses of historical discourse. Chapters Two and Three contain sections of several papers and presentations initially prepared for courses taken on the Globalization of states and its implications for sovereignty, on Deviance and crime, as well as a conference paper prepared on the utility of post-modern political theory for the revitalizing of classical archaeological theory. Chapter Four contains sections of an analysis initially undertaken for a course on identity politics and public policy, and my conclusion draws on a series of conferences dealing with questions of 'the social' and 'the event' as altering the social environment. I thank the University of Alberta for providing me with such a rich and inspiring academic environment in which to widen my intellectual horizons.

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Finally, I wish to borrow from the eloquence of Pascal, who very wisely apologized "Veuillez excuser ces longueurs, c'est pour n'avoir pas eu le temps de faire plus court."

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INTRODUCTION

Since 9/11 the international community, both private citizens and heads of state, has castigated the current American administration's side-stepping and outright reversal of supposed basic democratic tenets, such as rule of law, due process, freedoms of speech and of association, and various other rights and freedoms. Crying out accusatorily that George W. Bush's America has instituted a new surveillance state to prosecute its "War on Terror," the international community has railed against the apparent strengthening of the state under Bush, warning that new measures instituted under states of Emergency and including, among others, the USA PATRIOT Act, are eroding the ability of the people to control their democracy, essentially reducing the world's 'most democratic country' to an oligarchy. According to his detractors, President Bush has blindsided his people, lying to them through clever propaganda in order to pursue policies that ultimately will harm America. The thrust of this argument contends that the Bush administration has opportunistically seized upon a terrorized and mourning people in order to make a simple 'power grab'. The present thesis contends that this position, while understandable, plays power's game by basing its arguments on those same assumptions that allow the current administration to expand its role and reach, while simultaneously ignoring the reality of the governance of modern democracies. By focusing on what 'new powers' the state has acquired unto itself, opponents of the Bush administration perpetuate the (false) distinctions between the social and the political, truth and propaganda, liberty and security. This line of thinking also ignores the complicity of the people in their own rule, and stubbornly clings to the

assumptions that government is 'bad', and that 'those in power' are corrupt. The juxtaposing of 'righteous' Western democracies with the 'barbaric', totalitarian regimes of the Middle and Far East further plays into this flawed reasoning, ignoring, as Michel Foucault contended, that "there are sets of practices that are common to *all* modern governments, however they are defined and classified, practices that are simultaneously individualizing and totalizing, capturing all in their net. *Whatever distinguishes totalitarian regimes from representative regimes, it is not their governmental practices, which are the same*, involving individualization, normalization, the disciplining of body and soul, confinement and even execution. Of course, more people are brutalized, murdered, and confined in totalitarian regimes, but the methods are the same." (Brass 2000: 317, my emphasis) By maintaining that the Bush administration is destroying democracy in order to protect it, opponents of his regime misunderstand both power and democracy, and ignore the long line of precedents that have enabled his actions. In order to begin to comprehend the scope of the Bush reforms, and what they signify, the present thesis takes as its starting point Foucault's assertion that any study of modern power must begin with a re-conceptualization of *what power is*.

In their adamant claim that President Bush is corrupting democracy, his opponents "limit the idea of power to its more obvious political manifestations", which is in itself "an ideological move, obscuring the complex diffuseness of its operations." (Eagleton 1991: 7) The problem with such an institutional understanding of power is that it reduces power to domination and forces it "into universalized

schemes of rights and obligations [which] is a modern – and, more specifically, liberal – political strategy whose *raison d'être* lies in the principle of sovereignty. The political is identified with the state and public spaces, and is distinguished from the social, which is either a primordial or a residual category of that which is not (yet) political" (Dyrberg 1997: 86-87) In their insistence that Bush be seen as a corrupter of democratic power, opposition groups maintain the fiction that politics and the state are 'necessary evils', whose power must be limited as much as possible – power here is reduced to domination, or 'power over'. (Dyrberg 1997: 104) Social contract theory[1], key to modern conceptions of democratic power, perpetuates this misunderstanding of the functioning of power by limiting it to politics/domination, and by positioning power as existing outside the individual: power is something 'done to' the individual once he has 'given it up' to the state for his betterment, lest his life be "nasty, brutish and short."[2] The illusion that power exists independent of the individual once the social contract is established is what creates the fiction that the state is the sole legitimate bearer of power, which is understood solely as coercion: "The modern political science concept of power is primarily based on the notions of command and obedience and has been focused on the state's exercise of its powers of coercion in relation to individuals." (Brass 2000: 316) The great utility to governance of the maintenance of this fiction is that it reduces the questions of power to concerns regarding "*who* governs, *how much* coercion is exercised in the process, and *how to regulate* this power and prevent its abuse of the rights of the people." (*Ibid*, my emphasis) By Foucault's thinking, a re-conceptualization of power is needed to

[1] See Jean-Jacques Rousseau's famous *The social contract and discourses* (1973).
[2] See Hobbes's (2002) *Leviathan*, p.96.

expose "the more pervasive and insidious exercises of power not only by the state, but within society and virtually all public institutions" (Brass 2000: 316-17), which according to him, have been obscured by this focus on *who* governs rather than *how government functions* and where (and how) its legitimacy *is created*.

Denying the existence of a 'human nature'[3], and insisting upon the historical contingency of subjecthood, Foucault contended that modern governance could be called so because it was, indeed, modern. It is not simply that the modes by which we are governed have evolved over time, but more importantly how we *relate* to those governance techniques has changed. By moving from a mercantile system of mutual rights and obligations to a capitalist, technologically dependent system, Foucault argued that a different relation of power was established – one that could not be reduced to mere domination of the people by the state: the new power relation that developed as a response to the demands of urbanization, centralization, capitalist and technological developments, was discipline, which was – and is – characterized by the fact that "[O]thers besides the state itself are enlisted into the processes of creating order, of providing incentives for certain kinds of behaviors, and of fostering new modes of cooperation between different agencies." (Lyon 2003: 106) Furthermore, "[W]ith or *without* the active involvement of state agencies, society as a whole and the individuals comprising it are subjected to intrusive, molding, disciplining, normalizing mechanisms accompanied by bodies of knowledge that create them,

[3] For more on this fascinating question, please see Foucault's famous debate with linguist Noam Chomsky in Davidson 1997, where the two intellectuals argued over questions of justice and power as they related to the existence or nonexistence of human nature. For an interesting analysis of this debate, please see Wilkin 1999.

justify their use, and continue to perfect them, all for the good of society." (Brass 2000: 317, my emphasis) Foucault's re-conceptualized power, then, is a modern power that is relational, changing, inter-dependent and dispersed. Because of such a working definition of power, "studies of governmentality are not sociologies of *rule*. They are studies of a particular 'stratum' of knowing and acting. Of the emergence of particular 'regimes of truth' concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of speaking truth, persons authorized to speak the truths, ways of enacting truths and the costs of so doing. Of the invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses and devices for exercising power and intervening upon particular problems. They are concerned, that is to say, with the conditions of possibility and intelligibility for certain ways of seeking to act upon the conduct of others, or oneself, to achieve certain ends. And their role is diagnostic rather than descriptive" (Rose 1999: 19, my emphasis). This is why the accusations meted out against President Bush have not resulted in change: they persist in dealing with *what* is being said and by *whom*, rather than *why* and *how*[4]. While it is certainly noteworthy to examine *what* legislative changes are being enacted under his presidency, it is, according to a diagnostic analysis of his administration's use of power, more telling to ask why *he* was successful in passing the same legislation that his predecessor attempted to put through but failed. According to Nikolas Rose, "[T]o diagnose – the verb form emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century – was not to locate an essence, but to establish a singularity or individuation within a whole set of relations by means of a work on symptoms. In an analogous fashion, genealogies of government seek to establish the singularity of particular strategies within a field of relations of truth, power and subjectivity by

[4] Please see my discussion on this misplaced focus in the conclusion of this thesis.

means of a work on symptoms." (Rose 1999: 57) It is by undertaking a genealogy of President Bush's regime and the society in which it has come 'to power' that we can "seek to reconstruct the problematizations to which programmes, strategies, tactics posed themselves as a solution. If policies, arguments, analyses and prescriptions purport to provide answers, they do so only in relation to a set of questions. Their very status as answers is dependent upon the existence of such questions." (Rose 1999: 58) It is therefore by understanding the functioning of modern, disciplinary society – in all its relations – that we can situate President Bush's regime of truth, and his use of these same disciplinary relations, to understand the 'symptoms' of his governance strategies and begin to appreciate the impact of what they signify for disciplinary society as a whole. What this thesis hopes to prove, in fact, is that the President's rule is so offensive to so many precisely because it demonstrates so vividly the functioning of democratic power, which is, in fact, not so democratic.

While I am in fact not writing a genealogy of the current regime of truth, rather writing an expose of its functioning, I find it useful to rely on Foucault's genealogical method – and its assumptions – as I find it provocative to use a "form of history that can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, and so on, without having to make references to a subject that is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history." (Foucault 1976: 118) A genealogy, in other words, "will never confuse itself with a quest for (…) "origins" (…) it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning" (Foucault 1997: 236), and

therefore a genealogical study of Bush's regime of truth is "not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself." (Foucault 1976: 133) The point to take note of in this case is not so much how true or false the President's regime of truth might be, but rather that in democracies, the government is perceived as being the repository of truth: regardless of the verity of Bush's regime, it is *made* true by his presidency. The utility of the genealogical method, and the reason that I find it so useful to rely on Foucault's texts making use of it, is that "[A]lthough genealogies are empirically based, they are inherently critical, unlike histories. Genealogies are motivated by normative commitments, and aim at changing specific aspects of present thought and action. They do so by undermining the self-evident character of the objects of genealogical inquiry (…) Showing the object of critique to be historically constituted is but a means to the end of problematizing it, allowing for its political destruction." (Berard 1999: 217) In the case of Bush's post-9/11 America, by problematizing the re-securitizing of the state as the answer to terrorism, "these grounds [of military security as *the* answer to terror] become visible, their limits and presuppositions are opened for interrogation in new ways." (Rose 1999: 58) Just as Foucault specified in *Discipline and Punish*, however, that he did not intend to write "the history of the different disciplinary institutions, with all their individual differences, I simply intend to map on a series of examples some of the essential techniques that most easily

spread from one to another" (1977: 139), so too do I specify that I do not intend to trace every aspect of the Bush regime of truth in its prosecution of the War on Terror – not only is this far too great a task to do here (if indeed it is possible at all), it is not necessary: It is sufficient to map those key societal relations that, *by their very relation to each other*, enable the President's mobilization of support and his maintenance of legitimacy.

While it is disingenuous to add the caveat that my mapping the functioning of President Bush's regime of truth does not take a conspiratorial perspective on the issue[5], it *is* important to note that my analysis is not hermeneutic: "It is not a question of decoding or interpreting a particular strategy to discover hidden motives, of critiquing a particular alignment of forces to identify class interests or of interpreting a particular ideology to discover the real objectives that lie behind it. Rather, arguments, strategies and tactics are analysed in their own terms, in terms of the identities and identifications which they themselves construct, objectives they set themselves, the enemies they identified, the alliances they sought, the languages and categories they used to describe themselves, the forms of collectivization and division that they enacted." (Rose 1999: 56)

Because "Foucault shifts our attention away from the grand, overall strategies of power, towards the many, localized circuits, tactics, mechanisms and effects through which power circulates – what Foucault calls the 'meticulous rituals' or the 'micro-

[5] Indeed, as Carol A. Stabile notes, to distance oneself from the conspiratorial is a defensive posture that "is counterproductive, particularly in the context of the United States, since it can force scholars to actually overlook evidence of cooperation and intentionality among the ruling classes. Despite evidence of intentionality, scholars engage in some odd contortions to avoid eliciting the dreaded pejorative of conspiracy theory." (2001: 267)

physics' of power" (Hall 1997: 50), my analysis – of the means by which the Bush administration has made use of dispersed societal relations of power to further cement the state's hold over such – centers around one such tactic: the use of a narrative of fear by the Bush administration in order to extend its control. Key to understanding this study's approach to the problem at hand is appreciating that by examining the dispersal of such a narrative – how it is propagated through society, by what means, for what ends, by whom, etc. – we are examining the functioning and dispersal of power across *all* levels of society instead of restricting it to the juridico-sovereign notions focused on the state and its institutions. This is done "[N]ot because power at these lower levels merely reflects or "reproduces, at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviour, the general form of the law or government" but, on the contrary, because such an approach "roots (power) in forms of behaviour, bodies and local relations of power which should not at all be seen as a simple projection of the central power."" (Foucault, in Hall 1997: 50) It is through such an understanding that we can appreciate that, contrary to popular opinion, President Bush is not strictly a war-mongering, power-hungry man who is destroying democracy by using fear to 'prop-up' his presidency; not only does this smack of illegitimacy (which is not my concern) it completely ignores the fact that *every* president has made use of fear to 'prop-up' his power, and in fact, every regime of truth (power) has vilified an 'Other' who comes to embody this fear. The recourse to narratives of fear is used across administrations because, as my analysis will show, it is an *efficient* and *convenient* way to support and extend *existing* networks of power and their institutions, and this

is done not for the sake of sheer power alone (although it certainly can be used for that), but rather for the sake of *increased disciplinarity*.

To say however, that fear has been a convenient tactic used by successive governments to extend discipline does not mean that there is *nothing* new about 9/11 and how the Bush administration is making use of it. While of course the scale of the terror, the speed with which the American administration responded to it, and the widely felt repercussions of the tragedy, are without precedence, two aspects of the events and their aftermath hint at the enormity of their impact: the first is that a new legitimacy has been awarded the government (and by this I mean the state as an institution rather than the Bush administration specifically), and with it more leeway and freedom to pursue tactics of governance; and the second, is that these tactics are perhaps no longer based in disciplinary mechanism, but rather in *control* strategies. This is where the present thesis distinguishes itself from the myriad of excellent texts written in the aftermath of 9/11: I do not claim that the current administration is *corrupting* the principles of democracy through either power, charisma, propaganda or circumstance, but rather I maintain that the *use* of such devices is *inherent* to the *proper* functioning of democracy in the modern, technological, capitalist system in which we find ourselves. I am not concerned with revealing the nefarious machinations of any specific administration in relation to the functioning of disciplinary society, but rather use the Bush administration's prosecution of the War on Terror because it is a particularly exploded version of what has been occurring for years. While there have been a great many texts written in the aftermath of 9/11

dealing with surveillance, governmental legitimacy, conspiracy, civil rights, terrorism, etc., the present paper does not pretend to replace or reproduce any of them, but rather intends to synthesize some key aspects of each analysis in order to reveal how they all play into – and are symptomatic of – the mechanisms used in democratic societies to establish, maintain, and extend disciplinary control in certain situations, and to reveal how such mechanisms involve complex negotiations of problems intrinsic to governance.

To those ends, Chapter One provides an overview of disciplinary society as understood by Foucault. A relational definition of power, rather than a juridico-sovereign notion restricting power to the games of 'great men', provides the framework for understanding the development of Western, capitalist societies as disciplinary. Chapter Two outlines those key societal relations (and institutions) of power whereby such discipline is maintained, which include, among others explained: hegemony, ideology, propaganda and the media. Chapter Three details the furthering of disciplinary aims through the mobilization of fear that is directed at an 'Other', and the manipulation of panic situations enabling the extension of the state's disciplinary gaze. Chapter Four briefly details the Oklahoma City bombing and its legislative fallout in order to set the stage for understanding the events of 9/11 and their aftermath, both in terms of their continuity with the past, and what they signify for the future we may already be in. I conclude this text with a discussion of that same future, and how 9/11 may be seen as 'the Event' which has entrenched disciplinary society in control strategies that it had long been incorporating.

This thesis by no means claims to be the definitive word on any of the subjects discussed herein. Rather, I flatter myself with thinking that I have written a synthesis of some of the key power relations that construct the social environment in which modern discipline shapes the general will. To borrow Foucault's eloquence, my intent has been but to "map on a series of examples some of the most essential techniques that most easily spread" (1977: 139) the disciplinary gaze of the state, in an attempt to establish that while it may be the *State's* gaze that spreads, it does so through *non*-state relations, and without anywhere near the degree of planning and control that is too often, conspiratorially, assigned to it. If the present text should cause any doubt as to the functioning and the reach of the state, or raise any questions as to how governance may be changed or is changing, then I should consider my attempt successful, all the while recognizing that it is but a single such attempt of many.

CHAPTER ONE

Michel Foucault specified, in one of his last texts called *The Subject and Power*, that the final objective of his studies had not been "to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations for such an analysis." (Foucault 1982: 326) Rather, his objective had been "to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects." (Foucault 1982: 326) To that end, he specified that, "it was necessary to expand the dimensions of a definition of power if one wanted to use this definition in studying the objectivizing of the subject." (Foucault 1982: 327) This "objectivizing of the subject" was important in that Foucault's study centered around the critical difference between the modern subject and that which had come before: the modern subject was the *object* of knowledge and of truth. Therefore to create a history of the modern subject was to know how he had been made the object of a knowledge that created a truth on which his own subjectivity was based.

The key to this enterprise was to understand how power had operated to create and maintain the modern subject, as well as how power acted to mask its workings from this same subject. Foucault's modern power differed significantly from more traditional conceptions, for these defined power as being exercised by a sovereign in a repressive, juridical manner. For Foucault, it was imperative to free power from such traditionally simple juridical definitions, as the formation and maintenance of the modern subject (as an object of knowledge) had not been dependent upon repressive, legalistic power, but rather was dependent upon the power relations inherent *in*, and

formative *of*, disciplinary society. While it is not my intent here to retrace the genealogy of the modern subject, it behooves me to make use of this same genealogy, and the re-conceptualization of power on which it is based, if I hope to prove that modern modes of governing - of maintaining the modern subject as an object of knowledge - establish a system which finds it always convenient to make use of fear as one of its many governmentalized technologies of power.

For Foucault then, juridico-sovereign notions of power that persistently held in the West were incompatible with modern reality: "In a society such as ours, where the devices of power are so numerous, its rituals so visible, and its instruments ultimately so reliable, in this society that has been more imaginative, probably, than any other in creating devious and supple mechanisms of power, what explains this tendency not to recognize the latter except in the negative and emaciated form of prohibition?" (Foucault 1978b: 86) Foucault considered that understanding two elements were essential to moving past a repressive conception of power and understanding its functioning in modern societies: the first, is the productive nature of power; and the second element, assuring the first, is that power is relational: "if we speak of the structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others. The term "power" designates relationships between partners." (Foucault 1982: 337) Consequently, "power" was neither "a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state," or "a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule." Neither was it "a general system of domination exerted by

one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body." Rather, "[T]he analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes." (Foucault 1978b: 92)

If "[T]he first requirement is that analyses avoid thinking of power as having a fixed form," (Butchart 1998: 32) and we concede that power "is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable[6]. The omnipresence of power (...) is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in relation from one point to another" (Foucault 1978b: 93), then we cannot but conclude that "[R]ather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to speak of an "agonism" – of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation." (Foucault 1982: 342) Following this initial concession to Foucault's re-conceptualization of power, rather than study institutions, or individuals, or documents said to embody power, all that is left for the analyst "is to identify how it *operates*." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 185, my emphasis)

The operation of power in modern societies, which for the sake of continuity of argument I shall contentiously define as being industrialized, Western

[6] As Erickson and Haggerty explain: "Forces consist of more primary and fluid phenomena and it is from such phenomena that power derives as it captures and striates such flows." (2000: 608-09)

democracies, did not function in a 'top-down' manner, as, according to Foucault, jurists would have us believe. Instead of power being vertically *imposed*, that is by a sovereign on an unwilling and repressed populace, Foucault conceived of power as being vertically and *horizontally* distributed, maintained and negotiated: "power (…) is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation." (Foucault 1978b: 93) Torben Bech Dyrberg, expert at the University of Roskilde in Denmark in questions of democracy, in his enlightening text called *The Circular Structure of Power*, rightfully takes the time to clarify what might otherwise seem a vague description of the functioning of power. According to him, "one has to differentiate between power *strategies* and the complex *strategical situation* as such. The latter is an overall effect – a description of an absent societal totality, that is, a whole which is present in its effects only – that cannot exist without the former and which, while equipping this while with form and content, also presupposes it." (Dyrberg 1997: 92, my emphasis) He continues to specify that "[P]ower strategies insert themselves in the complex strategical situation as the terrain which conditions them and which they at the same time 'make up'. Hence neither part is capable of determining the form and content of the other" (Dyrberg 1997: 93). As I shall discuss later, this reflects Foucault's 'rule of double conditioning,' whereby local practices find themselves reinforcing and reinforced by larger-scale hegemonic practices, and implies a plurality of aims and governing tactics by those governmentalized forces 'in power':

> "Centres of political deliberation and calculation have to act through the actions of a whole range of other authorities, and through complex technologies, if they are to be able to intervene upon the conduct of persons,

activities, spaces and objects far flung in space and time – in the street, the schoolroom, the home, the operating theatre, the prison cell. Such 'action at a distance' inescapably depends on a whole variety of alliances and lash-ups between diverse and competing bodies of expertise, criteria of judgement and technical devise that are far removed from the 'political apparatus' as traditionally conceived. This generates an intrinsic heterogeneity, contestability and mobility in practices for the government of conduct. This mobility and contestability is intensified by the fact that 'the State' is neither the only force engaged in the government of conduct nor the hidden hand orchestrating the strategies and techniques of doctors, lawyers, churches, community organizations, pressure groups, campaigning groups, groups of parents, citizens, patients, survivors and all those others seeking to act upon conduct in the light of particular concerns and to shape it to certain ends." (Rose 2000: 323)

Given this plurality of aims and variety of "alliances and lashups," the aim for the analyst of the operation of power is to "grasp how the plethora of local power relations coalesce into general ones, whereby they become imbricated in various institutions through hegemonic practices." (Dyrberg 1997: 106) Foucault termed this process of coalescing interests and practices 'the governmentalization of the state,' which consisted of "the invention and assembly of a whole array of technologies that connected up calculations and strategies developed in political centres to those thousands of spatially scattered points where the constitutional, fiscal, organizational

and judicial powers of the state connect with endeavours to manage economic life, the health and habits of the population, the civility of the masses and so forth." (Rose 1999: 18) Contrasting 'ruling' a state (in the Machiavellian sense) with 'governing' a state (in the Malthusian tradition), Foucault specified that, "[T]o govern a state will mean, therefore, to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods." (Foucault 1978a: 207)

According to Foucault, this new 'governmentalization of the state' resulted in the institutionalization of social relations, which became "elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions." (Foucault 1982: 345) While conceding that the modern state might today be the most important form of power, Foucault is careful to specify that this is precisely because all other forms of power relations refer to it. (*Ibid*) He is doubly careful to clarify that, "local strategies cannot operate unless they are articulated with general strategies, just as general strategies cannot function if they are not rooted in local ones." (Dyrberg 1997: 106) The reason for this interdependence, or this circularity of power, is that "the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations; and, further, because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already-existing power relations. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth." (Foucault 1976:

123) By stressing the superstructural nature of the modern state, "Foucault makes it possible to view the state as a strategic location in the political system – the terrain of power struggles which is at once an instrument and an outcome of these – which plays a crucial role in governing it, while at the same time being governed (…) The state can be seen as a dispersed unity whose cohesion is precarious because it is erected in power struggles which define its limits within society." (Dyrberg 1997: 109)

Foucault's point, and key to both his re-conceptualization of power and his genealogy of the modern, disciplinary society, is that as the realm and the power of the political does not rest solely in the state (and its institutions), but rather is dependent upon, is shaped by and helps to shape, those ubiquitous societal power relations that map out its terrain (Dyrberg 1997: 103), there is no discontinuity between the state and say, the school, or the family; they are not merely two different levels, one microscopic, one macroscopic, "but neither is there homogeneity (as if the one were only the enlarged projection or the miniaturization of the other)" (Foucault 1978b: 100). The relationship between the state and its composing parts is far more complicated than simple domination or mirroring: "The family does not duplicate society, just as society does not imitate the family. But the family organization, precisely to the extent that it was insular and heteromorphous with respect to the other power mechanisms, was used to support the great 'maneuvres' employed for [the] Malthusian control" (Foucault 1978b: 100).

To accept that there is no simple 'macro' and 'micro' binary in the governmentalization of societal power relations does not, however, answer the question of how "government" is realized. Nikolas Rose, Professor of Sociology at the University of London and longtime student of Foucault's texts, concludes that sets of relations, manners of thinking, methods of production, technologies of life and for reproducing life, in short, society (as a thought) "becomes governmental to the extent that it becomes technical, it attaches itself to a technology for its realization." (Rose 1999: 51) The technology of government then, "is an assemblage of forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation, vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgement, architectural forms, human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscription techniques and so forth, traversed and transected by aspirations to achieve certain outcomes in terms of the conduct of the governed (which also requires certain forms of conduct on the part of those who would govern)." (Rose 1999: 52) However, because modern society is not merely 'ruled' but rather 'governed,' and as such modern governance structures (like the state) are dependent upon those societal relations they govern, the assemblages of which Rose speaks "are heterogeneous, made up of a diversity of objects and relations linked up through connections and relays of different types. They have no essence. And they are never simply a realization of a programme, strategy or intention: whilst the will to govern traverses them, are not simply realizations of any simple will." (*Ibid*)

To attempt to understand how power can be exercised with specific aims and objectives, but without either having an overarching plan nor a planner, may seem cryptic. This is not, however, a question of esoteric philosophy. After all, "[P]eople know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what they do does." (Foucault, in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 187) The key to finding out 'what we do does' lies in the practices of government, the technologies used to pursue them, the tactics which embody such governance. Crucial to our locating our subjection in modern disciplinary circuits of power, and the role we *ourselves* play in this ongoing subjection, is exposing the rationality of power, which "is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power), tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems: the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them" (Foucault 1978b: 95). Consequently, we should not consider "the "modern state" as an entity which has developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns." (Foucault 1982: 334) It was in this shaping of the subject, in this establishing, maintenance and governing of pattern that the modern state differed from its predecessors.

According to Foucault, Guillaume de La Perrière's text on government, an anti-Machiavellian response to *The Prince* entitled *Miroir Politique*, held the insight that the rise of government in the 17th and 18th centuries had rested on the new distinction that government had to do not with questions of sovereignty *per se*, but rather that, "government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end"." (La Perrière, in Foucault 1978a: 208) According to Foucault, it was this focus on *things*, not *territory* that introduced economy into politics, and signified a change in meaning of the term. Where once 'economy' had "signified a form of government," in the 18th century it came to "designate a field of reality, a field of intervention," where 'things' were understood to mean "men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on." (Foucault 1978a: 208-09) Because government was charged with the disposition of "things arranged so as to lead to a convenient end," Foucault argued that this lead to a new plurality of aims of government, as the ends sought were 'convenient', rather than just, or equitable, or for the common good. (Foucault 1978a: 211) As many different 'things' were involved (men in *all* their relations), what was convenient for each might differ, requiring that government adopt *tactics* so as to achieve these desired 'convenient' ends. It was here that a new "economy" of power was established, based on "procedures that allowed the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted, and "individualized" throughout the entire social body. These new techniques are both much more efficient and much less wasteful (less costly economically, less risky in their results, less open to

loopholes and resistances)" (Foucault 1976: 120), than the previous methods used to establish and maintain power had been, such as the ostentatious display of sovereign authority seen in the public torture and execution of criminals.

Rather than government focusing on products, as it had in the mercantile economy, "the finality of government resides in *the things it manages* and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of *the processes it directs*" (Foucault 1978a: 211, my emphasis). Techniques of governing were now concerned with increasing the usefulness of individuals while "decreasing the inconveniences of the power which, in order to make them useful, must control them." (Foucault 1977: 220) Interestingly enough, Foucault specifies that the disciplines were a technology of power developed and pursued in industrialized, *capitalist* states: "the methods for administering the accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact, the two processes – the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital – cannot be separated." (Foucault 1977: 220) Government's new-found interest in the managing of processes lead to a new 'political anatomy', which "defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may *operate* as one wished, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines." (Foucault 1977: 138, my emphasis) Government's new focus on processes and efficiency was reflected in this emphasis on the operation of the population – how quickly tasks were completed by the workforce, how they might be

made to function more swiftly, what type of person was more suited to particular tasks in order to speed the whole process up, what were that type of person's characteristics, etc. However, if one wishes to govern questions of speed, efficiency and technique, one must be able to determine what they should be, or, put differently, "[T]o govern, it is necessary to render visible the space over which government is to be exercised." (Rose 1999: 36) It was in this context, of booming government and the development of capitalism, that was born the age of the 'expert', whose knowledge of the population, in *all* its relations, was to steer the gaze of power into all those demographic fields availing themselves to control: "[F]rom the eighteenth century, new intellectual techniques (political arithmetic, statistical survey) operating within new governmental institutions (bureaus of economic management, public health, social assistance, public education) began to transform government into a series of domain-specific 'problems' open to expert analysis." (Hunter, in Deacon 2002: 443)

It is important once more to distinguish between what a Western, juridico-sovereign notion of power implies for an understanding of knowledge, and how a Foucaultian approach differs. Foucault suggests that Western notions of power have supported a tradition "that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests." (Foucault 1977: 27) While many critics have labeled Foucault a truth-relativist for his staunch refusal to indulge in notions of objectivity and fact as conceptualized in the Enlightenment project[7], Foucault's

[7] I will address such critiques in Chapter 2.

insistence that "power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations," (*Ibid*) paves the way for an understanding that, "[T]he constitution of knowledge [*savoir*] of government is absolutely inseparable from that of a knowledge of all the processes related to population in its larger sense – that is, what we now call the economy." (Foucault 1978a: 217) New governing techniques arose from that greatest of nineteenth century innovations that was 'population' as a field of knowledge: "the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem" (Foucault 1978b: 25).

Recognizing that "through its shifts, customs, activities, and so on, population has specific economic effects," (Foucault 1978a: 216) governments perceived for the first time that they were not simply dealing with a people, nor even simply with a multitude, but with a *multiplicity of individuals*, a *population*, with all its "specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, states of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation." (Foucault 1978b: 25) It was this innovation – population – that enabled the functioning of a new kind of control in states witnessing the birth of a new kind of society: discipline, *ingrained* through various techniques (such as schooling), as well as *enforced* through various apparatuses (such as the police), was instituted in order to control this newly 'discovered' population. The net result of this control was the modern subject,

subject, as it were, to a new triumvirate of power: one composed of sovereignty-discipline-government.

The governmentalizing of the state was comprised of three things: "The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target *population*, as its principle form of knowledge *political economy*[8], and as its essential technical means *apparatuses of security*." (Foucault 1978a: 219, my emphasis) As previously discussed, government's new concern was with "the things it manages," and "the perfection and intensification of the processes it directs" (Foucault 1978a: 211). As such, government was concerned not only with production *rates*, but with production *itself*, and not only with the processes by which the population produced its material wealth (and therefore the state's material wealth), but how it reproduced itself (and therefore the state *in potentia*). According to Foucault, the state's new concern regarding population, and its regulation, centered around the question of sex[9]. Sex and reproduction were seen as being at the heart of the future wealth of the state, and so the study of demography allowed the state to take as its object of control that most intimate and personal of acts: "the sexual conduct of the population was taken both as an object of analysis and as a target of intervention." (Foucault 1978b: 26) The establishing of this new

[8] In fact, Foucault defines "political economy" as arising out of a "perception of new networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory, and wealth" (Foucault 1978a: 217).
[9] "At the heart of this economic and political problem of population was sex (…) Of course, it had long been asserted that a country had to be populated if it hoped to be rich and powerful; but this was the first time that a society had affirmed, in a constant way, that its future and its fortune were tied not only to the number and the uprightness of its citizens, to their marriage rules and family organization, but to the manner in which each individual made use of his sex." (Foucault 1978b: 25-6)

field of study ('population') lead to the breaking down of the field itself into sub-fields[10], each of which was to be studied, compartmentalized and compared, this in order to establish methods of control over them:

> "it is the population itself on which government will act either directly, through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly, through techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of population into certain regions or activities, and so on. The population now represents more the end of government than the power of the sovereign" (Foucault 1978a: 217).[11]

This extension of the state's new-found gaze into the private lives of its citizens marked the transition between the society of sovereignty and that of discipline[12]. According to Foucault, "[T]he historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation

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[10] It may be possible to read into Foucault's texts a certain inevitability of the expansion of power through knowledge: "knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised." (Foucault 1977: 204) Therefore, the field/concept in question, in this case population, is inherently infinitely divisible into equally knowable (and equally divisible) sub-fields – all that is required is the recognition that such a division is possible, and the circular structure of power-knowledge establishes itself over and through the newly 'discovered' field.

[11] Foucault continues the same passage, specifying that, "the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the government, aware, vis-à-vis of the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it." (Foucault 1978a: 217) In *Discipline and Punish*, he further clarifies that "[I]n becoming the target for new mechanisms of power, the body is offered up to new forms of knowledge. It is the body of exercise, rather than of speculative physics; *a body manipulated by authority*, rather than imbued with animal spirits." (Foucault 1977: 155, my emphasis) I will later demonstrate that this is not as Orwellian a situation as it may initially appear.

[12] While I may seem to speak of this transition from sovereignty to discipline as being clear, as issuing from a break with history, it is important to remember that the 'invention' of the political anatomy of discipline was not instantaneous: "It is rather a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method." (Foucault 1977: 138) As Alexander Butchart clarifies, "[D]espite these clear distinctions between sovereignty and discipline, their operation is never mutually exclusive (…) the shift from sovereignty to discipline has been one of emphasis." (1998: 30)

of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely." (Foucault 1977: 137-38) The point that is important to retain is that discipline is a *relation* that seeks not to *dominate* its subjects, but rather to *increase their utility*. As such, it is neither an institution, nor an apparatus, nor an authority or privilege that one is endowed with. Rather, discipline "is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology." (Foucault 1977: 215) In its quest[13] to render its subjects more useful, disciplinary power (and disciplinary technology) works to organize an 'analytical space' (Foucault 1977: 142) in which comparison is made possible: comparison between individuals, techniques, methods, materials, etc. Disciplinary technology works to distribute bodies in space, so as to make possible the drawing of distinctions, the establishing of hierarchies, the compartmentalization of acts and activities, all in the name of efficiency. If the great discovery of government was population, the great discovery of discipline was *time*[14]: just as the study of demography revealed a

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[13] Here I must be careful not to encourage or perpetuate the personification of power and discipline; too often one hears about 'The Market' doing this or that, or about what 'Those In Power' are doing, etc. These statements are misleading and mask from their subjects their nature as *relations*; to speak of 'Those In Power' removes from citizens any possibility of action, and this is ultimately incompatible with a Foucaultian notion of power, as I shall I address later. For this view, I am indebted to Torben Bech Dyrberg's 1997 text, *The Circular Structure of Power*, particularly his chapter on 'Power, Identity and Political Authority', pp. 85-116.

[14] Notions of 'discovery' for the student of Foucault are extremely problematic, as Roger Deacon demonstrates with a concrete example of such 'discovery': "[T]he banal, the commonplace, the mundane, the customary – in short, everyday life – did not exist pre-modernity, waiting only to be 'discovered', but was an analytical product of emerging disciplinary technologies" (Deacon 2002: 444). It is perhaps better to speak of emergence, or discontinuity, as 'discovery' implies an archaeology of events and conceptions that are linear in evolution, but are circular in logic, and serve self-legitimizing functions, as explained by Dyrberg: "the *constitution* of identity retroactively takes the form of its *excavation*: the fundamental reversal points to the imaginary objectification of becoming, which, by turning ability into a fictitious object – an essence construed as a key to the truth of oneself and the societal order – can serve as a pole of identification rooted in an unattainable mythical origin which can function as a ground for the subject." (1997: 98, emphasis in original) The

population whose component elements could be further broken down into fields of equally intrusive study (fertility, sexual habits, diet, etc.), the disciplines established "the principle of a theoretically ever-growing use of time: exhaustion rather than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces." (Foucault 1977: 154) It is here that Foucault's logic in tying discipline to capitalism becomes crystal-clear: "The technology of discipline linked the production of *useful and docile individuals* with the production of *controlled and efficient populations*." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 193, my emphasis) Discipline, formerly considered in the monastic sense (as renunciation), came to mean seriation; disciplinary technology functions in society as the assembly line does in Fordist factories: everything in its space, and every space in use, with maximum use the goal: "The disciplinary methods reveal a linear time whose moments are integrated, one upon another, and which is oriented towards a terminal, stable point; in short, an 'evolutive' time. But it must be recalled that, at the same moment, the administrative and economic techniques of control reveal a social time of a serial, orientated, cumulative type: the discovery of an evolution in terms of 'progress'." (Foucault 1977: 160) It is this seriation, this dividing of time and space that allows for those very comparisons (between individuals working side by side on the factory floor, between techniques used in different factories, between different layouts for factory assembly-lines, etc.) that lead to ever-increasing seriation: "The 'seriation' of successive activities makes possible a whole investment of duration of

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'discovery' of population or of time then naturalizes the uses it might serve for the current regime of power, which has but to say that it 'discovered' such a concept *as is* rather than constructing it and making it function for that regime's ultimate ends. Therefore, by 'discovery' here I mean the emergence or fabrication of a particular *use* of the notion of time, a use that developed with the modern State.

power: the possibility of a detailed control and a regular intervention (of differentiation, correction, punishment, elimination) in each moment of time; the possibility of characterizing, and therefore of using individuals according to the level in the series that they are moving through" (*Ibid*).

While the example of the factory is instructive in its highly visual nature, it is important to note that such seriation was not only adopted by means of production of material objects: discipline was a technology of power made use of by the newly governmentalized state in order to render individuals docile and useful. To that end, seriation of time was a tactic used broadly throughout society to maximize use of time and comparison across both time and space (comparing the individual to his previous attempt at any given task, and to his colleague attempting that same task). In army barracks, in hospitals, in schools, this same seriation of time allowed for both implicit and explicit comparisons to be drawn[15], and such seriation and comparison established the notion of *exercise*. Where once apprenticeship had been the education norm, endless exercise and examination took its place: "It is this disciplinary time that was gradually imposed on pedagogical practices – specializing the time of training and detaching it from the adult time, from the time of mastery (…) qualifying individuals *according to the way in which they progress through these series.*" (Foucault 1977: 159, my emphasis) The passage from series to series was marked by this repetition of task known as *exercise*:

[15] See Foucault's 1977 *Discipline and Punish*, particularly his chapter on 'Docile Bodies' pp.135-70, for a more lengthy discussion than I can offer here of the development and integration throughout society of disciplinary tactics (seriation of time, exercise, examination, etc.).

> "Exercise is that technique by which one imposes on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different, but always graduated. By bending behaviour towards a terminal state, exercise makes possible a perpetual characterization of the individual either in relation to this term, in relation to other individuals, or in relation to a type of itinerary. It thus assures, in the form of continuity and constraint, a growth, an observation, a qualification." (Foucault 1977: 161)

The functioning of exercise, and the determination of its success or failure, was facilitated by perhaps the ultimate disciplinary tactic: the time-table. Facilitating the portioning of time and the comparison of individuals within that time, the time-table was widely adopted and used throughout eighteenth century as "both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge." (Foucault 1977: 148) Used in schools (in the dedicating of block-periods for certain subjects, for example), in hospitals (in the establishing of rounds schedules and visiting hours), and in the army (in the ordering of basic training – another modern innovation thanks to the 'discovery' of time), the time-table functioned by establishing rhythms, imposing activity, and regulating cycles of repetition. (Foucault 1977: 149) It was such tactics that Foucault considered were "no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice," citing that it was such tactics that constituted discipline as an "art of constructing, with located bodies, coded activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated combination" (Foucault 1977: 167).

The ready adoption (and adaptation) of such tactics by all of society's institutions, from the school and the university, to the police and the army, to the hospital and the asylum, spread the operation of the disciplines throughout society as a whole, making all such institutions "in effect, handmaidens of the state." (Brass 2000: 310) The modern individual, subject to such vast intrusion and calculation, was manufactured, was *made subject* by three procedures, which Foucault specified "were and *are*" central to the manufacture (and maintenance) of the modern individual: "hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and the examination. These terms are significant in that each hints simultaneously at an *exercise of power* (hierarchy; judgment; testing) and a *formation of knowledge* (observation; normalization; evaluation)." (Deacon 2002: 448, my emphasis)

While schools and hospitals perhaps *made use* of hierarchical observation in order to evaluate their charges, Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon* can be seen as the architectural *embodiment*[16] of a disciplinary power that eventually came to pervade all societal institutions, from the prison, to the army, to the school, and even to the

[16] "This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly located, examined and distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead – all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism." (Foucault 1977: 197) In this section of his text, Foucault makes clear not only how the Panopticon is the embodiment of disciplinary power, but also how this panoptic relation might be applied to other social situations, such as the management of those differences between the living, the sick and the dead (the hospital, the asylum, even today's nursing homes are exemplary of such division and supervision). Erickson and Haggerty clarify that the panopticon was "[M]ore than a simple device for observation, [it] worked in conjunction with explicitly articulated behavioural norms as established by the emerging social sciences in efforts to transform the prisoner's relation to him or herself." (2000: 607)

family.[17] Just as disciplinary techniques were designed to increase the efficiency of the population, the eighteenth century prison was designed by Bentham as a more efficient means of detention than the dungeon had been[18]; the architectural design of the prison[19] allowed for its major effect, that which distinguished it from other methods of punishment: the Panopticon induced in the inmate "a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power," and arranged things so that "the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its

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[17] See Foucault's *History of Sexuality* (1978b) for discussion on the conditioning and the role of the family in modern society, particularly his chapter on 'Domain', pp. 103-14.

[18] Since Foucault makes no mention in his discussion on Bentham's Panopticon of how the panoptic prison might be part of the 'corrective' detention that he specifies is now characteristic of the industrial system (see especially pp. 24-25 of *Discipline and Punish*), we are therefore left to presume that panoptic detention results not only in an inmate's disciplining while detained, but that behavior changes in the inmate are longer lasting and instill in the inmate a habit of discipline that he retains when rejoining society. Foucault does, however, indicate how the panoptic prison is reflective of those greater disciplinary concerns in society, namely those of increasing the utility and efficiency of the population: "How will power, by increasing its forces, be able to increase those of society instead of confiscating them or impeding them? The Panopticon's solution to this problem is that the productive increase of power can be assured only if, on the one hand, it can be exercised continuously in the very foundations of society, in the subtlest possible way, and if, on the other hand, it functions outside these sudden, violent, discontinuous forms that are bound up with the exercise of sovereignty." (Foucault 1977: 208) It is because of this self-discipline (whether ingrained through society's disciplinary institutions or imposed by detention under the panoptic gaze) that power can throw off its ostentatious displays that destroy the population (its individuals) rather than increasing their utility: "He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility to the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. By this very fact, the external *power may throw off its physical weight*; it tends to be non-corporal" (Foucault 1977: 202-03, my emphasis).

[19] As I am making reference to Foucault's study of the adaptation of the Panoptic prison principle, a description of Bentham's prison is perhaps required in order to make clear the surveillance engendered by such technology, whether it be through panoptic architecture, as in a bank, a school or through cctv (closed circuit television) surveillance, or through panoptic relations, such as the modern use of searchable computer databases, EFTPOS (electronic funds transfer at point of sale), and even passports, etc. (Rose 1999: 241) Bentham's Panopticon, then, consists of an annular building divided into cells. Each cell is visible only to the tower piercing the center of the building, not to its neighbouring cells. The cells are backlit by virtue of having exterior windows, and it is through such backlighting that the supervisor in the central tower can watch the inmates' activities. However, the inmates can never verify that they are being watched, only that the tools of their watching are always visible to them. As such, they are always under surveillance, either from the supervisor in the central tower, or through their own responsibility for watching their behavior, which they cannot help but assume through their uncertainty of being watched. The whole is an example of anticipatory compliance.

actual exercise unnecessary." (Foucault 1977: 201) Because of the architectural design of the prison, the inmates are "caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers." (*Ibid*)

The Panopticon was not, therefore, "the essence of power, as some have taken it to be, but a clear example of how power operates." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 188) Even though the Panopticon was an architectural example of disciplinary power, panopticism *as a relation*, "is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons." (Foucault 1977: 205) Panopticism, as a relation, was not simply "a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making power relations function in a function, and of making a function function through these power relations." (Foucault 1977: 207) Panopticism, as a disciplinary relation, was "polyvalent in its applications." (Foucault 1977: 205) The great strength of panoptic technology, and indeed, why it was adopted by, and incorporated in, so many institutions is the same reason why the time-table and its ever-increasing division of time appealed to so many of the same institutions: it made possible the making of distinctions, the drawing of conclusions, the establishing of hierarchies. Whether panoptic distinction is applied to the prison, the classroom, or the barracks, "[I]n each of its applications, it makes it possible to perfect the exercise of power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the number of those who exercise it,

while increasing the number of those on whom it is exercised," and consequently, "[B]ecause it is possible to intervene at any moment and because the constant pressure acts even before the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed," (Foucault 1977: 206) "the potential of monitoring induces anticipatory compliance with norms and targets." (Rose 1999: 244) In the frightening (and increasingly accurate?) view of the future that George Orwell offers in *1984*, his readers make it but three pages into the text before witnessing 'anticipatory compliance' at work:

> "There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork (…) You had to live – did live, from habit that became instinct – in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized." (Orwell 1977: 3)

A modern-day, pop-culture example of such panoptic technology at work (and discipline's internalized psychological effects) is perfectly illustrated in the 1995 film *Clerks*. Dante, the clerk in question, sits unseen on the floor behind his convenience store counter, with his girlfriend Veronica, having left money on the counter for customers to make change with for their purchases:

> [sound of person dropping coins on pile on counter]
>
> Dante [yelling over counter]: Thanks.
>
> Veronica: How much money d'you leave up there?

Dante: Only like three dollars in mixed change and a couple singles. This time of the morning people just get paper or coffee.

Veronica: You're trusting.

Dante: Why d'you say that?

Veronica: How do you know they're taking the right amount of change, or even paying for what they take?

Dante: *Theoretically, people see money on the counter, no one around: they think they're being watched.*

Veronica: *Honesty through paranoia*? (Mosier and Smith 1995: my emphasis)[20]

It is this panopticism-as-relation that is reflected in Foucault's assertion that one sees "the spread of disciplinary procedures, not in the form of enclosed institutions, but as centres of observation disseminated throughout society." (Foucault 1977: 212) Formal institutions, such as the school, the hospital and the army, become obvious examples of panoptic technology, with their time-tables and task-specific rooms. The anticipatory compliance of their subjects is reflected in the child who does not misbehave under the watchful eye of his schoolmaster, or the psychiatric patient who takes his medications under the gaze of both nurse and guard, or the soldier who obeys his intimidating sergeant. Less obvious than these formal, physical sites of institutional discipline are those that slip into everyday experience much more subliminally, yet remain sites of 'policed obligatory access points' (Rose 2000: 327)

[20] Transcribed by myself, November 28th, 2003.

for service or inclusion just the same. In this sense, "[O]ne of the earliest and most powerful of the techniques invented in the modern age that exemplifies the integral relationship between power and knowledge is the examination." (Brass 2000: 307-08)

In his fascinating study entitled *The Anatomy of Power*, psychologist Alexander Butchart examines the construction of the African body under a European, colonial gaze. The findings of his research are startling in that they reveal that, just as "[V]isibility is a trap" (Foucault 1977: 200) for the prisoner of the Panopticon, "the examination is that 'tiny operational schema', so widely spread from psychiatry to education, and from the diagnosis of disease to the hiring of labour, that every member of the population must at some time participate in its ritual and so be recruited into the wider disciplinary network that this most nodal form of surveillance enables." (Butchart 1998: 29) By the very nature of its unavoidability, the examination submits a necessarily acquiescent, though not necessarily *aware*, subject to a disciplinary gaze that, by its "procedure of recording, the power of inscription by which the identity and attributes of the individuals it fabricates are traced in a network of writing (or computer databases) that captures and fixes them in a permanent analytic space."[21] (*Ibid*) It is "in fusing the power of surveillance with its documentary techniques of notation, registration and filing," that "the examination 'makes each individual a case … a case which at one and the same time constitutes an

[21] Butchart further comments that it is "the flexibility of the examination" that makes it "the quintessential disciplinary device, a compact and portable Panopticon that requires no walls, towers or guards for its successful operation, and which through its properties of recording can interlink every point in the disciplinary regime to every other, so making the distribution of power continuous and autonomous of any 'control centre'." (Butchart 1998: 30) The implications of this sort of rhizomatic expansion and linking of disciplinary technologies (such as the examination) will be further examined in later chapters of this text, particularly in the conclusion.

object of knowledge and hold for a branch of power'." (Foucault, in Butchart 1998: 29-30) The compartmentalizing of individuals in the Panopticon can be seen as analogous to the compartmentalization of information learned about individuals through the examination[22]: it is this breaking down of the individual into his constituting elements, the making of his individuality into a 'case' (a data stream) as we shall later see, that submits the individual to disciplinary intervention, just as Panoptic segregation and the breaking down of time facilitate differentiative, corrective, punitive, eliminatory intervention.

As a data-stream, the individual loses some of his independence and his cohesion as an individual, rather becoming manipulable variables: "As a citizen, the individual operates within a framework that allows him, within restrictions, to adopt a multiplicity of attitudes, opinions, actions, and activities, and even to change them. *As a case, however, he is pinpointed, defined, classified.* His attitudes and opinions become not expressions of a political right or duty, but bases for making a judgment about him and whether the techniques of a body of knowledge or law need to be applied to him in order to train, correct, normalize, or exclude him from society." (Brass 2000: 308-09, my emphasis)

It is worth restating at this point that any analysis of the disciplinary technologies of modern society "should not ascribe to them some hidden or covert purpose of function of totalitarian control (…) Panopticism did not model a

[22] Indeed, Butchart specifies that "[T]he examination is analogous to a cell of the Panopticon, and is therefore a functional site that transforms the economy of visibility into the exercise of power." (1998: 29)

dominating totalitarian society: it was a diagram of a mode of power that sought to induce a certain relation of human beings to themselves. Discipline (…) was not a means of producing terrorized slaves without privacy, but self-managing citizens capable of conducting themselves in freedom, shaping their newly acquired 'private lives' according to norms of civility, and judging their conduct accordingly." (Rose 1999: 242) The disciplines did not have as 'their'[23] goal an accumulation of power itself (as though there were such a thing), rather the strengthening of social forces[24], which seemed to necessitate intimate knowledge of those same forces for corrective intervention[25]. It is therefore imperative for an understanding of the (necessity and) functioning of disciplinary technologies in society, such as the examination, to comprehend that they do not form the tools for a totalitarian power of an omnipresent and omniscient state: "control practices of identification that *do not* principally involve the tentacles of the state are spreading across everyday life. The securitization of identity is dispersed and disorganized. Problems of the individualization of the citizen have formed in a whole variety of sites and practices – of consumption, of finance, of police, of health, of insurance – *to which securitization of identity can appear as a solution* (…) The image of control by totalizing surveillance is misleading. Control is better understood as operating through

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[23] Again, I am not personifying discipline and power, but using a grammatical tool for expedience's sake.

[24] See Foucault 1977: 207-08.

[25] "the clinical sciences and practices of criminology, public health, medicine, and psychiatry flourished and entrenched themselves at the same time as did the democratizing movements that followed the French Revolution. Further, they became, in some respects, handmaidens to new systems of authority – first the centralizing absolutist state, then the democratizing state – that required detailed knowledge of their individual subjects/citizens to govern according to what were conceived as the new requirements of proper governance. These requirements included new systems of public health, means of keeping track of populations moving from the country to the city, means of detecting criminal elements in vast urban conglomerations, and so forth." (Brass 2000: 309)

conditional access to circuits of consumption and civility." (Rose 2000: 326, my emphasis) However, as these *ad hoc* extensions of the disciplinary gaze spread into more and more aspects of individual life and experience, as these extensions appear as necessary 'solutions' to societal problems, the assemblages formed by these various disciplinary technologies (the examination being but one) "enwrap each individual (…) in a web of incitements, rewards, current sanctions and forebodings of future sanctions which serve to enjoin each citizen to maintain particular types of control over their conduct. These assemblages (…) in policing the obligatory access points to the practices of inclusion (…) inescapably generate novel forms of exclusion." (Rose 2000: 327) The modern psychological examination alarmingly exemplifies such exclusion, as the psych exam "certifies not only competence but *normality*." (Brass 2000: 308, my emphasis) It is in this sense that the modern examination demonstrates the culling implied in the normalizing judgment of the disciplines: the power of the disciplinary examination is made evident when "it is exercised to define a person's place in society in relation to a scheme of knowledge that claims to know the difference between the normal and the pathological, the neurotic and the psychotic, the antisocial being and the civil being." (*Ibid*)

The *coup de grace* of the modern state is that such categories as the 'neurotic and the psychotic' are modern, disciplinary constructions, which this same state must then take hold of. The extension of the state's gaze into demography 'discovered' (that is to say *made*) categories where there had been none before: a perfect example of this is described in *History of Sexuality* when Foucault states that whereas "[T]he

sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species." (1978b: 43) It is in technologies such as the examination that we can see the extension of that modern mode of governing called discipline into all fields of knowledge: "the advance of bio-power is contemporary with the appearance and proliferation of the very categories of anomalies – the delinquent, the pervert, and so on – that technologies of power and knowledge were supposedly designed to eliminate. The spread of normalization operates through the creation of abnormalities which it then must treat and reform." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 195-96)[26] The state therefore gives itself an increasingly wider field of objects over which it has control, supposedly to normalize them in the aim of efficiency[27]: "The technology of discipline linked the production of *useful and docile individuals* with the production of *controlled and efficient populations*." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 193, my emphasis) In the disciplinary regime, then, punishment is aimed "neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It brings five quite distinct operations into play …

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[26] "Individuals whose tendencies threatened to move them off the normal curve required care, healing, treatment to restore them to the normal range. Those who fell beyond the normal curve faced confinement in asylum or prison. The reigning term for the treatment rendered in some of these institutions became "correction"." (Brass 2000: 310) It is at this point in the developing of modern penality that the term 'correctional facility' becomes popular. Please see Foucault's chapter on 'The Body of the Condemned' in Foucault 1977, particularly pp. 24-25.

[27] The brilliance of the circular nature of such a disciplinary regime is that as it discovers (creates) more categories (fields of knowledge) over which it must establish normalizing control, in the establishing of such control it discovers new fields, *ad infinitum*, exponentially widening its field of intervention and the technologies to which it must resort to solve the 'problem' of such categories: "Political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science. (…) When there was resistance, or failure to achieve its stated aims, this was construed as further proof of the need to reinforce and extend the power of the experts. A technical matrix was established. By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem. Once this matrix was established, the spread of bio-power was assured, for there was nothing else to appeal to; any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present merely technical problems. *We are promised normalization and happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies more of the same*." (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 196, my emphasis)

[it] compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*." (Foucault, in Deacon 2002: 448, emphasis in original)

In the modern, disciplinary society in which Foucault contends we now live, "we have become subjects of study, who both exercise and submit to power relations, and who are also "constituted as moral subjects of our own actions," beings possessed of knowledge that gives us power, subjects us to power, and makes us responsible in particular ways for what we do. This knowledge subjects us to discipline to ensure that we do not deviate from the normal curve, and subjects us to sanction, treatment, or punishment when we depart from it." (Foucault, in Brass 2000: 313)

While Foucault so eloquently surmises that "normalizing society has turned out to be a powerful and insidious form of domination" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 198), it behooves us to remember that 'power' and 'discipline' do not have their own agendas; they are *relations*, not individuals, not institutions, not privileges, and as such no one 'owns' them or 'controls' them, but rather one *makes use* of them and *exercises* them, and one *functions within* them. They are therefore not synonymous with the state, as Foucault reinforces: "Yet it would be wrong to believe that the disciplinary functions were confiscated and absorbed once and for all by a state apparatus." (Foucault 1977: 215) Indeed, the strength of the disciplinary society, and the root of its insidious nature, lies in the fact that "the disciplinary modality of power has (not) replaced all others; [but] because *it has infiltrated the others*, sometimes undermining them, but serving as the intermediary between them, linking them

together, extending them and above all making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements. *It assures an infinitesimal distribution of the power relations.*" (Foucault 1977: 216, my emphasis) Just as we must always remember that the state does not omnisciently lord over its citizens, but is rather made up of and makes up its citizens in all their relations, neither do the disciplines stand in exteriority to the citizens over whom, within whom, and through whom, disciplinary power is exercised: "the disciplines have to bring into play the power relations, not above but *inside* the very texture of the multiplicity, as discretely as possible, as well articulated on the other functions of these multiplicities and also in the least expensive way possible: to this correspond anonymous instruments of power, coextensive with the multiplicity that they regiment, such as hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration, perpetual assessment and classification. In short, to substitute for a power that is manifested through the brilliance of those who exercise it, *a power that insidiously objectifies those on whom it is applied*" (Foucault 1977: 220).

It is by specifying that disciplinary power functions rhizomatically throughout society rather than being vertically imposed upon society, that Foucault draws attention to the internalized practices of governing, to the policing of the self that occurs in disciplined individuals. This disciplining of individuals occurs not only through the various state institutions and public services that are central to the dispersion of the panoptic gaze, but through the modern subject's conception of the self grounded in what constitutes the social, and how one may gain access to the

social (through circuits of inclusion). This includes "[H]ow to live without neurotic fears and anxieties, how to follow a diet for bodily health, how to achieve sexual satisfaction, all these goals for a good life lead to an array of individual practices that affect our relations with others and that draw us into games of normalization, in which we determine who among us are truly fit, healthy, and happy." (Brass 2000: 318) It is by "not reducing political authority to legitimate authority in its centralized locations," that Foucault "paves the way for comprehending how power is politically authorized in all sorts of institutional settings where human beings are turned into subjects – institutions which cut across the distinctions between the political and the social, and the public and the private." (Dyrberg 1997: 87) It is through such rhizomatic authorizations of power and functioning of discipline that we may come to understand that "[M]ajor dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations." (Foucault 1978b: 94)

By focusing on the role that the state has had to play in the extension of disciplinary power, studies of power have focused only on those conspicuous sites of the exercise of power, such as the state, the prison, the police, and in doing so have failed to recognize that "[T]here are two meanings of the word "subject": subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to." (Foucault 1982: 331) Disciplinary control is therefore not only *imposed*, but is also *ingrained*. After all, "power relations become more effective the more they infiltrate into everyday life, as they shift from being externally imposed to

being internally invoked, from being authoritarian to being participatory, and from acting primarily upon bodies to acting in addition and more particularly upon souls and actions" (Deacon 2002: 450-51). We are conditioned through everyday experience to disciplinary control. This isn't as Orwellian as it sounds; if we think of gender construction, key to the modern conception of self, discipline (indoctrination to acceptance of one's gender) begins as early as birth: boys get blue blankets and trucks, girls get pink blankets and dolls. Later, there are separate gym classes, health classes and 'life-skills' classes: girls take home-economics and boys take shop class. *Systemic and constant* reinforcing of socially constructed gender roles results in the construction of gendered individuals, making them 'sexed' subjects who know the definite characteristics, physical and behavioral, of their genders. Anything 'other' is anomaly requiring normalization, either through corrective treatment or through incorporation into the canon of the acceptable[28].

The notion of time, key to instilling discipline, is a perfect example of how conceptions of discipline as solely imposed by an external force are insufficient in trying to come to terms with the persistence of modern modes of governing. For example, people do not often consider their wristwatches as disciplinary mechanisms ensuring their normalized behavior, but as succinctly put by Nikolas Rose, while "[T]he bell, the time-table, the whistle at the end of the shift manage time externally,

[28] "It is evident from much of Foucault's writing, though not always directly, that he mistrusted many of the contemporary movements that appeared to challenge existing modes of governance. Many such movements, in fact, that spring up from the marginal sectors of the population simply demand that they themselves be integrated into the normalizing frameworks of contemporary society." (Brass 2000: 318) For example, the recent transgender challenge to the binary system of gender, where one is forcible male or female, has resulted in yes, a new category being recognized and the identity of a group of persons being accepted, but it is still a *category* to be known, studied, and analyzed. There are simply three categories now, and the disciplinary *concept* of category remains intact.

disciplinarily", "[T]he beeping wristwatch, the courses in time management and the like inscribe the particular temporalities into the comportment of *free citizens* as a matter of their *self-control*." (Rose 1999: 31, my emphasis)

As technological innovation progresses and we, as a society, find better and more efficient ways to 'cut up' time, it is inevitable, *given the development of the disciplines and modern modes of governing thus far*, that not only will those governing institutions of discipline (the school, the army, the state) find better ways to take hold of their subjects, but modern subjects themselves will incorporate such disciplining techniques as a matter of conditioning: "Every technology also requires the inculcation of a form of life, the reshaping of various roles for humans, the little body techniques required to use the devices, new inscription practices, the mental techniques required to think in terms of certain practices of communication, the practices of the self oriented around the mobile telephone, the word processor, the World Wide Web and so forth." (Rose 1999: 52)[29] These same technological innovations – the cell phone, the Web, the palm pilot, the GPS, etc. – will provide nodal points of communication for other networks of disciplinary intervention *already in use* by the state and its various institutions. The disciplinary technology of power is one that allows for "new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by *technique*, not by law but by *normalization*, not by punishment but by

[29] For a fascinating discussion on how technological innovation reshapes societal roles and expectations, please see Taylor's 1988 article, "Life Sentence: The Politics of Housework". Taylor discusses the staggering fact that housewives, despite the plethora of time-saving and labour-reducing cleaning products and devices now available on the market, actually spend *twice* as much time housecleaning now than they did half a century ago, and this because of changing standards: the modern household must be spotless and germ-free, not simply orderly. The author discusses the creation of the 'housewife', and the reinforcing of her role in the home and in society through a discourse of 'woman-as-caregiver' emanating from both the religious and scientific communities.

control, methods that are employed on *all levels* and in forms that go *beyond* the state and its apparatus." (Foucault 1978b: 89, my emphasis) Fear is one such method of power used by disciplinary regimes because, just like the concept of population, it creates categories where none before existed, and as such allows the extension of the disciplinary gaze into these new areas, about which is required intimate knowledge in order to render them manageable. To render such dangerous categories normalized, the population, already conditioned as disciplined individuals, accepts these new intrusions, which are, after all, for their own good.

CHAPTER TWO

If it can be agreed upon that modern modes of governing – those which work to maintain the modern subject as an object of knowledge and therefore of intervention – work through disciplinary technologies of power, such as the school, the army, and the factory, to indoctrinate in the modern subject self-disciplining tendencies, the question is now how this indoctrination, this *conditioning*, proceeds outside of what Deleuze called Foucault's "vast spaces of enclosure" (Deleuze); outside the molding environment of the classroom, or the lecture hall, or the barracks, how is the people's anticipatory compliance to be maintained? Without Big Brother's telescreens assuring adherence to doctrine, how is the people's internalization of discipline to be assured? My contention is that the evolution[30] of the modern state, which has grown up alongside capitalism and technology, has resulted in a system which finds it efficient to make use of fear, whether by design or opportunity, as one of its tactics of power, that is to say, as one of the methods it finds convenient to use in establishing its hold over an ever-widening field of areas of subjecthood. In short (and grossly oversimplified), one of the ways the modern state disciplines its citizens is through fear.

This point, that the state makes use of fear to control its population, might be moot if an autocratic state were the subject of inquiry, but it is not. History has well shown that tyrannical societies may make use of fear to pacify their citizens, as with Stalin's Soviet Union, Pinochet's Argentina, Allende's Chile or Pol Pot's Cambodia,

[30] No value judgment is implied here by using the term 'evolution', by which I mean 'development' rather than 'progress'.

to name but a few, but it is less well understood that democracies make use of fear as well. Democratic governments, while perhaps not having access to death squads and thought police *per se*, make use of fear in such a way that certain modes of thinking and of rationale are unavailable for public consideration and have effectively been barred from public debate, without the public ever being aware of it. My aim however is not to necessarily illustrate *what* is excluded from public debate, although certainly this is important, but rather *why* it is excluded, and *how* this is accomplished. While the methods of tyrannical and democratic governmental control might differ, the ends are the same in that they result in a *self-disciplined* populace obeying its government. If I contend that discipline is a technology of (democratic, capitalist) modern power and fear its tactic, then to analyze fear is to analyze modern governance, "to start by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques." (Rose 1999: 20)

However, because Foucault asserted power's relational nature, and as such insisted that analyses of power "not assume the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination [as] given at the outset," rather that these were "only the terminal forms power takes" (Foucault 1978b: 92), Foucault was extremely suspicious of movements seeking emancipation from the state's disciplinary control: "He thought that the exclusive focus by revolutionary and ideological movements on state powers in modern liberal states diverted our gaze from the everyday practices of state and social service institutions and of our own

docility in relation to those practices." (Brass 2000: 317-18) As stated by Dyrberg, "[Foucault's] stress upon the intertwined nature of power and knowledge means that every attempt to endow power with a certain identity, form or manifestation cannot but be immanent in the power game itself, which is why discourses *on* power cannot but also be discourses *of* power." (Dyrberg 1997: 98, emphasis in original) Perhaps the most interesting notion raised by these questions is the understanding that modern power, diffuse through governance techniques and technologies (as we have seen in the school, the factory, etc.), has made use of fear to concentrate itself in that apparatus that has been considered, by some, to be the locus and embodiment of power: the state. What is interesting to note about this seemingly obvious conclusion is that the state accomplishes this concentration of *dispersed* societal power by making use of and taking advantage of *equally dispersed methods and means* facilitated by modern society's functioning. Here we may recall Foucault's caveat to his conception of power, whereby he stated that: "local strategies cannot operate unless they are articulated with general strategies, just as general strategies cannot function if they are not rooted in local ones." (Dyrberg 1997: 106)[31] By limiting themselves to challenging *governmental* control of society, emancipatory groups play power's game, ignoring both their *own* agency in their domination and the emancipatory role they themselves *could* play. The success of governmental power in appearing all-encompassing and over-arching is evident particularly when emancipatory groups make use of those same frames of debate put forth by the very governmental power they are trying to oppose. It is this notion of 'frame' that is

[31] Please refer to pages 20-22 of this text for a more detailed account of Foucault's heteromorphous power.

central to my analysis, for "[T]here is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. *It is formed, irradiated, disseminated*; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, *it establishes canons of taste and values; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as true*, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgments it forms, transmits, reproduces." (Said 2003: 19-20, my emphasis) The societal vehicle for state power is that central frame of understanding that it disseminates: the all-encompassing Narrative that delimits the realm of the expressible, the bounds of debate, the founding myths of identity and the accepted version of the History that comes to stand as our Past, and it exists partly because "government continually seeks to give itself a form of truth – establish a kind of ethical basis for its actions." (Rose 1999: 27) If the modern state is seen to by its citizens to control just about everything in their lives, and yet simulatenously these same citizens believe themselves to control their government, then the government must be seen *by the citizens* to represent them. How the government goes about legitimizing its rule (which involves concealing both the power that citizens *do* have, and the power that they believe they have but do *not*), is therefore "a matter of analyzing what counts as truth, who has the power to define truth, the role of different authorities of truth, and the epistemological, institutional and technical conditions for the production and circulation of truths." (Rose 1999: 30)

As I shall argue, it is the narration of events that imbues them with meaning, and therefore the shaping of the narrative shapes its meaning. Key, then, to understanding how the state persuades its citizenry towards a certain

(disciplinary/policy) option, is understanding the construction and use of the narrative it puts forth that problematizes a situation such that the policy option suggested presents itself as the only viable option to the problem *as defined*. In order to understand the prevalence of any given legitimizing discourse in society then, we must understand the configuration of power[32] that allows it to be used to mobilize the people. In the case of modern governance, then, we must understand the construction, maintenance, and dispersion of the narrative of fear throughout society. This chapter attempts to trace the relationship between modern modes of governing (the technology of power known as discipline) and the tactics of power (the narrative of fear and the manufacture and maintenance of 'the Other') used to pursue them. I contend that it is through elite control and dissemination of the dominant narrative that modern governance maintains, spreads, and enhances its control.

This thesis should not, however, be interpreted to mean that modern democratic society is subject to totalitarian, propagandistic control the likes of which terrified the readers of Orwell's *1984*; neither is state-organized Huxleyan conditioning intended[33]. Rather, it is important to remember that disciplinary society is characterized by "the continuous exercise of power through surveillance, *individualization* and *normalization*" (Rose 1999: 23, my emphasis), and as such "[A]ny ruling power requires a degree of intelligence and initiative from its subjects, if only for its own values to be internalized; and this resourcefulness is at once

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[32] According to Said, "ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied." (2003: 5)

[33] Please see Aldous Huxley's infamous *Brave New World* for a harrowing description of the total conditioning of the modern subject, particularly chapters 1 and 14, pp. 9-16 and pp. 154-59, respectively.

essential for the *smooth reproduction of the system*" (Eagleton 1991: 46, my emphasis). The disciplinary subject, therefore, cannot simply follow robotically, but must think, rationalize and innovate, *even if it only along accepted lines*, for the disciplinary society is not one of static automatons, but one of continually more efficient and productive individuals. In order to do this, disciplinary society cannot simply impose whatever order it chooses: the way the world *is* must at least resemble how *most* people *perceive* it to be.

Hegemony

The assumption that there exists a 'most' to speak of implies a certain cohesion and consensus in the public[34], and raises the notion of hegemony, which has traditionally been understood to mean "the organic cohesion of political and civil society at the level of the consciousness of those who rule and those who are ruled" (Hier 2002: 318). According to Gramscian thought, "[H]egemony is thus conceived as the vehicle whereby the dominant social groups establish a system of "permanent consent" that legitimates a prevailing social order by encompassing a complex network of mutually reinforcing and interwoven ideas affirmed by intellectuals." (Fontana 1993: 141) To further clarify, "[A] social group or class can be said to assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it articulates and proliferates throughout society cultural and ideological belief systems whose teachings are accepted as

[34] Although this is certainly not a universal assumption – indeed, there is a great deal of literature *disproving* such societal cohesion. For one such work, please see Abercrombie *et al.'s The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (1980).

universally valid by the general population." (Fontana 1993: 140)[35] Therefore, *most* of society is said to agree with the general goings-on of society's management (i.e. its governance). Because, still according to Gramsci, "reality is perceived, and knowledge is acquired, through moral, cultural, and ideological "prisms" or "filters" by means of which society acquires form and meaning, hegemony *necessarily implies the creation of a particular structure of knowledge and a particular system of values*." (Fontana 1993: 140, my emphasis) It is this generally agreed-upon meaning that constructs the consent necessary to allow for hegemonic powers to *remain* hegemonic: because, for Gramsci, "the rule of the State [rests] on the relationship of "dictatorship + hegemony", and "political society + civil society", "where the first term represents the element of force and the second that of consent. The state is this something more than domination or coercion" (Fontana 1993: 143-44), the consent of the people is therefore required, and it is through hegemony that "the state acquires an ethical content that transforms its repressive, class nature into one perceived as moral and universal. Thus the Gramscian state cannot rest on pure force; violence and coercion must always be mediated by the legitimating moments of consent and persuasion." (Fontana 1993: 144) The modern subject is therefore not simply cowered into submission, but accepts and perpetuates this submission, whether he is aware of it or not. The use of the notion of hegemony implies the understanding that there is a

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[35] Fontana specifies that, "it is only when the social group constructs a sociopolitical order capable of instilling its particular cultural and moral beliefs in the consciousness of the people that it can be assure of a permanent and stable hegemony." (Fontana 1993: 144) This ties back into the concept that, in contrast with totalitarian societies where the prevailing discourse of freedom and wealth may not coincide at all with the lived experience of the people, in the disciplinary, democratic society, life lived and life thought must at least resemble each other. I will discuss this more in depth when dealing with the notion of ideology.

general sort of consent in society as to how society is run (never mind if this corresponds to how society *ought to be* run)[36].

The entrenching of hegemony (which is never permanent but continually negotiated, as any power relation is[37]) raises the question of what exactly is constructing this consent, if indeed it really does exist? If "strategies have to be knitted together in time and space in order to be able to function, as political poles of identification for the variety of heterogeneous demands and interests operating in hegemonic power struggles aiming at authorizing power politically" (Dyrberg 1997: 92), what is the resultant fabric that is knitted, if not a coherent, hegemonic notion of social identity? Might it be that ideology serves to link together a public who, "[N]ormally, everything separates"? (Ellul 1965: 101)

Before continuing into the nebulous domain of ideology, let me clarify why such a foray is necessary. In order to properly attempt to link disciplining technologies of modern power to the dissemination of a narrative of fear, we have to have a working understanding of the process whereby such dissemination occurs. To that end, we must understand that hegemony does not simply *happen*, it does not fall onto an awaiting and empty populace, like so much rain on the desert. Hegemony, like power, is constructed from moment to moment, within unequal social relations, conditioning the populace in seemingly innocuous ways. For example, analyzing

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[36] For a fascinating discussion on the merits of the *dover essere*, please see Benedetto Fontana's (1993) analysis of Gramscian and Crocean Machiavelli in *Hegemony and Power*, particularly pp. 154-62.
[37] Please see Hall 1997 (p. 48 particularly) for a discussion regarding the impermanent nature of hegemony, as well as Eagleton's discussion on Williams's assessment of the dynamic character of hegemony (1991: 115).

Gramsci, Eagleton contends that "the whole range of institutions intermediate between state and economy" are the very same ones that "bind individuals to the ruling power by consent rather than by coercion." (Eagleton 1991: 113, 114) Such 'intermediate institutions' might include the family, the Church, daycare, and Boy Scouts, among many others. As a dominant group seeking to universalize its goals and values may pursue this ideologically (as through an appeal to an *ideal*, or an idea – for example through the bourgeoisie emphasizing the importance of the parliamentary system, which for Anderson is the political form of capitalism)[38], or may seek to strengthen its position economically through appeals to a given class (as with tax breaks or gas rebates)[39]. Consequently we may understand that processes of construction of hegemony *include* ideology. Eagleton says it best when he clarifies: "Hegemony, then, is not just some successful kind of ideology, but may be discriminated into its various ideological, cultural, political and economic aspects. Ideology refers specifically to the way power-struggles are fought out at the level of signification; and though such signification is involved in all hegemonic processes, it is not in all cases the *dominant* level by which rule is sustained." (Eagleton 1991: 113) It is hegemony that lends ideology its "material body and political cutting edge." (Eagleton 1991: 115) What then, *is* ideology that it needs hegemony to make it work on the world, to transform it from a "system[s] of ideas to ideology as lived, habitual social practice"? (*Ibid*)

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[38] Please see Eagleton 1991 pp. 112-13 for Perry Anderson's discussion on the role of the *idea* of the parliamentary system in maintaining capitalist states.

[39] Please refer to Eagleton's excellent discussion on the differences between ideology and hegemony, particularly pp. 112-16.

Ideology

> "Nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology, and this book will be no exception. This is not because workers in the field are remarkable for their low intelligence, but because the term 'ideology' has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with each other. To try to compress this wealth of meaning into a single comprehensive definition would thus be unhelpful even if it were possible." (Eagleton 1991: 1)

So begins Professor Terry Eagleton's seminal work on ideology, leaving his reader with little hope that the contentious concept can be grasped in any manner rendering it at all useful. Not all is lost, however, for he continues to state that "[T]he word 'ideology', one might say, is a *text*, woven of a whole tissue of different conceptual strands; it is traced through by divergent histories, and it is probably more important to assess what is valuable or can be discarded in each of these lineages than to merge them forcibly into some Grand Global Theory." (Eagleton 1991: 1, emphasis in original) He then proceeds to give his reader a long list of uses for and definitions of the word 'ideology'. To give the present reader an idea of just how many definitions of the word circulate, here is the list, in its entirety, provided by Eagleton. Ideology may be:

> "(a) the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life; (b) a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class; (c) ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; (d) false ideas which help

to legitimate a dominant political power; (e) systematically distorted communication; (f) that which offers a position for a subject; (g) forms of thought motivated by social interests; (h) identity thinking; (i) socially necessary illusion; (j) the conjuncture of discourse and power; (k) the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world; (l) action-oriented set of beliefs;

(m) the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality; (n) semiotic closure; (o) the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to a social structure; (p) the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality." (1991: 1-2)

While many of the definitions he offers are contradictory or only partial, it is interesting to note how many of them state, directly or by implication, some negative connotation: 'false' ideas; not only 'distorted' communication but 'systematically' so; legitimation of a 'dominant' power (implying a subordinate one); necessary 'illusion'; and 'confusion' of reality. According to Eagleton, this negative view is prevalent, as when speaking of ideology "[T]here is usually a suggestion that this involves an oversimplifying view of the world – that to speak or judge 'ideologically' is to do so schematically, stereotypically, and perhaps with the faintest hint of fanaticism. The opposite of ideology here, then, would be less 'absolute truth' than 'empirical' or 'pragmatic'. This view, the person-in-the-street might be gratified to hear, has the august support of the sociologist Emile Durkheim, who characterized the 'ideological method' as consisting in 'the use of notions to govern the *collation* of facts rather than deriving notions from them.'" (in Eagleton 1991: 3, my emphasis) But can the

notion of ideology be so cleanly swept aside as inherently biased and negative? How is the notion to be made useful at all if we go along with such a position? Is Althusser correct, for example, when he contends that ideology "expresses a will, a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality" and as such, is Eagleton correct when he continues, stating that "it is fundamentally a matter of fearing and denouncing, reverencing and reviling, all of which then sometimes gets coded into a discourse which looks as though it is describing the way things actually are. It is thus, in the terms of the philosopher J.L. Austen, 'performative' rather than 'constative' language: it belongs to the class of speech acts which get something done (cursing, persuading, celebrating and so on) rather than to the discourse of description." (Althusser, in Eagleton 1991: 19) Does such a definition not hold the public in extreme contempt, relying, as it does, on an unconscious populace that is fundamentally unaware of the contradictions it is subject to?

In fact, Althusser does qualify his perspective, stating that as ideology is a question of representing how individuals live their relations to society as a whole, of how they *themselves* perceive their connections to the production (and reproduction) of society, ideology cannot be said to be a question of truth or falsehood, reality or fantasy, as it is inherently subjective. So while *elements* of an ideology may be less true than its adherents might want them to seem to be, even Aristotle held "that there was an element of truth in most beliefs" (Eagleton 1991: 12). Part of the opposition to Althusser's seeming reliance on a duped populace "stems from the accurate claim that, in order to be truly effective, ideologies must make at least some minimal sense

of people's experience, must conform to some degree with what they know of social reality from their practical interaction with it. As Jon Elster reminds us, ruling ideologies can actively shape the wants and desires of those subjected to them; but they must also engage significantly with the wants and desires that people already have." (Eagleton 1991: 15)[40]

I concur with Eagleton when he asserts that "the majority of people have a fairly sharp eye to their own rights and interests, and most people feel uncomfortable at the thought of belonging to a seriously unjust form of life. Either, then, they must believe that these injustices are *en route* to being amended, or that they are counterbalanced by greater benefits, or that they are inevitable, or that they are not really injustices at all. It is part of the function of a dominant ideology to inculcate such beliefs." (Eagleton 1991: 27, emphasis in original) Ideology, then, is not simply a mystifying force that indoctrinates a deceived populace. Not only does such an approach assume that a dominant ideology is inherently misleading, but it also ignores the agency of individuals who may come to be invested in the dominant ideology for reasons of their own, which may have nothing to do with either being duped or believing in what is said. After all, "[T]he study of ideology is among other things an inquiry into the ways in which people may come to invest in their own unhappiness. It is because being oppressed sometimes brings with it some slim bonuses that we are occasionally prepared to put up with it." (Eagleton 1991: xiii) Even this perspective, however, demonstrates the negative connotations that

[40] For a more detailed discussion on this notion of the duped populace, which Eagleton terms the 'false consciousness' debate, please see the first chapter of his text, particularly pp. 11-18.

stubbornly cling to notions of ideology and hegemony. Rather than being a situation where only the dominant ideology exploits the people[41], there may exist the situation where the 'common people' similarly exploit the system that they acknowledge as being overall unequal[42]: "There is nothing crudely economistic in claiming that what keeps people politically quiescent is less transcendental signifiers than a concern over their wage packets. By contrast with the patrician gloom of the late Frankfurt School, this case accords a healthy degree of respect to the experience of the exploited: there is no reason to assume that their political docility signals some gullible, full-blooded adherence to the doctrines of their superiors. It may signal rather a coolly realistic sense that political militancy, in a period when the capitalist system is still capable of conceding some material advantages to those who keep it in business, might be perilous and ill-advise." (Eagleton 1991: 36)

Additionally, the argument stands that those subject to hegemonic rule are too busy with material concerns to worry themselves with the overthrow of (what is assumed to be) an unjust system: "if the system survives, it is more on account of social divisions between the various groups it exploits than by virtue of some overall ideological coherence. There is no need for those groups to endorse or internalize

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[41] Here I must again apologize for making use of a grammatical tool for expedience's sake: quite obviously I do not mean for 'ideology' to exploit the people as though 'ideology' were an entity of its own (although it is often spoken of as having a mind of its own, much like 'the Market'), but rather by 'ideology exploiting' do I mean that those who are seen as typifying or obviously benefiting from the dominant ideology – in modern capitalist society we may consider corporate CEOs as exemplifying such a group – exploiting those who do not immediately seem to benefit from the maintenance of such a situation.

[42] For example, this argument is often raised when people working in the sex trade, particularly female strippers, retort that *they* are the ones exploiting men, not men exploiting them, or alternately, that the exploitation goes both ways. For further reading please see Bell *et al.* 1998; or Sloan and Wahab 2004. See also the web sites of organizations such as COYOTE (Call Off Your Old Tired Ethics), PONY (Prostitutes of New York) and ISWFACE (International Sex Worker Foundation For Art, Culture and Education) for more on the sex worker lobby in the United States.

dominant ideological values, as long as they do more or less what is required of them." (Eagleton 1991: 35-36)[43]. While there is something to be said for the consuming pressures of assuring material existence, Eagleton argues, and I agree, that "it is unrealistic to imagine that as long as people do what is required of them, what they think about what they are doing is neither here nor there." (1991: 42) Again, it is not enough that the people believe the lies they are told (even if we conceded that hegemony or ideology is constituted principally of lies), but that these lies must approximate the reality the people know to be true. If anything, rather than glossing over social realities, or negating them altogether, "[A]n ideology may be seen not simply as 'expressing' social interests but as *rationalizing* them." (Eagleton 1991: 51)

According to J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, the psychoanalytic category of rationalization is a "procedure whereby the subject attempts to present an explanation that is either logically consistent or ethically acceptable for attitudes, ideas, feelings, etc., whose true motives are not perceived." (in Eagleton 1991: 51) However, there is something that smacks of the disreputable to call ideologies 'rationalizing' if rationalization is so defined. This somehow seems to imply that there is a need to mask the 'real' motives behind any given statement labeled 'ideological', and gives the impression that "[I]n an entirely just society, there would be no need for ideology in the pejorative sense since there would be nothing to explain away." (Eagleton 1991: 28) Perhaps it is better to conceive of ideologies as *legitimizing*, which can

[43] George Orwell's *1984* offers a rather cynical version of this position, stating: "It was not desirable that the proles should have strong political feelings. All that was required of them was a primitive patriotism which could be appealed to whenever it was necessary to make them accept longer working hours or shorter rations." (1977: 71)

resound just as pejoratively as 'rationalizing', but which can perhaps be more easily 'declawed'. While legitimation may also imply the masking of nefarious motives, it can just as easily involve any one of (at least) six strategies, according to Eagleton:

> "A dominant power may legitimize itself by *promoting* beliefs and values congenial to it; *naturalizing* and *universalizing* such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; *denigrating* ideas which might challenge it; *excluding* rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic; and *obscuring* social reality in ways convenient to itself. Such 'mystification', as it is commonly known, frequently takes the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts, from which arises the conceptions of ideology as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions." (1991: 5-6)

Important to retain about the notion of the legitimation of ideology is its being achieved through universalization and externalization (or naturalization), whereby "[V]alues and interests which are in fact specific to a certain place and time are projected as the values and interests of all humanity." (Eagleton 1991: 56) It is in this manner that "[A] mode of domination is generally legitimated when those subjected to it come to judge their own behaviour by the criteria of their rulers" (Eagleton 1991: 55), without ever realizing that there is nothing 'natural' or immanent about such criteria. In fact, "[I]t is preferable on the whole for power to remain conveniently invisible, disseminated through the texture of social life and thus 'naturalized' as custom, habit, spontaneous practice." (Eagleton 1991: 116)[44] Naturalized ideology

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[44] This section in fact continues, ending with the statement "Once power nakedly reveals its hand, it can become an object of political contestation." (Eagleton 1991: 116) In modern, democratic states, ideology may be said to 'gloss over' the lack of actual power individuals have in their 'representative democracy' by retaining those institutions seen to embody the ideology, for example those institutions

then, according to some, ceases to be ideology: "Ideology for Macherey is the invisible colour of daily life, too close to the eyeball to be properly objectified, a centreless, apparently limitless medium in which we move like a fish in water, with no more ability than a fish to grasp this elusive environment as a whole." (Eagleton 1991: 46) It is with this understanding of ideology as naturalized in our being that we can understand the humour of Eagleton's assertion that "ideology, like halitosis, is in this sense what the other person has." (1991: 2)

Foucault, however, is suspicious of such a conception of (naturalized) ideology, for according to him, this notion implies a "nostalgia for a quasi-transparent form of knowledge, free from all error and illusion, and behind the concept of repression is the longing for a form of power innocent of all coercion, discipline, and normalization. On the one hand, power without a bludgeon, and, on the other, knowledge without deception." (Foucault 1976: 119)[45] Here Eagleton is in agreement with Foucault when he states that "ideology cannot be substantially transformed by offering individuals true descriptions in place of false ones – that it is not in this sense simply a *mistake*." (Eagleton 1991: 30) The redemptive quality of legitimation versus rationalization (as defined by Laplanche and Pontalis) is implicit in the acknowledgment that if ideology can come to stand for groups in whom it did not

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of parliament, congress, the senate, etc. Again, please see Perry Anderson's comments regarding such illusion in Eagleton 1991: 112-13.

[45] In fact, Foucault is suspicious of the entire notion of ideology, and of its potential use in critique: "The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of (…) first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else that is supposed to count as truth." (Foucault 1976: 119) This is quite in keeping in line with his insistence that power be conceived of as relational and negotiated, rather than imposed along juridico-sovereign lines, and his conceptualization of truth and knowledge being intimately bound up with notions of historically specific forms of power. If ideology is meant to stand in opposition to truth, this assumes the existence of a truth against which one can stand in opposition, a position that Foucault flatly refuses.

originate, there must be something in it for these groups to grasp – following Althusser, if ideology is inherently subjective, it cannot be a question of truth or falsehood, but rather perhaps utility, which we can agree is historically contingent and therefore follows Foucault's thesis regarding the historicity of forms of power. However, we must be careful not to dismiss the notion of ideology simply because it is so historically variable and intrinsically subjective: "we can note that a body of beliefs may be false but rational, in the sense of internally coherent, consistent with the available evidence and held on what appear to be plausible grounds. The fact that ideology is not at root a matter of reason does not license us to equate it with irrationality." (Eagleton 1991: 25-26)

If then, ideology is *not* representing the social situation *as is*, and it cannot be dismissed for being *un*representative of the actual social situation, then what is ideology doing, and how is it tied to hegemony? If we concede that the truth or falsehood of ideological statements is, at least theoretically, irrelevant to the force of these statements and to the sway the ideology in question holds, then "[I]deology appears here as a suasive or rhetorical rather than veridical kind of speech, concerned less with the situation 'as it is' than with the production of certain useful effects for political purposes." (Eagleton 1991: 29) It is in this sense that we come to understand how certain ideologies become hegemonic and remain so, as "[I]deology can here be seen as a discursive field in which self-promoting social powers conflict and collide over questions central to the reproduction of social power as a whole." (*Ibid*) It is this focus on the discursive field, a notion I shall explain in greater detail later, that

uncouples the 'truth' of an ideology from the 'truth' of its statements: "Ideology is a matter of 'discourse' rather than of 'language' – of certain concrete discursive effects, rather than of signification as such. It represents the points where power impacts upon certain utterances and inscribes itself tacitly within them. But it is not therefore to be equated with just any form of discursive partisanship, 'interested' speech of rhetorical bias; rather, the concept of ideology aims to disclose something of the relation between an utterance and its material conditions of possibility." (Eagleton 1991: 223) In this line of thinking, it may help to conceive of ideology as the *effects* engendered within discursive statements, rather than ideology being reducible to the statements themselves.[46] It therefore becomes clear that "[I]deology is less a matter of the inherent linguistic properties of a pronouncement than a question of *who* is saying *what* to *whom* for what purposes." (Eagleton 1991: 9, my emphasis) In the case of hegemonic ideology, presumably the 'who' is the ruling elite, the 'whom' those subject to such rule, and the 'why' to maintain the rule of the elite.

However, if we understand that *most* people go along with *most* of what is said *most* of the time (either through actual belief in what is being said or through an understanding that material gain is possible in their acquiescence), we must also

[46] Eagleton further explains this somewhat ambiguous assertion by providing an example: "Davidson argues that when native speakers repeatedly point at a rabbit and utter a sound, this act of denotation must for most of the time be accurate, otherwise we could never come to learn the native word for rabbit, or – by extension – anything else in their language. Imagine, however, a society which uses the word 'duty' every time a man beats his wife." (Eagleton 1991: 14) By way of this example, Eagleton demonstrates what Davidson overlooks, namely 'systematically distorted communication', which, interestingly, goes by the name of ideology for Jurgen Habermas. This 'systematically distorted communication' is then not necessarily tied to the choice of words or any other properly *linguistic* factor, but rather to "the social *structure* to which that language belongs." (1991: 28, my emphasis) This would then qualify as the material conditions of the possibility of social power relations reproducing themselves (in this case of male dominance asserted through spousal abuse), a situation *ideologically* supported (by the notion that it is not only the *right* of the man, but his *duty* to assert his dominance).

understand that, again, *most* of what is said must resemble (most of) life *as it is*. In order to accomplish this in such diverse societies as most democracies now are, "[A] dominant ideology has continually to negotiate with the ideologies of its subordinates, and this essential open-endedness will prevent it from achieving any kind of pure self-identity." (Eagleton 1991: 45) This is a vital point in understanding why ideologies cannot be simply outright lies: it is only by being living, changing social entities that are continually negotiated that ideologies are able to establish hegemonic consent. The seeming unity and stability of any hegemonic ideology is therefore illusory: "Unity can then only be thought of as an imaginary movement erected in power struggles. This unity is imaginary in that it bridges the unrepresentable gap between identity posed and identity presupposed, that is, between performance and semblance." (Dyrberg 1997: 94) If the concept of ideology "refers more precisely to the processes whereby interests of a certain kind become masked, rationalized, naturalized, universalized, legitimated in the name of certain forms of political power" (Eagleton 1991: 202), then the so-called cohesion of a ruling ideology cannot be but masking the historically contingent and profoundly *un*natural nature of its rule. In legitimizing its identity as ruling ideology, in posing itself as natural, ideology both *performs* and *resembles* what it espouses: "Processes of identification thus entail a duality of performance and semblance; this is vital for political representation, which both resembles and performs what it represents. Hence both identification and representation are caught up in the politics of posing identity *as if* it was presupposed. This circularity is crucial for social entities which construe their identity in such a way that their politically contestable nature – their historical contingency – retreats in

favour of a mythical grounding." (Dyrberg 1997: 95-96) The democratic state, for example, in presenting itself as the necessary development of History, erases the privileging of 'facts' that goes on in the construction of that History that render the development of democratic institutions 'inevitable'.

This notion of a naturalized ruling ideology, which poses itself as *a*historical, raises the question of those great myths that are used as the foundations for identity[47]: there is nothing natural, for example, about the national history any given state has: in the forming and naturalizing of a historical narrative legitimizing the current political system, the "synthetic order pertaining to the formulation of historical knowledge has more in common with fiction than with physics." (Crowell 1998: 223) In order to naturalize the current regime, "the historical explanation demands a moment of synthesis in which facts are linked according to an order that is not itself reducible to the structure of fact. As Hayden White puts it, "events must not only be registered within the chronological framework of their original occurrence but narrated as well, that is to say, revealed as possessing a structure, an order of meaning, that they do not possess as mere sequence"" (in Crowell 1998: 223). The naturalizing process involved in the issuing of an 'Official History' of any given state is implicit in the treating of such a History as the 'Story' of the country, against which Niall Ferguson argues: "A story, [Ferguson] says, implies that events had to turn out the way they

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[47] "For the Roland Barthes of *Mythologies*, myth (or ideology) is what transforms history into Nature by lending arbitrary signs an apparently obvious, unalterable set of connotations. 'Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply to purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but of a statement of fact. The 'naturalization' thesis is here extended to discourse as such, rather than to the world of which it speaks." (Eagleton 1991: 199)

did. It keeps us from understanding that the final result was not preordained." (Fulford 1999: 38) But why would any ruling power want to point out that there is nothing natural about its rule, nothing permanent and immanent in its dictates? Why would the state point out that its identity (and its legitimacy) is a mere fabrication that might have turned out otherwise, if only different events had been privileged in the making of its Story? As stated by Canadian journalist and editor Robert Fulford, "every historian knows, and most readers of history eventually learn, that each story is constructed, each emphasis chosen, each major character selected by a historian or a team of historians. And the historians in turn are heavily influenced, sometimes in ways they don't entirely understand, by the intellectual tone of the period in which they are writing and by the imagined needs of the people for whom they are writing." (1999: 43)[48] George Bernard Shaw takes a harsh view on history in his play *The Devil's Disciple*, in which he has his characters state:

> "Swindon: What will history say?
>
> Burgoyne: History, sir, will tell lies as usual." (Shaw, in Z 2004: 8)

In his masterpiece *1984*, George Orwell takes this position even further, having his main character, Winton Smith, work for the Ministry of Truth, where his job is to rewrite history, a task he undertakes methodically, resigned as he is to the irrelevance of the notion of 'truth': "actually, he thought as he readjusted the Ministry

[48] For an interesting analysis of such historically determined writing, please see Pothecary 2002, in which the author deconstructs Strabo's *Geography*, concluding that Strabo's omissions of certain events had to do with the constraints of writing for the mad emperor Tiberius, rather than writing under Augustus (and hence before such events occurred), as is commonly thought. To understand Strabo as a Tiberian author rather than an Augustan one completely changes the context in which he was writing, and consequently how one may interpret his texts today.

of Plenty's figures, it was not even forgery. It was merely the substitution of one piece of nonsense for another. Most of the material that you were dealing with had no connection with anything in the real world, not even the kind of connection that is contained in a direct lie." (1977: 40-41) While this is perhaps an extreme position, it is interesting to note that the perception of history as direct fraud exists[49]. However history cannot be mere fabrication, as it is in large part dependent upon the ruling ideology that has written it, and as we have seen, "successful ideologies must be more than imposed illusions, and for all their inconsistencies must communicate to their subjects a vision of social reality which is real and recognizable enough not to be simply rejected out of hand. They may, for example, be true enough in what they assert but false in what they deny, as John Stuart Mill considered almost all social theories to be." (Eagleton 1991: 15)

The communication of such a vision of social reality is made through the fabrication of a narrative of history that explains the inevitability of the current situation while limiting the possibilities for the future of the state to those acceptable within the confines of the dominant ideology's constraints. It is through the control of the manufacture and the dispersal of a dominant narrative that allows for the maintenance of hegemonic control, as it not only continues to legitimize the ruling elite, but also serves to erase the possibility of considering the ruling elites

[49] As we shall see, such rewriting of History is not in fact unheard of today: when White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer warned in an official news brief that Americans should "watch what they say" in the new post-9/11 environment, a comment that was directed at certain journalists and TV personalities, "[L]est Fleischer's own remarks prompt an unruly debate, history was rewritten for the public record; the official White House web-site transcript of the briefing deleted Fleischer's warning, an omission the White House later attributed to "a transcription error" (but took days to correct) after some reporters noticed. It's hard to imagine how those who "hate our freedoms" could have attempted this Orwellian sleight of hand with greater panache." (Rich, in Didion 2003: viii)

*il*legitimate. How this is accomplished is through the control of the construction of narrative and through the control of its dissemination to the public. What, then, is understood by 'narrative', and why does it/how *can* it play such a large role in legitimizing hegemony?

Narrative

If we concede that ideology is not some nefarious force surreptitiously slipped past an unconscious public, and if we understand that hegemony is not power *as such*, nor is it a doctrine or a way of thinking, but rather that 'status' that a (form of) power attains when it is implicitly agreed upon, by the society it claims to represent, that it *is* indeed representative (and thus both performs and resembles what it represents) – then we must attempt now to understand what it is that ideologies espouse in order to become hegemonic. I do not mean to recount here the details of all ideologies; it is not the specifics of say, Democracy or Socialism that interest me, but rather how it is that ideologies are constructed and communicated to the public so as to become not only meaning*ful*, but meaning-*making*. What is that mechanism by which ideologies are rendered coherent and relevant?

According to Nietzsche, there is no given order to reality at all, rather whatever meaning we find is what we have arbitrarily constructed in our attempts to make sense of a world that is simply and always chaos: "The world does not spontaneously sort itself out into kinds, causal hierarchies, discrete spheres, as a philosophical realist would imagine; on the contrary, it is *we* who do all this by

talking about it. Our language does not so much *reflect* reality as *signify* it." (Eagleton 1991: 203, emphasis in original) Although Eagleton here uses the word 'language' to denote the signification of reality, by this I understand he means a system of representation, rather than the actuality of signs, which as de Saussure explained at length, is arbitrarily set[50]: there is nothing inherent in the name 'Elizabeth' that predetermines a person so named to be Queen, anymore than the word 'tree' is inherently arboreal. Either could just as easily have been called 'apple' or 'tea pot' – it is the construction of meaning in and around these words that determines the social impact they may have, not the words themselves. The actualities of the system of representation (the choice to call the Queen 'Queen', rather than 'Tea Pot') are therefore less relevant than the way in which this system of representation is used to construct and constitute reality. It should not be misunderstood, however, that the choice of words is altogether irrelevant – as the discourse analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate, there are very clear reasons why certain words or expressions are chosen over others, and why they may be changed: in Britain, for example, homeless persons are now referred to as 'rough sleepers', "as if the lack of accommodation were a personal lifestyle choice or a symptom of pathology. The unemployed person is now officially designated a 'job seeker', a term which places the problem firmly within the mode of life of the individual." (Rose 1999: 254) The point here is not to dismiss the choice of words entirely, for as we all know, words have power[51]; rather the point is that the words

[50] For a brief explanation of his analysis of the sign, please refer particularly to de Saussure 1997: 82-85.

[51] In fact, for Voloshinov, "without signs there is no ideology" (in Eagleton 1991: 194) According to Eagleton's analysis, "In his [Voloshinov's]view, the domain of signs and the realm of ideology are

may be otherwise, and the construction of our reality is entirely of our own making – if we change our words – we change our system of signification – we change our reality[52]. If it is then the system of representation – the combination of words and meaning (both denotation and connotation) that *we* use – that constructs our world, then "[T]he relations between the political, cultural, economic and the rest are ones *we* fashion for specific political ends within given historical contexts; they are in no sense relations which subsist independently of our discourse." (Eagleton 1991: 205) In his analysis of this constructionist perspective of reality, Eagleton rightly wonders how far we may take such a position, for if we construct our reality, "[W]hat is it which *constrains* our discursive constructions?" (Eagleton 1991: 205, emphasis in original) How is it that any meaning gets made? How is meaning made to 'stick'?

In his text on critical discourse analysis in the media, Brett Dellinger of the University of Turku in Finland begins to answer this question, delimiting the

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coextensive: consciousness can arise only in the material embodiment of the signifiers, and since these signifiers are in themselves material, they are not just 'reflections' of reality but an integral part of it." (*Ibid*) Therefore the choice of words is critical to our capacity to reflect on our world i.e. to think. As I shall explain later, establishing and maintaining control of the choice of words for framing debate in times of crisis is crucial to a successful propaganda campaign. The force of such control is frighteningly demonstrated in Orwell's *1984*, his 'Newspeak' running along these same conceptual lines.

[52] It is also important to note that for thinkers such as Stuart Hall, the term 'language' may apply broadly: "The writing system or the spoken system of a particular language are both obviously 'languages'. But so are visual images (…) [A]nd so are other things which aren't 'linguistic' in any ordinary sense: the 'language' of facial expressions or of gesture, for example, or the 'language' of fashion, or clothes, or of traffic lights." (Hall 1997: 18-19) All of these elements may constitute a single language in that they must be culturally accepted to make sense. For example, 'flipping the bird' (the raising of one's middle finger) is only a derogatory gesture in certain western countries, and does not have the same impact in other cultures. 'The bird' is an iconic element of western 'language' then, accepted by and understood according to social convention. While Hall's assumptions are somewhat problematic, in that not every meaningful gesture or 'sign' may be said to have a grammar proper to language, certainly much may be 'said' without utterance or indication, merely by understanding of the uses of social convention. Sex trade workers in Burundi may not resemble those in Los Angeles, and yet without having to say a word, both may be successful in their cultural environments.

construction of reality by specifying its historical and cultural constraints: " "Reality," or the way we see reality through the prism of our own culture's means of assigning meaning to the various elements of our world, especially as this applies to television news reports, is a phenomenon which will inevitably be defined differently according to the dictates and needs of different cultures. Different formulas in different societies will be used to decode the different scripts, or codes in television news production – a process which is dependent upon our culture's history, its evolution and development. The meaning of "reality," therefore, will depend very much on the way a particular society defines it." (Dellinger 1995: 7) This of course does not mean that the reality of a blue sky exists only in Argentina, while in Chile the sky is 'in reality' green, but rather that the *significance* of a blue sky might differ in each country depending on its history, founding myths, religion, culture, etc. As we saw earlier, 'systematically distorted communication' is meaning that makes sense only in particular contexts, such as spousal abuse as 'duty' in some societies (including our own). Therefore the context of systems of representation is what determines the form a message may take if it is to be understood: the form this message takes, the stringing together of meaning, the construction of reality, may be termed 'narrative'.

In their analysis of narrative as a new paradigm in humanities research, Oxford Professors Jens Brockmeier and Rom Harré explain the functioning of narrative, which can only be locally understood (that is, culturally specific)[53]:

[53] While I will leave the complexities of the nuances of identity politics for others to explain, it occurs to me that some clarification of the term 'culture' ought to be attempted: by 'culture' I do not simply mean what is commonly understood to be culture (American, Spanish, Indian), which is something presumably based on geography as much as shared language and accepted history (among other

"narrative, we argue, works like an especially flexible *model*. A model, in most general terms, is an analogue. It links the unknown to the known. It is used in order to explain (or to interpret) a set of phenomena by referring to a set of "rules" (or schemata, structures, scripts, frames, similes, metaphors, allegories, etc.) that in one or another way encapsulate generalized knowledge (…) the genres and forms of narrative knowledge are highly dependent on the cultural context in which they are used. It is the cultural cannon that makes specific analogues appear plausible and intelligible." (Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 279, emphasis in original) Brockmeier and Harré concur with Hall's assessment that it is the narrative's reliance on that same cultural cannon in which we find ourselves embedded that allows us to understand one another: "we are able to communicate because we share broadly the same conceptual maps and thus make sense of or interpret the world in roughly similar ways (…) Because we interpret the world in roughly similar ways, we are able to build up a shared culture of meanings and thus construct a social world which we inhabit together." (Hall 1997: 18) It is in learning these 'conceptual maps' that the individual learns to place him/herself within the greater cultural cannon, or, as moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre contends, "I can only answer the question, 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question, 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a

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things); but also *political* culture, so that Parisians may be assumed to have a political culture similar enough to that in London that certain statements – such as those dealing with democracy, or certain forms of citizenship - may be understood in both countries, regardless of linguistic backgrounds or nationally specific histories; as well as *religious* culture, so that one may speak of a broadly defined (and perhaps overly inclusive) Christian culture, or Islamic culture, for example. There is also a *linguistic* culture, as can be seen in the Commonwealth or La Francophonie. Obviously, one may have several simultaneous 'cultural' identities at any given time, although in all likelihood one is privileged over others (for example, while my primary cultural identification may usually be with my religion, during the Olympics, I probably consider myself Canadian before I identify myself as Christian). To quote Hall on this matter, "[O]ne way of thinking about 'culture', then, is in terms of these shared conceptual maps, shared language systems and the *codes which govern the relationships of translation between them*." (Hall 1997: 21, emphasis in original)

part?'" (in Fulford 1999: 33) This cultural cannon not only informs us of what story(ies) we are a part, but also "our local repertoire of narrative forms is interwoven with a broader cultural set of fundamental discursive orders that determine who tells which story, when, where, and to whom." (Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 266) The 'discursive orders' of which Brockmeier and Harré speak have to do with their conception of narratives as not simply being reducible to "cognitive, linguistic, metalinguistic, or ontological entities," but rather as being the "modus operandi of specific discursive practices" (Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 278), practices whereby power relations in society are reproduced in the cultural cannon of stories[54], and the individual is therefore indoctrinated into such power relations by their integration into the cultural cannon. Hall states: "This is what children learn, and how they become, not simply biological individuals but cultural subjects. They learn the system and conventions of representation, the codes of their language and culture, which equip them with cultural 'know-how' enabling them to function as culturally competent subjects (…) They unconsciously internalize the codes which allow them to express certain concepts and ideas through their system of representation – writing, speech, gesture, visualization, and so on – and to interpret ideas which are communicated to them using the same system." (1997: 22) It isn't coincidence that Robert Fulford warns of the story form that, while it is perhaps the most comfortable and versatile

[54] Analyses dealing with the power relations in children's stories, and particularly in fairly tales, abound – one need not look further than Grimm's fairy tales to see power reproducing itself in its young subjects. Reading (or being read) these stories, youngsters learn (so the theory goes) that men are powerful (in every fairy tale), women clever and tricky (Rumplestiltskin), disobedience will be punished (Little Red Riding Hood), unmarried women are suspicious and dangerous (Hansel and Gretel), etc. The very fact that fairy tales have recently been rewritten in 'politically correct' versions points to the relations of power implicit in such stories. For more on this subject, please see Zipes 1991; Westland 1993; Garner 1995.

way in which people communicate with one another, it is "perhaps also the most dangerous." (1999: x)

This danger inherent to the story form stems from its multipurpose use and the impact it has on our conception of the world: "[S]tories are how we explain, how we teach, how we entertain ourselves, and how we often do all three at once. They are the juncture where facts and feelings meet. And for those reasons, they are central to civilization – in fact, civilization takes form in our minds as a series of narratives." (Fulford 1999: 9) The reason for the centrality of the story form to our understanding of both ourselves and our world (indeed the one is impossible without the other), is that "[E]xperience is kaleidoscopic: the experience of every moment is unique and unrepeatable. Until we can group items in it on the basis of their similarity we can set up no expectations, make no predictions: lacking these we can make nothing of the present moment." (Britton, in London 1993: 2) Lived experience is too complicated to be grasped, whereas stories are extractions, reduced to their essentials: "A story has shape, outlines, limits; an experience blurs at the edges and tends to merge imperceptibly with related experiences." (Fulford 1999: 4)[55] It is in this sense that "the story form, both oral or written, constitutes a fundamental linguistic, psychological, cultural, and philosophical framework for our attempts to come to terms with the nature and conditions of our existence." (Brockmeier and Harré 1997:

[55] In his text, Fulford asks "if it is understanding we yearn for, why isn't analysis good enough? Why can't we simply *study* our experience rather than recounting it chronologically?" (1999: 15, emphasis in original) His answer is *a point*: "narrative, as opposed to analysis, has the power to mimic the unfolding of reality. Narrative is selective, and may be untrue, but it can produce the feeling of events occurring in time; it seems to be rooted in reality." (*Ibid*) It is narrative's ability to establish the possibility of truth (a 'natural' reality, unconstructed by human efforts of editing, framing, omission, exaggeration, etc.) and to present itself *as* that truth that naturalizes discourse and renders its ahistoricity so appealing, and thus so dangerous.

264) If we return to the concept of narrative as model, we can see that narratives provide us with the template with which we can make sense of otherwise seemingly chaotic experiences. Because of the role these narratives play in making sense of our reality, they are more that merely *representations* of this reality: they are the *constructions of* and they *constitute* our reality. Therein, again, lies Fulford's danger, for "the very authority with which narrative presents its vision of reality is often achieved by obscuring large parts of that reality, for example, by dismissing, suppressing, or ignoring alternative or dissident voices." (Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 271) The link with ideology here is obvious, if we recall Mill's assertion that successful ideologies may be "true enough in what they assert but false in what they deny" (Eagleton 1991: 15), and presumably, what they ignore or omit.

It is this construction process of narrative – the privileging of who gets to tell what story and how this is decided – that raises again the questions of ideology and hegemony. While not all pronouncements are ideological[56], it is important to realize that there is an implicit bias in narration that can easily become ideological, or at least be perceived as such. When beginning his ground-breaking work *Orientalism*, Edward Said was careful to note, as much as a caveat to his own work as a warning about those texts he would study, that "there is no such thing as a merely given, or simply available, starting point: beginnings have to be made for each project in such a

[56] Indeed, Eagleton offers a humorous clarification for his reader on this distinction: "To state that there is a constituted monarchy in Britain is a political pronouncement, it becomes ideological only when it begins to involve beliefs – when, for example, it carries the implicit rider 'and a good thing too'." (1991: 11) It is important to note here as well that such pronouncements are not narratives – statement of 'fact' (this too is a slippery notion) are not necessarily narrative, although they can be, just as they can be ideological, as we can see from Eagleton's example. This notion of 'fact' will be addressed later in the text when I discuss regimes of truth and discourse.

way as to *enable* what follows from them." (Said 2003: 16, emphasis in original) He continued to specify that, "[T]he idea of beginning, indeed the act of beginning, necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which something is cut out of a great mass of material, separated from the mass, and made to stand for, as well as be, a starting point, a beginning." (*Ibid*) The performative and resembling nature of ideology may be mirrored (indeed located) in the act of narration, which necessarily *breaks off* but comes to stand as a beginning. This can be seen in the writing of national histories, where, according to Professor Steven G. Crowell of Rice University, who paraphrases historian Hayden White, "to give meaning by coming to the end is to possess a "principle for assigning importance or significance to events," which (he claims) is to identify a "social center" (...) If this is true, at stake in any narrative is not only the "redemption of names" but equally the establishment of the right or authority of the narrator to speak as a meaning-giver, to pass judgment on the events." (Crowell 1998: 225-26) If we accord narrative such power, and therefore also accord that same power to the narra*tor*, then it is logical to assume that, much like the fixing of sign to signifier is arbitrary, so too is the fixing of meaning, as were the narrator to change, so too presumably would the start/end points of the subsequent narration, resulting in a different narrative, or the dismissal of it altogether[57]. So

[57] Fulford in fact offers a startling example of such reconsideration of important narratives; giving as example that event which "historians have traditionally considered the most important event of the Renaissance", he explains how the 500 year anniversary of Columbus having discovered America was in fact overshadowed and finally only very dubiously celebrated because the assumed starting point of the Americas – Columbus – was in doubt: "Columbus didn't *discover* the Americas, since there were already many people living on these continents. That verb revealed a Eurocentric and imperialist habit of mind; the repetition of such an error only added to the grievances of peoples who were in the Americas before his time. (...) That controversy illustrated the fact that we structure history in ways we currently find satisfying and comfortable, even if the events in question occurred five centuries in the past. The master narrative centered on Christopher Columbus collapsed because we no longer found its simple outlines truthful or satisfying" (1999: 36, emphasis in original)

while "[T]he process of forging 'representations' always involves this arbitrary closing off of the signifying chain, constricting the free play of the signifier to a spuriously determinate meaning which can then be received by the subject as natural and inevitable" (Eagleton 1991: 197), it is important to note that there is nothing either *natural* or *inevitable* in the construction of meaning through narrative.

Brockmeier and Harré explain two fallacies they believe to be intimately bound up with questions of narrative: the 'ontological fallacy' and the 'representation fallacy'. The ontological fallacy centers on the naturalized narrative, which creates the belief that there is a Story out there waiting to be discovered and told, a Story that preexists the narrative process. The representation fallacy is intimately tied to the ontological problem: the problem with representation is that it assumes that the Story to be told is True, and that it can be told 'position-free'. As we have seen, Foucault posited that we are essentially products of our *historically contingent* social environs, and because of this, we are "trapped in our own history" (Foucault 1982: 328-29), meaning that, as Macherey intimated, we cannot see our own ideology so embedded in it are we, and in this sense, paraphrasing Eagleton, ideology is what 'other people have', or as so eloquently put by Althusser, "Ideology never says: "I am ideological"." (in Eagleton 1991: 60) Along Foucaultian lines, it would be impossible to do so, incapable are we of completely discovering the traces of the politics of our time, the master narratives that transmit our dominant ideologies to us, or how we embody and perpetuate the production (and reproduction) of our society. Narrative, however, masks the arbitrary nature of our system, instead presupposing "the

existence of a hidden level of prediscursive meaning structures," (Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 274) in short, a *neutral time* in which the events of the Story occurred, without their having to be narrated to us.

While Nabokov argues that "[Y]ou can get nearer and nearer … to reality; but you can never get near enough because reality is an infinite succession of steps, levels of perception, false bottoms, and hence … unattainable" (in Fulford 1999: 117), Crowell asserts that "[N]arrative idealism claims that reality does not include points of view on reality" (1998: 237). Narrative therefore does not recognize that there is no 'Truth' to any given story; narrative masks[58] that its narrator is not merely the writer or the discoverer of a Truth that existed before his/her narrative of It. However, if there is no 'Truth', then what are narratives representing?

Truth

Let me pause for a moment here, and in the style that is so popular now in international politics, strike pre-emptively against a potential critique of this line of questioning. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the label of 'truth-relativist' has often been applied to Foucault because of his refusal to support the notion of objectivity as it has

[58] Let me again clarify that 'narrative' in itself does not mask, anymore than 'power' controls, or 'the Market' determines… as with so many of these overarching concepts, what is meant is that those persons and social entities (groups, organizations, relations) most directly 'in charge of' (although this too, is problematic, as it masks the relational dependence of such arrangements, giving too much control over to too select a group) the workings of such *allow* a certain ambiguity to persist in the functioning of these relations. In this instance, those groups who are constituted by, help to maintain and elaborate, legitimizing regimes of truth are those who 'mask' the function of narrative by pursuing a tautological narrative, such as the media.

been used in common parlance since the age of Enlightenment[59]. It is not, as we have seen, that Foucault would have objected to the reality that settlers arriving at Plymouth shared a meal with local indigenous peoples, but he would have questioned the mythic place that Thanksgiving now holds, having been made to represent a benign relationship with Native Americans, which we know was not the case. His objection, therefore, rests on the argument that, "[I]t is not at the level of the sentence – of the "fact" – that the question of evaluation becomes interesting. We are fairly clear about what constituted the truth of statements and how such truths can be established." (Crowell 1998: 220) The emphasis accorded to the 'factual' content of a narrative "slides into the claim that the narrative *as a whole* is true." (Crowell 1998: 243, my emphasis) Foucault argued against such interpretation, pointing out that, "the problem (...) consists in seeing historically how *effects of truth* are produced within discourses that, in themselves, are neither true nor false." (Foucault 1976: 119, my emphasis) Crowell clarifies this, specifying that "[W]hile it is important to note that the past "does have a fixedness that allows reinterpretation only up to certain limits," this tells us nothing about how the concept of truth might be used to evaluate the narrative, in which reinterpretation is possible and in which both the fixedness of facts and the fluidity of meaning encounter one another." (Cart and Time, in Crowell 1998: 240) Nietzsche took this position further, arguing vehemently that, "No, facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretation," (in Rella 1994: 63) which Freud qualified as being "interminable". (*Ibid*)

[59] For definitions of objectivity and Enlightenment, please see The Oxford English Dictionary at http://dictionary.oed.com/

In his *History of Sexuality*, Foucault specified that, "truth is not by nature free (…) but that its production is thoroughly imbued with relations of power." (Foucault 1978b: 60) Just as he was suspicious of the uses of the concept of ideology, Foucault also advocated wariness regarding the concept of truth that was the implicit critique of ideology: "We do not therefore have an originary "truth" on the one hand and a set of apparatuses that repress, hide and distort it on the other. "… [T]ruth isn't outside power, or lacking in power … Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power"." (Foucault, in Rella 1994: 59) In announcing the purpose of his huge project of analyzing Orientalism, Said specified that, "[W]hat I am interested in doing now is suggesting how the general liberal consensus that "true" knowledge is fundamentally non-political (and conversely, that overtly political knowledge is not "true" knowledge) obscures the highly if obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced." (Said 2003: 10) Foucault argued that not only was knowledge always a form of power, but that understanding the application and effectiveness of power/knowledge was a more useful exercise than questioning the 'truth' of such knowledge. (Hall 1997) Understanding that "[K]knowledge does not operate in a void [that it] is put to work, through certain technologies and strategies of application, in specific situations, historical contexts and institutional regimes," means that "[T]o study punishment, you must study how the combination of discourse and power – power/knowledge – has produced a certain conception of crime and the criminal." (Hall 1997: 49) As stated by historian and philosopher Paul Veyne, "[W]e cannot study such fixed objects as power or sexuality or force or man

because such "grandiose objects do not exist". Concepts such as the body, power, force do not exist independently of the discourses about them but are objects of inquiry constructed by and within particular discourses." (in Brass 2000: 313)

The task for the intellectual then, in attempting to understand 'truth' in society (or power, as indeed they are the same), is to understand that "[T]here is a battle "for truth," or at least "around truth" – it being understood once again that by truth I mean not "the ensemble of truth to be discovered and accepted" but, rather, "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true," it being understood also that it's not a matter of a battle "on behalf" of the truth but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays." (Foucault 1976: 132) The 'truth' of society, narrated to us, needs to be understood to be a *construction* intimately bound up with relations of power: "it needs to be made clear about cultural discourse and exchange within a culture that what is commonly circulated by it is not "truth" but representations" (Said 2003: 21), bearing in mind that, "for Foucault, the production of knowledge is always crossed with questions of power and the body", and that this "greatly expands the scope of what is involved in representation." (Hall 1997: 51) Representation, then, is something *other* than truth, or the simple narration of a 'factual' story. If this is so, just what is representation *representing*? How does it do the work of power?

Representation

According to famed cultural theorist Stuart Hall, to represent something is to "describe or depict it, to call it up in the mind by description or portrayal or imagination; to place a likeness of it before us in our minds or in the senses (…) To represent also means to symbolize, to stand for, to be a specimen of, or to substitute for" (1997: 16). If we think of representation in literal terms[60], say a photograph, then to be shown a photo of a man is to be shown a representation of him[61]. However, this photo does not encompass all that man is, all his qualities, faults, abilities and limitations. His bio-chemical processes, history, likes and dislikes escape the photo. Therefore iconic (or resemblance) representation is inadequate; yet our words are no freer of limitations than our images. For example, the dictionary defines man thus: "human being, male human (…) a man belonging to a particular category (as by birth, residence, membership, or occupation)", and gives descriptives such as "husband," "lover," "fellow, chap"[62]. Hamlet, in his grief however, describes man differently: "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form and moving how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the world! The paragon of animals! And yet to me, what is this quintessence of dust? Man delights not me." (Shakespeare 1911: 1022) How is it that such different representations of man should exist, and yet none of them be incorrect? The dictionary's second definition for

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[60] According to *Merriam-Webster Online*, representation may be "an artistic likeness or image". Please see http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=representation for the exact definition.

[61] Please note that this applies equally to representations and definitions of 'woman' as it does to those of 'man'.

[62] See http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=man for the exact definition according to *Merriam-Webster Online*.

'representation' offers insight: a representation may be "a statement or account *made to influence opinion or action.*" (my emphasis) Representation then has two limits: one is of impossibility, for if a photo, description or definition of man can never grasp his totality, then representing him is impossible. The other limit is one of bias, as representation is made with the intent to "influence opinion or action".

Whether representation is iconic (visual, as in an image) or indexical (written[63] or spoken), it is successful, as we have seen, because it is interpretable by its audience. This interpretability is dependent upon social convention: "The forms of narrative do not exist as templates to be made concrete but *are constrained to take the forms they do by the exigencies of the situations in which they occur.*" (Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 278, my emphasis) It is along these lines that we can say that, "it is not only narrative that mediates, expresses, and shapes culture but also culture that defines narrative." (Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 270) Consequently, we may not say and do just as we please, but rather must make use of certain norms in order to create a narrative that is recognizably meaning-making. This can happen in the *form* the message takes, but also in the words or images used to narrate. This iconic (symbolic) or indexical (arbitrary) language is itself not meaning-free: "Language can never appear by itself – it always appears as the representative of a system of linguistic terms, *which themselves realize discursive and ideological systems.*" (Kress, in Dellinger 1995: 2, my emphasis) With this in mind, we can conclude that

[63] My thanks for Professor Sourayan Mookerjea's clarification that 'written representation', being based in convention, may also indicate 'pointing', as in the delineation of the boundaries of a soccer field, or in traffic signs. While such writing is not discursive or ideological, it *is* representative, and understood only within a certain cultural context.

"[U]tterances are not linguistic atoms but are "moves" in games whose rules (usually uniformalized) authorize specific sorts of responses (utterances, behaviors) as proper. (…) Thus to interpret a given descriptive utterance as a move in the game of cognition (whose end or point is to establish what is real) is to grasp it as necessarily linked to another (possible) utterance, an ostensive statement in which the evidence establishing its truth is given. (…) The propriety of interpretation, its validity, thus turns on the rules of the language game being played, *rules that determine what counts as a move*." (Crowell 1998: 222-23, my emphasis) It is the 'regimes of truth' that help constitute the rules for utterances.

Regime of Truth

According to Foucault, "[E]ach society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned … the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true." (in Hall 1997: 49) It is society's hegemonic institutions that "occupy a position between the legitimate framework of the political representation of interests (…) and the regulatory apparatuses of social control *in which stocks of knowledge are materialized.* It is these administrative apparatuses that, in practical terms, sustain the regimes of legitimate domination." (Dyrberg 1997: 111, my emphasis) In defining the rules of the game, hegemonic institutions delimit the range of utterances that could count as true at any given time: this knowledge linked to power – the regime of truth and the institutions that propel it – "not only

assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to *make itself true*." (Hall 1997: 49) As each society has its own regime of truth, and it is power linked to knowledge through institutions that can establish such a regime, as institutions and societies change, so too will their corresponding regimes of truth. Consequently, "[T]hings mean something and are 'true' *only within a specific historical context*. Foucault did not believe that the same phenomena would be found across different historical periods. He thought that, in each period, discourse produced forms of knowledge, objects, subjects and practices of knowledge, which differed radically from period to period, with no necessary continuity between them." (Hall 1997: 46) To properly understand how important a role discursive formations play in our lives, and consequently how their control (and the control of the narrative and regimes of truth through which they are communicated and legitimated to us) is vital to society's reproduction, we must first understand just what is meant by the terms 'discursive formation': what constitutes discourse? How inclusive is it? Does anything exist 'outside' discourse?

Discourse

Foucault understood discourse to be "a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular historical moment … Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But … since all social practices entail *meaning*, and meanings shape and influence what we do – our conduct – all practices have a discursive aspect." (in Hall 1997: 44) In his analysis of Foucaultian discourse, Hall specified further that it is

"important to note that the concept of *discourse* in this usage is not purely a 'linguistic' concept. It is about language *and* practice. It attempts to overcome the traditional distinction between what one *says* (language) and what one *does* (practice). Discourse, Foucault argues, constructs the topic. It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge." (*Ibid*)[64] In this sense, a discursive formation may be seen as the set of rules which determine, much like the cultural cannon does with narrative, "what can and must be said from a certain position within social life; and expressions have meaning only by virtue of the discursive formations within which they occur" (Eagleton 1991: 195). Discursive analyses along Foucaultian lines "have tended to eschew the epistemology of the truth/falsity dichotomy in the interests of conceptualizing power as a *set of phenomena* distributed across a multiplicity of discursive sites" (Hier 2002: 317). In the case of Said's study of Orientalism, for example, his examination of the discursive formation of the school of Orientalism looked at "style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, *not* the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original. The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West, and *faute de mieux*, for the poor Orient." (Said 2003: 21, emphasis in original) In other words, "[P]osing for discourse the

[64] In fact, Hall's position regarding a Foucaultian approach to discourse highlights how Foucault redefined the term, taking it away from the Saussurean focus on linguistic analysis (see Hall 1997: 51). Foucault's emphasis on *practice*, meaning both the "grand, overall strategies of power (…) (and) the many, localized circuits, tactics, mechanisms and effects through which power circulates" (Hall 1997: 50) widens the field of discourse to include the reproduction of social power *outside of* language, rather than perceiving social power to emanate strictly *from* language, and creates a (vicious or virtuous) cycle of power and meaning construction in society. For a more in depth discussion on the social (and socializing) aspects of discourse (both practice and language), please see van Dijk 1997, particularly pp. 1-37.

question of power means basically to ask whom discourse serves." (Foucault 1976: 116)

In his infamous *History of Sexuality*, published two years after the interview in which he posed this question, Foucault specified that to ask such a question of a particular discourse was to seek "to account for the fact that it is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said." (Foucault 1978b: 11) However, because for Foucault discourse was practice as much as it was speech, that which was *not* said, or was expressly *omitted* from society's practice, was just as important as those things articulated, although he did note that "[S]ilence itself – the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers – is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said" (Foucault 1978b: 27). In asking of discourse what power it served, Foucault enjoined his public to "try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion is required in either case." (*Ibid*) It is this distribution, between those things said and those not, the statements required and those forbidden, that discursive analyses should seek to reconstruct, in order to trace the outlines of that power being served, that power at work *constructing* the field of discourse.

However, to say that there is a discursive formation establishing the 'rules of the game', so to speak, is not to say that there is something outside of discourse. Foucault was in fact adamant about not imagining a "world of discourse divided between accepted discourse and excluded discourse" (1978b: 100). Posing for discourse the question of an 'outside' is to fall into the same trap posed by ideology or by the concept of 'truth' – that there is something other than it, to which it stands opposed. By Foucault's estimation, those things meaningful were made so in relation to discourse – either by being included *within* discursive bounds, or by reacting *against* them (which, we shall see, is the same thing). Anything outside of discourse is *non*sense. It is therefore not a question of discursive versus non-discursive statements – if a position, story, statement, etc. makes sense, it is because it fits within the molds of what we know (such as in a dominant narrative). That is not to say however, that once formed, a discursive field cannot *change*, nor does it mean that at any given time there is only one discursive field in effect: just as individuals may identify themselves with several different communities simultaneously, "one [can] situate discursive communities as the articulation of social solidarities that share certain points of advocacy (or frames). These *compete* strategically in public debate to determine what our greater society, or social imaginary, should look like." (Hayden 2003: 3) The establishing of a *hegemonic* discursive formation necessarily implies the existence of *non*-hegemonic discursive formations that may, at any time, themselves *become* hegemonic. Indeed, Foucault continued his *History* specifying that "[W]e must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an *instrument* and an *effect* of power, but also a *hindrance*, a stumbling-block,

a *point of resistance* and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it." (1978b: 101, my emphasis)

As we have seen, hegemony is in part built on the consent of the people, who are not likely to accept a wholly alien perspective. The notion of hegemony therefore necessarily implies compromise with, and inclusion of, various perspectives to form a pastiche of relations that then support, hegemonically, the dominant power. Just as hegemony is in constant negotiation with such subordinate groups, so too is the discursive formation which is maintained by such hegemony: "the articulation of interacting discursive fields is understood to never achieve a state of absolute finality, but rather holds that discourses are always subject to struggle and contestation, engagement and subversion." (Hier 2002: 318-19)

It is in this sense that we may understand that ideology's task "is not just a matter of [making] meaning, but of making a meaning *stick*." (Eagleton 1991: 195, emphasis in original) The importance of the fixing of meaning is demonstrated in the fact that the battle for control of discourse often takes place at the level of the sign. Working from Voloshinov, Eagleton clarifies: "contending ideological positions may articulate themselves in the same national language, intersect within the same linguistic community; and this means that the sign becomes 'an arena of class struggle'. A particular social sign is pulled this way and that by competing social interests, inscribed from within with a multiplicity of ideological 'accents' (...)

Voloshinov's work thus yields us a new definition of ideology, as the struggle of antagonistic social interests at the level of the sign." (*Ibid*)[65] As long as this struggle can be kept at the level of the sign, hegemonic constraints remain more or less in place: "Debate cannot be stilled, and indeed, in a properly functioning system of propaganda, it should not be, because it has a system-reinforcing character if constrained within proper bounds. What is essential is to set the bounds firmly. Controversy may rage as long as it adheres to the presuppositions that define the consensus of elites, and it should furthermore be encouraged within these bounds, thus helping to establish these doctrines as the very condition of thinkable thought while reinforcing the belief that freedom reigns." (Chomsky 2003: 48)

Because "[I]t is discourse, not the subjects who speak it, which produces knowledge (…) [S]ubjects may produce particular texts, but they are operating within the limits of the *episteme*, the *discursive formation,* the *regime of truth*, of a particular period and culture. (…) the 'subject' is *produced within discourse*" (Hall 1997: 55, emphasis in original), it is vital for hegemonic powers to maintain control, as much as is possible within the realm of interpretation[66], over discourse: "The most effective device is the bounding of the thinkable, achieved by tolerating debate, even encouraging it, though *only within proper limits*." (Chomsky 2003: 105, my emphasis) Nikolas Rose terms this delimitation the "zone of intelligible contestation"

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[65] The African-American reclaiming of the term "nigger" serves as an example of such antagonistic struggle for the sign: formerly a derogatory term in white American parlance, the term now serves as an affectionate recognition between members of the African-American community. The term is now exclusively "owned" by that community, and no one outside it dares use the term similarly, as it has *retained in the white community* all its racist overtones.

[66] The contentious hold, given the infinite interpretability by subjects of their world, that hegemony and dominant ideologies have over individuals is hotly debated, and is an issue that I will address later.

(1999: 28). Chomsky explains the use of such a zone, indicating how it can successfully operate: "*If the agenda can be restricted* to the ambiguities of Arafat, the abuses and failures of the Sandinistas, the terrorism of Iran and Libya, and other *properly framed issues, then the game is basically over; excluded from discussion* is the unambiguous rejectionism of the United States and Israel, and the terrorism and other crimes of the United States and its clients (…) The same considerations hold whatever questions we address." (2003: 48-49, my emphasis) Although it is the system of representation that is at stake (who has the power to speak), it is at the level of the control of the sign (those words used) at which the battle is most obviously fought. An extreme example of this, Orwell's *1984* demonstrates the power of words, and the importance of having one's definition accepted in order to frame debate (and thought): Orwell's 'Newspeak' is a system of words "deliberately constructed for political purposes: words, that is to say, which not only had in every case a political implication, but were intended to impose a desirable mental attitude upon the person using them." (Orwell, in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 114) It is not that 'those in power' wish to brainwash the people, rather that consensus breeds the stability required to maintain the efficient society discipline has fashioned: that hegemony maintains such consensus through narrowly defining the parameters of acceptable debate should not be viewed conspiratorially. The successful diffusion of disciplinary control mechanisms throughout society is accomplished in part through hegemonic constraints (such as the bounding of debate), which serve to exclude (whether it be by censure or ridicule) those acts (speech or otherwise) that would challenge the dominant ideology. As we have seen, hegemony is (at least theoretically) consensual,

and therefore alongside actual *structural* constraints (for example such as those acting on the media, which we shall see) are *ideological* ones, put in place and made concrete through propaganda.

Propaganda

In his text *Opinion Control in the Democracies*, Terence Qualter succinctly stated the 'problem' with propaganda: "It is always difficult to discuss propaganda objectively because the pejorative connotations of the word in English have largely reduced it to a device for destroying the credibility of opponents" (1985: 107). According to Qualter's analysis of the history of the usage of the term, it is only recently that we have strayed from Pope Gregory's original model of *Propaganda*, which was understood to be an *organization* formed to undertake specific activities. In the western, English-speaking world, this term has now come to mean the activities *themselves*, or "the material disseminated as part of that activity." (Qualter 1985: 108) The sense that propaganda is something deceitful persistently remains, testament to the success of Second World War British and American propagandists, who cemented within the Western psyche that propaganda was something that the 'bad guys' do: "the Allies graciously gave their enemies exclusive use of the word propaganda. While the enemy engaged in propaganda they set up departments and Ministries of Information" (*Ibid*). Although this perceived (and persistent) distinction between propaganda and information is a vital one, and will be addressed momentarily, for now we must construct a useful working definition of propaganda, one which recognizes that "[C]ommunication acquires meaning only in its context. Propaganda

effect arises from the interaction of a communication and an audience, through a specific medium, in a particular cultural and ideological environment, at a particular time and place. All these variables must be considered as a unit." (Qualter 1985: 110) It is therefore vital to this project of conceiving modern democratic societies as disciplinary entities which find it useful and efficient to make use of fear as a control measure, to understand propaganda *neutrally*, that is as simply being an activity that may be directed toward either good or bad ends. In fact, Jacques Ellul was adamant that propaganda *not* be considered as serving "the purpose of sugar-coating bitter pills, of making people accept policies they would not accept spontaneously. But in most cases propaganda seeks to point out courses of action desirable in themselves, such as helpful reforms. Propaganda then becomes this mixture of the actual satisfaction given to the people by the reforms and subsequent exploitation of that satisfaction." (1965: 21) Propagandists consequently "do not decide to tell the truth because they personally are honest, any more than they decide to tell lies because they are dishonest. Given a particular audience to be reached with a particular policy, the basis for decision is an estimate of what will work." (Huff, in Qualter 1985: 113)

Propaganda is therefore perhaps best understood in terms of manipulation rather than in terms of a true/false dichotomy. While this manipulation, as van Dijk explains, is not intended necessarily to construct a false consciousness, whereby a duped populace acquiesces to anything its malevolent rulers suggest, still "the possible discrepancy between group ideology and group interests implies that power relations in society can be reproduced and legitimated at the ideological level,

meaning that, to control other people, it is most effective to try to control their group ideologies. In such circumstances, audiences will behave out of their own "free" will in accordance with the interests of the powerful. van Dijk's thesis, like Wodak and Kress, implies that the exercise of power in modern, democratic societies is no longer primarily coercive, but persuasive, that is, ideological." (Dellinger 1995: 5) While propaganda may therefore be used to diffuse an ideology, "[O]ne must not think, for this reason, that ideology *determines* a given propaganda merely because it provides the themes and contents. Ideology serves propaganda as a peg, a pretext. Propaganda seizes what springs up spontaneously and gives it a new form, a structure, an effective channel, and can eventually transform ideology into myth." (Ellul 1965: 117) For Edward Said, it was this mythic quality of propagandized ideology that was dangerous, not propaganda *per se*. The danger posed by such mythic discourse as that put forth by propaganda is that, in appearing universal and natural, myth conceals ideology's origins and those of what it (mythic ideology) purports to describe[67], and "as Roland Barthes has said, a myth (and its perpetuators) can invent itself (themselves) ceaselessly." (Said 2003: 308) As we have briefly seen with the concept of a 'National History', the role of myth in the formation of identity is key to the social cohesion that builds and supports the basis for hegemony. It is through "the influence of propagandists, [that] patriots became aware of their traditions, their customs, and their responsibilities." (Qualter 1985: 111) In the process of state formation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when so many

[67] I say 'purports' to describe because "myth does not analyze or solve problems. It represents them as already analyzed and solved; that is, it presents them as already assembled images, in the way a scarecrow is assembled from bric-a-brac and then made to stand for a man" (Said 2003: 312), or in the same way that coverage on CNN is made to stand for war - myth is the ultimate simulacrum. For more on this, please see Sarup 1993.

European and North American countries were still solidifying their identities as nations, according to Qualter it was through propaganda that "[N]ational symbols and slogans acquired a new significance, for in the absence of a national tradition or history they were the only force capable of forging a sense of national identity." (*Ibid*)[68]

In helping to build the social cohesion necessary for hegemony, propaganda therefore acts as a social control mechanism, molding people's belief systems and steering them toward certain conclusions. Following Harold Lasswell, propaganda is then less what people *think* or *are*, rather more what they can be *made to think* and *be*. (Said 2003) This is vital to governance because, "[O]nce framed, claims makers must campaign to have their definition of reality accepted since a policy's survival "depends, to a large extent, on policy makers constructing and 'selling' a problem and

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[68] In Fulford's text on narrative, he expounds on the importance of a national myth: "Lewis Lapham, the editor of *Harper's* magazine, wrote: "The schools have lost the thread of the American narrative." Without that narrative, he argued, the United States can't permanently sustain democratic government. Lapham thinks Americans need their history more than most people, because the United States is founded not on race but on a series of propositions that can be understood only in historical context." (1999: 39) While Lapham's assumptions that not only do 'racial' states fare better than non-racially based states, but that such things as racially-based states exist, are extremely problematic, his position is supported by Qualter, who states "In the United States, in particular, the sudden throwing together of tens of thousands of immigrants from diverse cultural, linguistic, economic and political traditions created a new role for political persuasion." (1985: 126) This political persuasion, he goes on to specify, is undertaken by ideological propaganda, whose task it is to unite a people who have, theoretically, no innate reason to. In Nancy Chang's *Silencing Political Dissent*, she specifies that the post 9/11 anti-terrorist legislation brought in by the Bush administration threatens the integrity of the American system precisely because it sets aside, according to her analysis, the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, as well as writes off the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. While she bemoans the dismissal of these documents for legalistic reasons, she also decries the ideological implications of such a rejection of the founding documents of the American State, which she contends rest at the center of American identity: "A nation of immigrants bound by no common language or heritage *has been unified by the idea of democratic liberty, embodied in its founding documents.*" (2002: 19, my emphasis) To dismiss the validity of such documents, in actions if not in words, as she contends the Bush administration has done, is to play Russian Roulette with the cohesion of American ideals, which are the foundation – in the US more strongly than perhaps in any other country – of the State.

policy to deal with the problem"." (Boxill and Unnithan, in Hawdon 2001: 421-22) As we shall see, the role of propaganda is perhaps more important in democratic societies than in totalitarian ones, as in democracies the people are perceived to be the repository of the power of the state, and therefore it is the party with the greatest number of votes behind it that may pursue its governance agenda: "Why do officials sometimes lie to the people they have sworn to serve, about the policies carried out by their own government? First and foremost, the goal is to secure the public's acquiescence. Voters have the ultimate veto over their elected representatives' policies, after all; they hold the purse strings of the Army, the secret service, the police." (Flanders, in Z 2004: xiii) The great irony of democracy then, is that "[D]emocratic societies tend to become more concerned with what people believe than with what is true, to become more concerned with credibility than with truth" (Boorstin, in Qualter 1985: 187), and therefore in a democracy it is "more important to be credible than to be truthful, and there [are] instances where the lie [is] more believable than the truth, credibility being more a matter of perception than objectivity." (Qualter 1985: 114) The engineering of consent (propaganda), then, is the creation of the basis for the hegemonic operation of ideology, which functions, as famed theorist Jacques Ellul contends, not only to sugar-coat "bitter pills" (which it certainly may), but also to govern in the interests of a society that, without such propaganda, would not recognize its shared interests. Therefore "whoever turns against manufacture of consent resists any form of effective authority." (Bolkestein, in Chomsky 2003: 18)

While Ellul distinguishes between political and sociological propaganda, he contends that these function to "integrate the maximum number of individuals into [society], to unify its members' behaviour according to a pattern, to spread its style of life" (Ellul, in Qualter 1985: 125). While propaganda serves to unify people under a single banner, it simultaneously serves to make these same people believe themselves to be involved in the raising of that banner: "in a democracy, the citizens must be tied to the decisions of the government. This is the great role propaganda must perform. It must give the people the feeling – which they crave and which satisfies them – "to have wanted what the government is doing, to be responsible for its actions, to be involved in defending them and making them succeed, to be 'with it.'"" (Hamon, in Ellul 1965: 127) Propaganda accomplishes this task of investing the individual with the decisions of government: "governmental propaganda *suggests* that public opinion *demand* this or that decision; it provokes the will of a people, who spontaneously would say nothing. But, once evoked, formed, and crystallized on a point, that *will* becomes the *people's will*; and whereas the government really acts on its own, it gives the impression of obeying public opinion – after first having built that public opinion." (Ellul 1965: 132, emphasis in original) It is because of this need to include the populace that Ellul contends propaganda is not merely a weapon like any other in society's arsenal of control, but "the product of a technological society, a *necessary* and *inevitable* consequence of the structure of the modern world." (Qualter 1985: 124, my emphasis) The reason for this is that, as population density rises and technology continues to link every*one* to every*thing* so quickly, 'politics' can no longer remain the game of a select few, isolated from "the concrete reality of the

masses" (Ellul 1965: 121-22). Ellul does not, however, suppose that this impossibility of isolation means that politics is to become populist, rather that "if the ruler wants to play the game by himself and follow secret policies, he must present a decoy to the masses. He cannot escape the mass; but he can draw between himself and the mass an invisible curtain, a screen, on which the mass will see projected the mirage of some politics, while the real politics are being made behind it." (Ellul 1965: 122)[69]

However, while politiking can no longer *ignore* the masses, courses of action *cannot* be based on their opinion, which is so variable and uninformed[70] that it cannot hope to serve as a basis for politics: "With regard to an enterprise that involves billions and lasts for years, it is not a question of following opinion – either at its inception, when opinion has not yet crystallized, or later, when the enterprise has gone too far to turn back." (Ellul 1965: 125) Ellul summarizes the problem succinctly, stating: "In many instances, political decisions must be made to suit new problems emerging precisely from the new political configurations in our age, and such problems do not fit the stereotypes and patterns of established public opinion. Nor can public opinion crystallize overnight – and the government cannot postpone actions and decisions until vague images and myths eventually coalesce into opinion. In the present world of politics, action must at all times be the forerunner of opinion."

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[69] Please note that while Ellul makes use of masculine terminology, using 'man', 'him', and 'his' exclusively, my citing of his material should be understood to include both men *and* women.

[70] Ellul is not being elitist when he states that the public is too uninformed to serve as the basis for government; this is not a case of appealing to Niebuhr's "cool observers" so contemptuously critiqued by Chomsky (2003: 18). Rather, Ellul sympathizes with modern citizens, whom he specifies are faced with "problems that are way over their heads. They are faced with choices and decisions which demand maturity, knowledge, and a range of information which they do not and cannot have." (1965: 139)

(*Ibid*) But if the government can neither act without the support of public opinion, nor base its decisions on it, what is government to do? In a totalitarian state this would not be problematic, but in a democratic society, the state, "precisely because it believes in the expression of public opinion and does not gag it, must channel and shape that opinion if it wants to be realistic and not follow an ideological dream." (Ellul 1965: 126) Therefore, and this is what Ellul contends is the characteristic feature of the "Mass-Government" relationship in modern, technological, disciplined society, "[O]nly one solution is possible: as the government cannot follow opinion, opinion must follow the government." (*Ibid*) We may consequently understand that propaganda's function is to "make the masses demand of the government what the government has already decided to do." (Ellul 1965: 132)

Again, it behooves me to restate that propaganda is not merely a devious means by which government slips past its citizens that which is not in their interests, although this certainly may happen. Rather, propaganda acts to tie the people to their government and to their government's decisions. The great problem that most people currently have with the concept of propaganda is that it makes them uncomfortable to realize that most people not only 'buy it', they *need* it: "As most people have the desire and at the same time the incapacity to participate, they are ready to accept a propaganda that will permit them to participate, and which hides their incapacity beneath explanations, judgments, and news, enabling them to satisfy their desire without eliminating their incompetence." (Ellul 1965: 140) Propaganda furnishes average citizens with an explanatory framework that permits them to understand the

news and the events of the day. Rather than being a *piece* of information, propaganda prepares the way for *receiving* information:

> "Effective propaganda needs to give man an all-embracing view of the world, *a view rather than a doctrine*. Such a view will first of all encompass a general panorama of history, economics, and politics. This panorama itself is the foundation of the power of propaganda because it provides justification for the actions of those who make propaganda; the point is to show that one travels in the direction of history and progress. That panorama allows the individual to give the proper classification to all the news items he receives; to exercise a critical judgment, *to sharply accentuate certain facts and suppress others, depending on how well they fit into the framework.*" (Ellul 1965: 146-47, my emphasis)

Here Ellul takes a hard perspective on the resultant frame of mind of the propagandized individual, contending that such an individual loses "[E]verything in the nature of critical and personal judgment." (1965: 169) While his perspective may seem extreme, his conclusions are in line with the disciplined society functioning within strictly delimited frames of debate; according to Ellul, propaganda "determines the core from which all his [the modern individual] thoughts must derive and draws from the beginning a sort of guideline that permits neither criticism nor imagination. More precisely, his imagination will lead only to small digressions from the fixed line and to only slightly deviant, preliminary responses *within* the framework." (*Ibid*) The resultant individual, according to Ellul, is therefore more than merely integrated into the social group when he/she accepts public opinion as his/her own, "he *is* the social

group, there is nothing in him not of the group, there is no opinion in him that is not the group's opinion. He is nothing except what propaganda has taught him. He is merely a channel that ingests the truths of propaganda and dispenses them with the conviction that is the result of his absence as a person." (1965: 171, my emphasis)

But how is it that the modern individual should find him or herself so incapable of forming his/her own opinion that he/she must needs accept another's? The key to this lies in democracy itself: in order to participate in democratic processes, the individual must be informed of the issues at hand. The problem with modern democracies is that the state has grown so large, and come to encompass so much, that reasonably well informed individuals[71] cannot hope to come to grips with all they might be faced with. Technology but complicates matters, as "the media represent an excess of information and they do so in a manner that excludes response by the recipients." (Sarup 1993: 166) Bombarded by an over-eager press with what Lasch calls the political equivalent of 'junk mail'[72], the modern citizen cannot hope to understand, much less act on, the countless tidbits of information he/she is thrown: "it is a fact that excessive data do not enlighten the reader or the listener; they drown him. He cannot remember them all, or coordinate them, or understand them; if he does not want to risk losing his mind, he will merely draw a general picture from them. And the more facts supplied, the more simplistic the image." (Ellul 1965: 87)

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[71] Which Ellul describes as such: "aside from spending eight hours at work an two more commuting, this man reads a newspaper or, more precisely, looks at the headlines and glances at a few stories. He may also listen to news broadcasts, or watch it on TV; and once a week he will look at the photos in a picture magazine. This is the case of the reasonably well informed man" (1965: 144).

[72] See Lasch, in London 1993: 9.

It is along these lines that Ellul states, "[I]t seems that the more informed public or private opinion (notice I say "more," not "better"), the more susceptible it is to propaganda." (1965: 113) So overwhelmed by the complexities of governing modern life, the individual comes to depend on 'the news' to put it all in order: propaganda provides both the individual and the media with the grand narratives needed to make sense of it all. It is this shared societal dependence on information that paves the way for propaganda, and allows the construction of hegemony: "To the extent that a large number of individuals receive the same information, their reactions will be similar. As a result, identical "centers of interest" will be produced and then become the great questions of our time made public by press and radio, and group opinions will be formed which will establish contact with each other" (Ellul 1965: 115-16).

It is because of this dependence on the media that Madan Sarup of London's South Bank University asks, "What is the relationship between the media and the masses? Without the media, there are no masses; without the masses, there are no 'mass' media." (1993: 166) The people's understanding of themselves *as a people* is communicated to them through the modern mass media: without them, Sarup intimates, such national self-identity would be next to impossible. The irony of this situation is that, taking up Baudrillard's critique of modernity, these nationalizing mass media are, in essence, individualizing: "In Baurillard's increasingly pessimistic view, the function of TV and mass media is to prevent response, to privatize individuals; to place them into a universe of simulacra where it is impossible to

distinguish between the spectacle and the real." (Sarup 1993: 165) Eagleton clarifies the 'how' of this individualization by stating that, "[W]hat is politically important about television is probably less its ideological content than the act of watching it. Watching television for long stretches confirms individuals in passive, isolate, privatized roles, and consumes a good deal of time that could be put to productive political uses. It is more a form of social control than an ideological apparatus." (Eagleton 1991: 34-35) Craig A. Hayden, in his analysis of media system dependency and 9/11, notes the circular nature of such dependence: "[A] mass-audience prone to deferring authority over a specific strategic frame is more likely to be dependent on the structural inequalities of the media system. This is a key example for how social knowledge is constructed and gains its own currency of legitimacy in an uncontested media environment." (Hayden 2003: 17) By learning about their government (and their role in it) through the mass media, individuals' conceptions of such are cemented through the circular functioning of mediated propaganda, which simultaneously inscribes a certain form of reasoning, and prevents dialogue challenging such reasoning. This dual nature of propaganda – that it creates a mass while preventing its members from communicating – is the situation of the "lonely crowd," which Ellul contends is "a natural product of present-day society and which is both used and deepened by the mass media." (1965: 8-9) According to Ellul, this isolation within the mass is the perfect situation for propaganda, as it most easily allows access to individuals, who, were they not alone, might be able to fortify themselves against propaganda's work[73].

[73] Literature once again affords us an extreme view on this enforced isolation so that propaganda may do its work. In his novel *1984*, Orwell states that the aim of the Party is partially "to prevent men and

This introduces the duality of modern propaganda, a system which functions not simply by isolating individuals, but by reducing them to what they share in common with the mass, of which they are a part and are expected to identify with, but with whom they have no ties other than those constructed through propaganda. According to Ellul, modern propaganda cannot separate the individual from the mass, instead individuals must never be considered as such, rather they must always be thought of in terms of "what he[she] has in common with others, such as his[her] motivations, his[her] feelings, or his[her] myths. [The individual] is reduced to an average (...) the individual is considered part of the mass and included in it (...) because in that way his[her] psychic defenses are weakened, his[her] reactions are easier to provoke, and the propagandist profits from the process of diffusion of emotions through the mass, and, at the same time, from the pressures felt by an individual when in a group." (1965: 7)

However, it is not enough that the modern individual be isolated from others (be it physically or psychically) in order for propaganda to work – modern individuals must be reached on every level of their consciousness, in every aspect of their lives. Propaganda must be total in order to be effective, not because the individual may choose between media that are not propagandized and media that are (for as Ellul contends, no such distinction exists), but rather because totalizing propaganda must not allow itself to be subverted by local influences. To that end, propaganda must attack from all sides, using all media available:

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women from forming loyalties which it might not be able to control" (1977: 65), while Huxley's *Brave New World* (1965) engineers romantic emotions out of people so that they might never fall in love, or hate, and by so doing tear apart society's apathetic and receptive complacent stability.

> "Each usable medium has its own particular way of penetration – specific, but at the same time localized and limited; by itself it cannot attack the individual, break down his resistance, make his decisions for him. (…) Each medium is particularly suited to a certain type of propaganda. The movies and human contact (…) slow infiltration, progressive inroads (…) Public meetings and posters (…) shock propaganda, intense but temporary (…) The press tends more to shape general views; radio is likely to be an instrument of international action and psychological warfare, whereas the press is used domestically." (Ellul 1965: 9-10)

It is *still* not enough that individuals be bombarded on several levels, for this does not imply a conscious propaganda, merely a plurality of messages that do not necessarily have any coherent aim. Rather, all these various media must be centrally controlled: "To make the organization of propaganda possible, the media must be concentrated, the number of news agencies reduced, the press brought under single control, and radio and film monopolies established. The effect will be still greater if the various media are concentrated in the same hands." (Ellul 1965: 102) Surely we can agree that in the age of Conrad Blacks and Rupert Murdochs, of Ted Turners and Izzy Aspers, Ellul's conditions for propaganda have been met. As we shall see with the dispersion of information regarding the events of September 11, 2001, people's heavy dependence on the mainstream media - those located squarely in Ellul's 'concentrated ownership' - reinforce Ellul's third major condition for successfully organized propaganda, mainly that the message of these concentrated sources be *widely diffused and accessed* throughout society.

It is while addressing this issue of diffusion that we come to the question of the debate surrounding the supposed difference between information, education, and propaganda. On this Ellul is very clear: "No contrast can be tolerated between teaching and propaganda, between the critical spirit formed by higher education and the exclusion of independent thought. One must utilize the education of the young to condition them to what comes later." (1965: 13) Again, this is nowhere near as Huxleyan as it initially appears. John Stuart Mill specified that "[I]t is the societal purpose served by state education (…) to "train the minds of the people to a virtuous attachment to their government," and to the arrangements of the social, economic, and political order more generally." (in Chomsky 2003: 13) According to Terence Qualter, public education serves as the major socializing forum for patriotic and nationalistic propaganda, for it is here that the established values of society are passed on to the next generation[74]. Qualter further specifies, and I concur, that generally, "the things we believe in will be treated as education, and (…) what we don't believe in will be dismissed as propaganda." (1985: 119) While we may easily enough agree that education may relatively clearly (and without too much negativism) serve to indoctrinate the people, the question of the distinction between propaganda and information is trickier: information is often touted as being 'factual', or based on and addressed to reason and experience, whereas propaganda is said to be aimed at feelings and passions. Being (supposedly) obviously irrational, propaganda is

[74] Interestingly, the passage dealing with this issue in Qualter's work reads: "Despite the survival of some rhetoric to the contrary, education systems in liberal democracies, *as much as in totalitarian regimes*, are held responsible for protecting and passing on the established values of the society." (1985: 118, my emphasis)

generally thought to be clearly distinguishable from the 'facts' that one may supposedly use to counter it. This distinction is not so easy to make, Ellul argues convincingly: "There is, of course, some truth in this, but the reality is not so simple. (...) there is a propaganda based exclusively on facts, statistics, economic ideas. (...) but it is still propaganda, for it uses these *facts* to *demonstrate, rationally*, the superiority of its system and to demand everybody's support." (1965: 84, emphasis in original) Put another way, an individual so propagandized will adhere intellectually to that which is put to him, because the material in question is presented didactically, and although "he can express his conviction clearly and logically (...) it is not *genuine* because the information, the data, the reasoning that have led him to adhere to the group were themselves deliberately falsified in order to lead him there." (Ellul 1965: 81) Therefore, "his action is not his own, though he believes it is." (Ellul 1965: 80)

Education therefore serves to lay the foundation on which later, overt propaganda will establish itself. In this sense, education serves as both propaganda (in the learning of patriotic duty and National History, for example) and as pre-propaganda (in that it accustoms individuals to receiving information that remains above challenge):

> "Seen from this angle, pre-propaganda does not have a precise ideological objective; it has nothing to do with an opinion, an idea, a doctrine. It proceeds by psychological manipulations, by character modifications, by the creation of feelings or stereotypes useful when the time comes. It must be continuous,

slow, imperceptible. Man must be penetrated in order to shape such tendencies. He must be made to live in a certain psychological climate." (Ellul 1965: 31)

Much like discipline, which serves to habituate individuals to the molding process, education habituates the individual to certain symbols and codes, which then provoke conditioned reflexes for (it is hoped) the rest of that individual's life. Political education (propaganda) serves to (disciplinarily) mold the individual, "training him so that certain words, signs, or symbols, even certain persons or facts, provoke unfailing reactions." (*Ibid*)[75] The ultimate success of such propaganda is when it can tap into (or create) an all-encompassing myth, such as the master narratives that for centuries helped organize (and legitimize) human thought and experience (for example the Bible, or Columbus's 'discovery' of the Americas, or the *mission civilizatrice* that was the White Man's Burden…) The point of such a myth, and its utility for the propagandist, is that it provides an "all-encompassing, activating image" (*Ibid*) by which the modern individual will live. This image "pushes man to action precisely because it includes all that he feels is good, just, and true." (*Ibid*) It is only when such reflexes have become second-nature (Ellul calls this 'living within the myth'[76]) that the modern individual can be mobilized within propaganda's overt aims, whatever they may be (winning a war, scapegoating a new enemy, fortifying one's nation against hardship, etc.).

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[75] George Orwell provides us with a clear example of such Pavlovian response, one which, in light of the recent War on Terror and its subsequent racial profiling, no longer seems so extreme: speaking of the daily Two Minutes Hate, Orwell's Winston Smith explains that "the sight or even the thought of Goldstein produced fear and anger automatically" (1977: 13), and yet "[T]he horrible thing about the Two Minutes Hate was not that one was obliged to act a part, but that it was impossible to avoid joining in." (1977: 14)

[76] See Ellul 1965: 32.

The propaganda of the modern age has less to do with making the people accept a specific idea (though it certainly may); rather its aim is to provoke action (or inaction) – the Pavlovian responses to calls from the state. While Ellul's text might have seemed, in the 1960s, to have alarmist overtones, applying perhaps only to Communism, his assertion that propaganda's goal is to make "the individual cling irrationally to a process of action" (1965: 25) can rather easily be supported by the War on Iraq begun under George W. Bush – despite the absence of *any* proof of involvement *whatsoever* with the terrorist organizations sought by the Bush administration in the War on Terror, the American people have been, largely successfully it would seem, propagandized to believe that not only was Saddam Hussein's regime *terrorist*, it was intending the United States harm. As we shall later see in Chapter 3, this is an approach that functions on several levels – the individual believes there is an easily identifiable enemy (in this case the Arab Other: Saddam), that something of intrinsic moral value is in danger (the Freedom of the West: symbolized by the United States), and that a specific course of action is obvious and desirable (in this case: War). Again, while facts and figures are presented and *resemble* information, it remains propaganda just the same due to the nature of the information presented (and what is not) and the how/why it is done so (or not). The choice of symbols, the stakes of the war, etc., all are chosen to "arouse an active and mythical belief" (*Ibid*) which short-circuits "all thought and decision." (Ellul 1965: 27) It is because of the constraints of modern democracies – where citizens want to participate and are expected to, but are incapable of such – that government finds it so convenient to simply guide opinion where it determines it ought to go. It is because

of the constraints of trying to govern a modern state – with its dense population, diverse interests, and complicated problems – that "[W]e are living in a time when systematically – though without our wanting it so – action and thought are being separated." (*Ibid*) To prompt such spontaneous action when it is needed, propaganda furnishes the modern state with Pavlovian subjects, for [propaganda] "does not seek to create wise or reasonable men, but proselytes and militants," (Ellul 1965: 28) who are subject to myths and calls to arms[77] to defend those myths.

Just as the propagandized individual must follow the *cause* (for example, the War in Iraq) if not the *argument*, should the argument *change* (No, there were no WMDs in Iraq, we are there to democratize), the propagandized individual does not necessarily cease "to follow the line when there is a sharp turn. He continues to follow it because he is caught up in the system." (Ellul 1965: 18) Once again I appeal to George Orwell for an example of such blind following: "it had been announced that Oceania was not after all at war with Eurasia. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. Eurasia was an ally. There was, of course, no admission that any change had taken place. Merely it became known, with extreme suddenness and everywhere at once, that Eastasia and not Eurasia was the enemy." (1977: 180) It is along these lines, and in keeping with the idea that the propagandized individual will not blink at a change

[77] These 'calls to arms' should not be thought of solely militarily, but rather each time the State calls on its citizens to accept reforms, new taxes, restrictions, etc. The State usually finds some greater myth to which to appeal in order to legitimize whatever is being imposed on its citizens. Richard Rorty uses the idea of the Nation to exemplify such an ideologically (propagandized) appeal: "Consider, as a final example, the attitude of contemporary American liberals to the unending hopelessness and misery of the lives of the young blacks in American cities. Do we say that these people must be helped because they are our fellow human beings? We may, but it is much more persuasive, morally as well as politically, to describe them as our fellow *Americans* – to insist that it is outrageous that an *American* should live without hope." (in Eagleton 1991: frontispiece, emphasis in original)

in *reason* so long as the *cause* remains, that Ellul contends "[T]he propagandist does not necessarily have to worry about coherence and unity in his claims." (1965: 18) Orwell once again obliges us:

> "The speech had been proceeding for perhaps twenty minutes when a messenger hurried onto the platform and a scrap of paper was slipped into the speaker's hand. He unrolled it and read it without pausing in his speech. Nothing altered in his voice or manner, or in the content of what he was saying, but suddenly the names were different. Without words said, a wave of understanding rippled through the crowds. Oceania was at war with Eastasia! The next moment there was a tremendous commotion. The banners and posters with which the square was decorated were all wrong! Quite half of them had the wrong faces on them. It was sabotage! The agents of Goldstein had been at work!" (1977: 181)

We cannot however, interpret this to mean that any cause or argument will willingly be taken up by the propagandized individual: "propaganda cannot easily create a political or economic problem out of nothing. There must be some reason in reality. The problem need not actually exist, but there must be a reason why it *might* exist." (Ellul 1965: 114, emphasis in original) In this sense propaganda must rest on the reality of the individual, on what the individual knows to be true. Therefore the information that citizens are provided with in order to construct their reality is key to the laying of the groundwork of what might or might not exist as a problem requiring state intervention; narrative tradition establishes certain individuals/groups of

individuals as acceptable enemies (the Arab, for example, has for centuries furnished the West with an Other who is perhaps at times mysterious and alluring, but always dangerous), while mediated news establish for the public those issues of the day requiring concern and attention. In this sense, "information actually generates the problems that propaganda exploits and for which it pretends to offer solutions. In fact, no propaganda can work until the moment when a set of facts has become a *problem* in the eyes of those who constitute public opinion." (Ellul 1965: 114, emphasis in original) This idea of the manipulation of perceived risk versus actual risk will be addressed momentarily, but for now let us inquire what this manipulation means for democratic principles. If we concede that modern democracy depends on an unthinking, molded populace, "it is evident that a conflict exists between the principles of democracy – particularly its concept of the individual – and the processes of propaganda. The notion of rational man, capable of thinking and living according to reason, of controlling his passions and living according to scientific patterns, of choosing freely between good and evil – all this seems opposed to the secret influences, the mobilizations of myths, the swift appeals to the irrational, so characteristic of propaganda." (Ellul 1965: 233)

Ellul asks whether it is possible to make democratic propaganda, and while he concedes that propaganda may be made in favor of, or on behalf of democracy, he is adamant that we "dismiss the idea that simple difference of content would mean a difference in character." (1965: 235) Propaganda, according to Ellul, is fundamentally anti-democratic in character, and in essence totalitarian, "not because it is the

handmaiden of the totalitarian State, but because it has a tendency to absorb everything." (1965: 242) As we have seen, propaganda must be total, must reach the individual on every level, in every aspect of his life, in order to function as it should. Distinguishing between the propaganda of the nineteenth century, and even early twentieth century propaganda, which Ellul contends sought to reach the citizen *on an individual basis* in order to change the citizen's *ideas* (in order to win him/her to another doctrine), he argues that *modern* propaganda, being concerned with the *actions* of individuals acting *en mass*, acts outside the individual. Gone are the days of the state fighting to win the opinion as expressed of the individual – the individual has been taken out of the equation, and now "[F]reedom to express ideas is no longer at stake in this debate (…) he [the individual] is no longer a participant in this battle for the free expression of ideas: he is the stake. *What matters for him is which voice he will be permitted to hear and which words will have the power to obsess him.*" (Rivero, in Ellul 1965: 237-38, my emphasis)

As the state controls the 'words that will obsess' the individual, what chance has the individual to form opinions outside the bounds of the debatable? Put differently, "what happens when the game is "rigged"? What happens when the ability to "collectively sense-make" is controlled (explicitly or implicitly) by the competitive interests capable of manipulating the structural relationships between media and public discourse? What happens when *someone* else "constructs the factuality of the political world"?" (Pan and Kosicki, in Hayden 2003: 11) It is along this line of thinking that Qualter can confidently, and somewhat mournfully, state

that, "Democracy cannot be much more than a sham if public opinion is based only on what the government chooses to make public." (1985: 152) The danger in thinking that propaganda is what 'the bad guys' do is that it ignores the construction – the industrialization, as indeed it is, relying as it does on so much industry (the media in all forms, on all levels, from textbooks to films, TV to newspapers, radio and satellite) and of the participation (whether knowing or not) of so many different aspects of social life – of public opinion. Such thinking ignores the role of "[C]ensors in a dozen guises, the guardians of official secrets, the gatekeepers and the agenda-setters all control, limit, restrict the information available to the public. There can be no informed rational public opinion because the public is seldom given enough information. And what information is supplied is likely to be distorted, weighted, and manipulated by the propagandists." (Qualter 1985: 168)

Opinion

All is not lost, however, in realizing the *un*natural nature of public opinion: conceding that public opinion is steered according to propaganda should not overlook that it can *only* be steered – it cannot be dragged, kicking and screaming, to toe the government line. There is a wealth of scholarship studying the social construction of public opinion, and across all the fields in which it is studied, be it media studies, advertising, political science, sociology, etc., there is general agreement that "[T]he social communication through which public opinion is formed consists of everything, from conversations between neighbours, discussion at street-corners or in the pub; rumour, gossip, speculation, "inside dope," debate between members of the family at

home, expressions of opinion and views in private meetings, and so on, all the way up to the more formal levels, with which the mass media intersect. The organizing of "public opinion" takes place at *all* these levels of social interchange." (Hall *et al.*, in Stabile 2001: 261)[78] Determining what public opinion *is* on any given subject does not in fact necessarily signify *anything*: "we have only imperfect knowledge of the predispositions of the audience, and can only infer attitude change. Even declared opinion shift is not necessarily proof of behavioural change. People may 'give in' to persuasive argument because they are tired of the argument and because agreement is less taxing than continued opposition." (Qualter 1985: 132) Such *appearance* of public opinion often serves as a substitute for the *existence* of such: "People may not agree, in fact, with law and order policies, but the appearance of consent in the media may have what Bourdieu describes as "reality effects". Specifically, the appearance of consent may lead members of the public (not to mention the media and politicians) to behave as if that consent did exist." (Stabile 2001: 266)[79] An unfortunate example of such a case is the support that the USA PATRIOT Act is said to have in the United States, simply because: (a) both the Senate and the House voted overwhelmingly in favor of the bill (implying the support of their constituents), and (b) there was no explicit and equally overwhelmingly expressed objection to the act. Silence was

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[78] To these variables composing public debate, Qualter adds: "Other variables (…) include: the existing opinions of the audience, the audience evaluation of the source, the source credibility and authority, the salience of the issue to different audiences, the medium chosen, the audience evaluation of the medium, the cohesiveness of the audience, extent of monopoly of media, level of dissonance created by message, familiarity with the issue, order of presentation of arguments, personal involvement of audience in issue, limits imposed by literacy, intelligence, or memory, skepticism or confusion created by previous communications, and so on." (1985: 138) If public opinion is so variably dependent, as mentioned earlier, interpretability of any given statement is so, too. This is what Bakhtin termed the "dialogical principle". Please see Brockmeier and Harré 1997: 271 for more on this.

[79] For more on this appearance of public consent and its consequences, please see Kuran's (1995) *Private Truths, public lies: the social consequence of preference falsification.*

therefore interpreted to mean agreement. It is in this sense that academics are increasingly uncomfortable with the entire notion of 'public opinion', as too often it "functions rather like the trope of the silent majority: it signifies only insofar as politicians and journalists want it to signify within the context of a given argument. All too frequently, it is used to fill in gaps in the logic of arguments, and it ultimately serves as a prophylactic against political or intellectual accountability. After all, in the marketplace of ideas, how can an opinion be wrong, especially when it is an opinion attributed to a majority?" (Stabile 2001: 265)

It is this impossibility of certainty in correlating a given opinion and action with a specific reason (and thereby establishing absolute[80] propaganda) that we can begin to understand the enormous task set before the Democratic state: in such need for successful propaganda, if only to allow the state to *work*, propaganda must be total and it must maintain hegemony, but in democracy, it cannot do so through violence or coercion, but must do so through 'softer' means, using hegemonic constraints, ideological guidance, and disciplinary technologies, none of which are guaranteed: "All these accounts of personality and policy divisions within propaganda agencies, the heated battles between rival organizations for control of the propaganda instrument, and the struggle by propagandists to reach even the fringes of the policy-making process, destroy any notion of a cold, efficient, all-powerful national propaganda machine able to manipulate the public mind at will." (Qualter 1985: 144)

[80] Note the difference here between 'absolute' and 'total' propaganda – the one implies certainty of effect, the other the range over which it is applied. In this sense absolute propaganda is impossible, although a relatively successful propaganda may be totally applied, that is, over all available media and regarding all obvious aspects of an individual's life.

It is this inability of the Democratic state to enforce (unless under extreme situations) the propaganda that it puts forth that "gives propaganda in totalitarian regimes the potential for greater influence, *because it is easier to impose the controlled environment in which it flourishes*." (Qualter 1985: 148, my emphasis)

How then is the Democratic state to attempt its control of the social environment? Because, as we have seen, in the modern state individuals access information about their world through mediated means, "opinion depends to a large extent on such intermediary channels of information" (Ellul 1965: 101), and therefore "[T]he mass media (…) can and do contribute to the fostering of a climate of conformity, *not by the total suppression of dissent, but by the presentation of views which fall outside the consensus as curious heresies*" (Miliband, in Qualter 1985: 149, my emphasis). It is, again, through the bounding of debate that hegemony is maintained. In the Democratic state, although there may certainly be governmental constraints placed on the media during certain situations – as in times of war – generally the media have a relatively free reign. What then are the structural constraints bounding debate, if there are none legally or illegally enforced? While we have seen that the narrative format imposes certain restrictions on communication (such as the selection of beginnings and endings for events that may not otherwise have them), in order to make sense to any given public, the manner in which such a narration is made available to the public is key. Because now, more than ever, individuals rely on the media for their sense-making, the role of the media in determining what is to made sense *of* is vital to our understanding of the construction

and maintenance of hegemony for social stability. The functioning of the media as a tool for such communication is therefore our next stumbling block in trying to understand how fear is made use of to govern.

The Marketplace of Ideas

In his text *The Captive Public*, Benjamin Ginsberg clarified the purpose of his inquiry: "What I am interested in explaining is why, of the many ideas conceived, a very small number are attractive to institutional, political, and social forces; I am not seeking to explain where ideas originate but rather why ideas are advocated." (1986: 111) Despite the apparent total freedom of the press, very little diversity of view point or even of information is expressed in western democracies: Why should this be? According to Ginsberg, the key to understanding this is ridding ourselves of the notion of a 'free press': "Westerners often equate freedom of opinion and expression with the absence of state interference. The freedom of opinion found in the western democracies, however, is not the unbridled freedom of some state of nature. It is rather the structured freedom of a public forum constructed and maintained by the state." (1986: 87) According to his research, the concept of a public space (and indeed of 'the public' who occupies it) is a recent invention, dating back only two hundred or so years. It is only since the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that western governments have made use of their carefully maintained "marketplace of ideas", which "effectively disseminates the beliefs and ideas of upper classes while subverting the ideological and cultural independence of the lower classes." (Ginsberg 1986: 86) Just because incidents of overt repression are relatively infrequent in the

West (and even then, most often justified by occurring during times of war and the like) does not mean that there is no regulation whatsoever of public debate. As Qualter so concisely puts it, "Denial of access to information is a more potent weapon of censorship than trying to control the publication of what is already known." (1985: 154)

As we have seen with the exercise of power that has specific aims without specific planners[81], it is not so much a case of conspiratorial meetings between 'Those in Power', where it is decided what will or won't be communicated to the public (although, as we shall see with Rupert Murdoch's Fox News channel, this certainly can and does happen); such organization is not reproduced throughout society in general – Ted Turner and Conrad Black do not have breakfast meetings during which they decide to paint the Palestinian movement as 'terrorist'. However, if this is so, how does it come to be that there is widespread agreement in the media on such a portrayal? Qualter, in his study of opinion in democracies, specifies that it is the heavy concentration of ownership that results in a narrowly defined public agenda, making it extremely difficult for outsiders to bring other matters or perspectives to public attention. (1985) Ellul concurs, adding that while the concentration of mass media does not *inevitably* produce propaganda (or any one position, which may be the same thing), it is the *necessary prerequisite* for it, creating a situation in which propaganda can reach the greatest number of people on the same level[82].

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[81] See Chapter 1, specifically pp. 8-9, of this text.
[82] See Ellul 1965, particularly pp. 102-05 regarding the question of concentrated ownership.

Noam Chomsky, in his celebrated *Necessary Illusions*, provides the outline of an answer as to why this concentration of ownership might result in propaganda, despite a lack of overt managerial direction of the news, such as is found in a state-controlled press: "What is at issue is not the honesty of opinions expressed or the integrity of those who seek the facts but rather the choice of topics and highlighting of issues, the range of opinion permitted expression, the unquestioned premises that guide reporting and commentary, and the general framework imposed for the presentation of a certain view of the world." (2003: 11-12) It is therefore structural constraints, beyond the banal concentration of ownership (which implies managerial direction – the determining of what viewpoint to privilege, for example), that result in a mass media that help maintain an ideology of isolated individualization that permits the continuation of the system of late capitalism for which fear proves to be a key (and easy) means of control. Everything from what Rose termed the "little body techniques,"[83] whereby, for example, modern individuals are accustomed to receiving the news at certain times of day (and therefore those *planning* events time them to coordinate with late editions or with evening newscasts), to the market mechanisms that have helped to determine "what bleeds, leads", to the technological and format limits on how a news narrative is constructed, all these lead to a situation which

[83] Rose's "little body techniques" (1999: 52) are explained in Ellul's work, in which he also mentions, "that modern technical instruments have their own weight and by themselves change political structures." (1965: 252-53) In a footnote to his text, Ellul remarks that, "a televised sessions of Congress or the Cabinet is not a *true* session, cannot be a true session. In such a televised session, "the public sees the responsible government in action, but only as a political show performed by humanized stars who play a role." (Albig, in Ellul 1965: 253, emphasis in original) For its part, the news, surely a political matter (even without the fashionably contested adage 'everything is political'), both constructed and communicated along technological lines, must be considered altered by such considerations. Virtuous or vicious circle, we expect news to look a certain way, and as such, it is so presented, perpetuating both its expectation and its construction.

cannot help but be hegemonic, and therefore facilitate the dispersion of propaganda, which may, as part of its many techniques, make use of fear in order to maintain that same hegemony.

More than any other factor, perhaps because it is the subtlest and the most difficult to pinpoint (and therefore to react against), the marketplace of ideas, constructed as part of the nineteenth century nation-building project of many states, imposes the most constraints on the format and content of mediated messages. It was not until this time that a 'public' even existed which could become 'mass': "Prior to the nineteenth century, public opinion was stratified by class, region, religion, ethnicity, and so on." (Ginsberg 1986: 87) Society was made up of a hierarchy of relatively independent groups that had very little to do with one another, until western governments, seeking to (construct and) solidify their 'nations', "launched vigorous efforts to encourage the development of mass communications, to promote popular literacy, and to expand individual freedom of speech and of the press." (*Ibid*) The knitting together of civil society into a single nation of shared interests required a marketplace of ideas, a "national forum in which the views of all strata would be exchanged. The construction of this marketplace had five principle components: language, literacy, perception, communications, and jurisprudence." (Ginsberg 1986: 92)[84]

[84] For a different, although parallel, take on this construction of national identity, please see Hobsbawm 1994. Also of interest is, of course, Benedict Anderson's (1994) "Imagined Communities".

States like France, Spain and Germany established a *single* national language, and "[W]ith the advent of universal, compulsory education, of course, almost all children were taught to read and write the mother tongue." (Ginsberg 1986: 93) Besides establishing a common language for all citizens, compulsory education facilitated universal literacy, which in turn created a mass audience able to receive civic instruction *beyond* the classroom. The creation of a shared perception of the nation required the setting of a common calendar, standard time, a shared notion of geography and demography (so that citizens might know to which nation they belonged and in what capacity), a shared history, etc[85]. This common framework of perceptions "by no means ensured agreement among the various and disparate elements of the populace, but nevertheless it was essential for the achievement of even meaningful disagreement." (Ginsberg 1986: 94-95) As we saw with Ellul, the importance of this shared framework is not to be overlooked, as it is just such a common perception that allows identical "centers of interest" to be formed, and directly related "to the extent that a large number of individuals receive the same information, their reactions will be similar." (Ellul 1965: 115-16) It is in fact through mass literacy that the mass public was created, receptive to "those with a capacity to produce and promote their ideas – a capacity most frequently found at the upper levels of the social and economic hierarchy." (Ginsberg 1986: 93-94)

It is here that we begin to see how the marketplace of ideas serves to maintain dominant groups in power: "Whatever their particular ideology, those groups and forces that can muster the most substantial financial, institutional, educational, and

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[85] Please see Ginsberg 1986, particularly pp. 92-98, regarding the construction of the marketplace of ideas.

organizational resources – or, as we shall see later, access to state power – are the ones best able to promote their ideas in the marketplace." (Ginsberg 1986: 131) As it is generally the wealthy, upper and upper-middle classes that have this capacity, they are generally the ones to dominate the idea market. Not only do these groups dominate the *production* (in the creation, promotion and dissemination) of ideas, they dominate the *consumption* of such. As a result, "[I]t is the economic importance of the "upscale" audience rather than prejudice on the part of journalists that tends to bias media news" (Ginsberg 1986: 89) towards a certain perspective and style, as we shall see. It is in this sense that we can understand Ginsberg's assertion that "While westerners usually equate the marketplace with freedom of opinion, the hidden hand of the market can be almost as potent an instrument of control as the iron fist of the state." (*Ibid*) It is a testament to the understated power of the marketplace of ideas to act as a constraining force that, "[T]he construction of a national idea market and the emergence of a measure of similarity among the views of disparate social strata are often described as aspects of "political development" or "modernization," terms suggesting that these phenomena should be seen as natural and probably desirable historical processes." (Ginsberg 1986: 103)

The Media

> "Reporters are puppets. They simply respond to the pull of the most powerful strings." (President Lyndon Johnson, in London 1993: 5)

If public education paves the way for propaganda and an ingrained understanding of one's role in society, then mass media *maintain* this. Media analysts Maxwell E. McComb and Donald L. Shaw shed light on the power of the press in modern state, specifying that "the mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think *about*." (in London 1993: 4, my emphasis), an observation which causes Qualter to assert that "if an issue is not taken up by the media, then for large sections of the population it does not exist." (1985: 166) Such a perspective is shared by cultural theorist Hayden White, who remarks that, "The power of the press in America is a primordial one. It sets the agenda of the public discussion; and this sweeping political power is unrestrained by any law. It determines what people will talk and think about – an authority that in other nations is reserved for tyrants, priests, parties and mandarins." (in London 1993: 4) Because of the impossibilities of relating *all* information pertinent to governing *directly* to *all* citizens, "[I]n industrial societies, the body of information from which (…) ideas are built, is invariably received at second hand. That is, it arrives already processed by the mass media and this means that the information has been subject to alternative definitions of what constitutes 'news' and how it should be gathered and presented. The information is further structured by the various commercial and political constraints in which newspapers, radio and television operate." (Cohen 2002: 7) It is the 'news' that furnishes us with knowledge about the "normative contours of society. It informs us about right and wrong, about the boundaries beyond which one should not venture and about the shapes that the devil can assume. The gallery of folk types – heroes and saints, as

well as fools, villains and devils – is publicized not just in oral-tradition and face-to-face contact but to much larger audiences and with much greater dramatic resources." (Cohen 2002: 8) Because "television takes up more of the typical American's waking hours than interpersonal interaction" (Iyengar 1992: 85), the importance of who gets to determine the characters in the "gallery of folk types" that are communicated to this "much larger audience" is key to the reconstruction of society's dominant values. More often than not, those in a position to make such a determination are those *already* in dominant positions, but this privileging of their position "is not based on a dominant group's structural position as gatekeepers of specialized knowledge so much as it is on their overall accessibility and the mere fact that the very essence of their position as politicians, police personal (sic), etc. facilitates the material demands imposed upon the newsmaking process itself – deadlines, constant turnover, quoting sources, etc." (Hier 2002: 320) It is the media's increasing reliance on information originating from certain sources that facilitates the power of such groups to frame debate. As we shall see, increasingly, "the media rely on information not ferreted out by investigative reporters but provided by government. This reliance on officially-provided information is such that journalists as prominent as Tom Wicker of *The New York Times* have described it as the 'biggest weakness' of the American press." (Heise, in London 1993: 6)

But are we sure the media exercise such influence? If the upper classes who dominate the marketplace of ideas were the only ones subject to it, the social cohesion required for social stability would not exist. Regardless of the impact of the

various factors involved in opinion formation, and there are many as we have seen, the fact is that shared mediated narratives about the world *do* in fact result in a shared perception of it: "If we examine the distribution of opinion within the lower-income sector of the populace, not only do the political views of heavy media users differ from those who do not report much media exposure but, significantly, the distribution of opinions among lower-income heavy users tends to be more similar to the distribution of opinion within the upscale public." (Ginsberg 1986: 147) The crucial element to note in this is that this shared perception of the world, independent of other opinion-forming factors, is *dependent upon heavy media use* – as is the case with public education forming at least a common basis for argument, heavy media use results in individuals having very much the same frames of reference for understanding their world. The marketplace of ideas can therefore only effectively act to privilege a certain world view *if* the individual is tapping into that market: "The more exposed they are to the market, the more likely ordinary people are to see the world through the eyes of the upper classes." (Ginsberg 1986: 148) Those media that can reach a large enough audience to begin establishing such a commonly held world view are those controlled by the upper classes – major corporations, international conglomerates, etc. While it is worth noting again that there is not necessarily a conspiratorial consensus between major media providers regarding just what this 'commonly held world view' will resemble, Qualter is correct when he remarks that "[M]edia, not the events themselves, make the news." (1985: 164) It is therefore the functioning of the media – how stories are chosen, constructed, communicated – that

will reveal how the hidden hand of the marketplace of ideas acts to reinforce hegemonic, and disciplinary, constraints on individuals' thinking.

George Orwell once commented that, "Early in life I had noticed that no event is ever exactly reported in a newspaper." (in Z 2004: 118) Reading or watching the daily news however, individuals, unless they are intimately acquainted with the 'facts' of the story, are rarely able to distinguish what or where the author has omitted or embellished his narrative. Journalist Robert Fulford explains: "At their most accomplished, journalistic narratives may appear natural and inevitable, as if each story *had* to be told and could not have been told another way. But the facts are chosen and shaped by journalists, and necessarily reflect their interests and traditions." (1999: 80) Communications analyst Denis McQuail clarifies, remarking on the constructed nature of the journalistic narrative: "News does not record reality as it happens but is a somewhat arbitrary, culturally patterned, version of this 'reality' which meets the expectations of audience and fits the production and distribution requirements of mass media systems." (in Qualter 1985: 160) While these production and distribution requirements will be touched on throughout the following discussion, briefly they include (but are not limited to): financial constraints (the media are, after all, big business), corporate sponsorship obligations, deadlines (particularly regarding late editions and evening newscasts), time constraints (resulting in 'soundbites' for example), etc. All these constraints act to shape the news that people receive and accept as the way the world 'is'.

If "[E]vents only become news when they are published," (Qualter 1985: 160) then as the headline reads, "News is What Newspapermen Make It." (Gieber, in Qualter 1985: 161) As Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, editors of *PR Watch: Public Interest Reporting on the PR/Public Affairs Industry*, surmise, "[T]he news media offer two basic services to people who are trying to understand the world: information-gathering and information-filtering." (2003: 161) Not only do the news media gather the facts of the goings-on of the world, they *edit* them into a coherent timeline of events, offering the public an explanatory narration that offers closure to events that may not (indeed probably do not) have such closure. According to Fulford, early journalists "understood narrative as the most persuasive method of organizing an account of reality and understood also that every narrative needs a sense of purpose. Neutrality in storytelling, which newspapers sometimes claimed they were delivering, is probably an impossible goal and in any case is certain to cripple the act of storytelling." (1999: 77-78) The 'invention of the news', as Fulford calls it, remains for him one of the most important moments of the development of human society, giving "humanity a new way to assemble facts, stories, and ideas – a frame, a grid in which to place and assimilate events." (Fulford 1999: 71) Those companies that excel in the mass media environment are those that can tap into the need individuals have for a good story: "*Time* magazine's carefully calculated approach to the transmission of news stories arose from an understanding of the connection between fiction and reporting, and from the knowledge that journalism can never be a simple, straightforward account of events in the world. It is always a likeness, a semblance, a simulacrum." (Fulford 1999: 80)[86] As an imitation of reality,

[86] In fact, Fulford continues to state of television giant CBS, "like all other broadcasters (…) [it pieces]

journalistic narrative follows the inclinations of its makers as much as it does the 'facts' of any given story it is ordering. It is here again that we can raise Foucault's objections to Enlightenment notions of objectivity, and demonstrate the ingrained nature of temporal bias. Even the very notion of objectivity masks that fact that not only are we not objective, we *cannot* be, and in trying to argue that we are/can, we may gloss over the assumptions inherent in pursuing such objectivity. As Stanford Professor of Communication Theodore Glasser argues, "objective reporting is biased against the very idea of responsibility; the day's news is viewed as something journalists are compelled to *report*, not something they are responsible for *creating*" (in London 1993: 7, my emphasis). How is it then, that the news is created, and how does it impact on its consumers?

Jacques Ellul was already arguing the central position of television in the modern individual's life in the 1960s, before the advent of satellite TV, before 24-hour cable news channels, before, as Shanto Iyengar has stated, television took up more time "of the typical American's waking hours than interpersonal interaction." (1992: 85) Speaking of the role that TV would have to play in the dissemination of propaganda, Ellul foresaw "that TV is destined to become a principle arm, for it can

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together little bits of film or tape until they look like reality." (1999: 83) Recapping Baudrillard's scathing critique of television culture, Madan Sarup summarizes that "TV is dissolved into life, and life is dissolved into TV. The fiction is 'realized' and the 'real' becomes fictitious. Simulation has replaced production." (Sarup 1993: 165) A frighteningly clear example of this "mashing together of images and storylines from fiction and reality" is summarized by Barry Glassner, in what is called the "Cuisinart Effect": "A report by *Dateline NBC* on deaths in Zaire, for instance, interposed clips from *Outbreak*, a movie whose plot involves a lethal virus that threatens to kill the entire U.S. population. Alternating between Dustin Hoffman's character exclaiming "We can't stop it!" and real-life science writer Laurie Garrett, author of *The Coming Plague*, proclaiming that "HIV is not an aberration … it's part of a trend," *Dateline*'s report gave the impression that swarms of epidemics were on their way." (1999b: xxiv) This juxtaposing of the real and the fictitious is in part responsible, according to the likes of Ellul, Glassner, Baudrillard and Qualter, for both the modern individual's dependence on the media, and his/her inability to cope with it.

totally mobilize the individual without demanding the slightest effort from him (...) It asks no decision, no a priori participation, no move from him (such as going to a meeting). But it holds him completely and leaves him no possibility of engaging in other activities." (1965: 254) If individuals are 'at the mercy' of the message of the medium they are consulting (and this is a gross exaggeration), then "television determines what Americans believe to be important issues by paying attention to some problems and ignoring or paying minimal attention to others." (London 1993: 4) Craig A. Hayden calls this reliance on news reception to sense-make of reality 'media system dependency'. (2003) The more complicated the issue, the greater the dependence on the media to provide simplified answers that are comprehensible to an ignorant public. It is in part this increased dependence on the media (particularly in times of crisis) that renders the public more susceptible to the mass media's (either implicit or explicit) support of hegemony – as the public turn to the media to make sense of events, the media turn to recognized and legitimate sources for information with which to buttress and substantiate their narration of the facts.

As we shall see, this media-indexing[87] results in a very specific encoding of reality, as only one perspective is privileged, and if this is so, "[I]f television news is a system of encoding reality, then the intentions of those who encode must be understood before proper decoding can occur." (Dellinger 1995: 11) While Barry

[87] Media indexing is, according to Lance Bennett, "where information about most foreign and military policy is constrained by the news media's "indexing" of their reported information to mostly official government sources (rather than more "objective" or even "critical" sources). This process has become even more predominant as the United States moves to control nearly all aspects of information flow around its international policies, starting with the 1991 Gulf War and now the coverage of the "War on Terror"." (in Hayden 2003: 10)

Glassner, author of *Culture of Fear*, contends that it would be wrong to assume that journalists *alone* are responsible for the content and ideological bent of the news, he warns that "[I]t would be equally wrong, however, to pretend that those interests and experiences have nothing to do with which hazards and categories of victims are favored by the news media." (1999b: 202)

Will Rogers asserted "[A]ll I know is what I read in the papers" (in London 1993: 4), and if we can assume that this applies to most people (Ellul's 'reasonably well informed men'), then as the primary source of the public's knowledge about society's problems (and therefore its heroes and villains), the media could be said to act as a gatekeeper of information – in their selection of 'facts', the media construct our reality. Glassner describes this "media-effects theory" (1999b: xx) in the context of several theories hypothesizing on the media's impact on the public[88]. While a multitude of such theories abound, most of them rest on this idea of the media as gatekeeper, which is itself highly debated.

In Qualter's analysis of the restricting of information in democracies, he criticizes the gatekeeper model, arguing that while certain people (editors, for example) do occupy what may *function* as gatekeeper positions, there is no agreement on what *activates* the gates – there are no guaranteed criteria across all media (TV,

[88] It is in the interest of brevity that I do not detail the principle 'media effects theories' currently used in cultural and media studies. Those theories discussed here are those which demonstrate particularly clearly and least controversially the issue at hand, mainly that the media are to a great extent key to the maintenance of hegemony in society. For an excellent overview of other such theories (hypodermic model, mass society theory, minimal effects model, political socialization and cultivation theories), please see Croteau and Hoynes 2003, particularly pp. 231-64.

print, radio), or even across all outlets of a particular medium (MSNBC, Fox News, CNN). What may sway a particular editor may not move the next, or similar events occurring on different nights or at different times of the day may not receive similar or even comparable treatment. Qualter argues, and there is something to his critique, that there are simply too many variables (both personal – in both the journalist and the editor – and structural – organizational or technical constraints that may vary) in trying to determine the functioning of the gatekeeper role for it to be analytically useful. He concedes that while "[P]ublishing news is necessarily a decision-making process, an acceptance of some communications, and a rejection of most others," and this may *appear* to be gatekeeping, what is crucial to retain from this concession is that "news does not have an independent existence." (1985: 160) If this is so, how is this social construction *constricting*?

If we recall that McCombs and Shaw argued that the media are "stunningly successful in telling us what to think *about*" rather than what to think *per se* (in London 1993: 4), Qualter's support of *agenda-setting* as an alternate paradigm to gatekeeping holds that much more weight. According to this model, the organizing force of the media stems from their capacity to determine and confine the range not of *opinion*, but of *topics available* for discussion. Shanto Iyengar's research supports the use of this paradigm, as he asserts that "agenda-setting research showed that individuals habitually refer to issues or events "in the news" when identifying the nation's social and political problems." (1992: 89) As these mediated concerns change, so too does public perception of those problems facing the nation. In his

research on the War on Drugs and presidential rhetoric, Sociology professor James E. Hawdon positively correlates public perception of social problems with presidential speeches on the matter of drug use in America – as the President focused on drug use, so too did the media (to be expected when the source in question is the President, 'The' official source if ever there was one), and consequently so too did the American people[89]. Barry Glassner's research on public fear also supports this: in a study undertaken to locate the source of people's anxiety, professor Esther Madriz found that, "[T]he interviewees identified the news media as both the source of their fears and *the reason* they believed those fears were valid." (Glassner 1999b: xxi, my emphasis) While it is apparent that agenda-setting clearly plays an important role in the ordering of human reality, the undertaking of this agenda-setting involves more than simply including or excluding certain stories or perspectives – after all, certain events cannot simply be ignored, but if they *must* be included in the news, they must be framed in such a way as to still fit the cultural cannon of acceptable discourse.

According to political scientist and communication professor Robert Entman, media framing is "to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or recommendation." (in

[89] For a more detailed discussion on agenda-setting, please see Hawdon's (2001) analysis of the role of presidential rhetoric related to policy cycles pertaining to moral panics and public perception of social problems. Regarding this question of presidential rhetoric, Barry Glassner's text *The Culture of Fear* examines this very question, finding that "After Reagan's successor, George Bush, declared in his first televised address as president that "the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs," the number of stories on network newscasts *tripled* over the coming few weeks, and public opinion changed significantly. In a nation-wide survey conducted by the *New York Times* and CBS two months into the media upsurge, 64 percent of those polled selected drugs as the country's greatest problem, up from 20 percent five months earlier." (1999b: 133, my emphasis)

Hayden 2003: 4-5) Theories of media effects based on this understanding argue that this 'framing' of events is necessary for our understanding: "ordering the causal logic, ethics, and contexts of the events to lesson the confusion and ambiguity of what transpired. Framing theories argue that the way in which we receive information – indeed, how the story is told, begins to structure how we view what has transpired." (Hayden 2003: 4) While it is important to study the use of certain frames over others in specific analyses of media effects[90] (regarding specific issues or appeals made to specific audiences), the general point to retain here is that such framing is part of "a much more general strategy of "sense-making" that is drawn from the "cultural repertoire of symbolic resources"." (Pan and Kosicki, in Hayden 2003: 5) According to Pan and Kosicki, it is through framing that cultural categories (the "gallery of folk types" – saints and sinners both) are reproduced, maintained, and the boundaries of the social reaffirmed and reinforced[91]. Hayden pursues this line of reasoning, contending that this bounding role of framing establishes the realm of the permissible, and as such implies an evaluative dimension of what is normal, acceptable and worthy.

There are many variables involved in framing, and there are a number of ways to go about emphasizing a particular point of any given story: from episodically to

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[90] For example, Iyengar notes that the style of framing matters regarding long-running issues: "People held society responsible to a greater degree when the news frame was thematic and held individuals responsible to a greater degree when the news frame was episodic." (1992: 95-96) In Hawdon's analysis of the War on Drugs, when thematic framing was used, *society* was perceived as having let down *victims* of drug use, but when episodic framing was used, the *individual* was seen as *shirking his responsibility* to society. Under Reagan, episodic framing dominated, resulting, in part, in *punitive* legislation regarding drug *users* over *rehabilitative* legislation and funding for drug *use*. (2001: 423-26)

[91] Please refer to Hayden 2003: 6 particularly, for Pan and Kosicki's discussion regarding the culturally constructive role of framing.

thematically approaching the stories, the viewpoints that are privileged, how pages are laid out, etc.[92], all impact on the reception of the story. For example, "lead stories exert stronger agenda-setting effects than stories appearing in the middle of the newscast. Similarly, newspaper articles with accompanying photographs prove more influential than articles without pictorial cues." (Iyengar 1992: 89)[93] While people may not pinpoint such banal details as being involved in framing (which often smacks of overt propaganda connotations), it is the very banality of these details that results in the marketplace of ideas being so insidious[94]; unaware that it is at work on them, the public accepts the construction of journalistic narrative, taking for granted not necessarily the *content*, but how it is *presented*, all of which "is related to the materials, skills, and social position from which it is articulated and promoted" (Hayden 2003: 7), directly reflecting the interests of the upper-classes. While we can accept that the constraints of trying to construct a coherent narrative out of countless details and viewpoints necessitates editorializing the content of the story, the hidden strength of framing lies in the fact that "[W]hen a single news frame predominates, as is clearly the case with poverty, crime and terrorism, journalistic practice takes on considerable political significance." (Iyengar 1992: 96) In the case of the War on Terror, as we shall see in Chapter 4, "[T]o the degree individuals are fed a steady diet of episodic as opposed to thematic news about terrorism, characteristics of terrorists will be relatively accessible and therefore used to a greater degree when individuals

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[92] For more on this, please see Kress and van Leuuwen's 1998 chapter "Front Pages: (The Critical) Analysis of Newspaper Layout".

[93] Please see Frosch's fascinating 2001 article "Inside the image factory: stock photography and cultural production", as well as Fishman and Marvin's 2003 article "Portrayals of Violence and Group Difference in Newspaper Photographs: Nationalism and Media" for more on the uses and impact of photography in journalism.

[94] For more on this notion of banality, please see Michael Bilig's famous book on the subject, *Banal Nationalism* (1995), or Yumul and Ozkirimli's (2000) study on the same.

think about causal or treatment responsibility for the issue." (*Ibid*) The danger with this situation, particularly as concerns the War on Terror, is that in many cases people gets *nearly all* their information regarding an act of terrorism from the mass media. Speaking of terrorists, expert J.B. Bell specifies that "[T]hese new transactional gunmen are, in fact, television producers constructing a package so spectacular, so violent, so compelling that the networks, acting as executives, supplying the cameraman and the audience, cannot refuse the offer" (in Weimann 1992: 105). The public is then held captive to a mass media providing stereotypically framed societal *problems* as isolated *events*[95]. By framing problems such as terrorism as being simply events, framing acts to increase the sense of urgency already felt regarding such acts, which, as we shall see, results in a social climate which may spur societal demand or acquiescence (or the appearance of such) for punitive or aggressive measures in response to them. In this sense, framing, because it both frames thought and spurs action, can be considered to "participate in public debate strategically." (Pan and Kosicki, in Hayden 2003: 5-6) Implicit in the act of strategic participation is the fact that "some frames must "win out" over others," and consequently, "there is power embedded in the way in which frames get subsidized over others." (Hayden 2003: 9) It is therefore vital to recognize that "[T]he importance of frames lies not just in the stories that are told, but the *stories that are not told*." (Hayden 2003: 14) Again, the

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[95] Citing one of the many problems with such dependence on mass media, political science professor Thomas Dumm of Amherst College explains that, "[T]elevision monitors event and nonevent equally. (...) The event, as it is covered in the serial procedures of television, is not a development of a situation requiring some resolution, but an intrusion or emergency. Each event subsides into the ground of the uneventful. Cavell suggests that serial procedure is thus "undialextical," so that the manner in which television can be said to monitor events disables interpretive schemes of reversal." (1993: 311) Theoretically (and problematically, as we shall see) this results in a populace blindly accepting the framing of issues provided them by the mass media, which it cannot challenge.

choice of stories is not always necessarily conspiratorial – media constraints inherent in the functioning of mass media may act just as much as actual managerial privileging of certain perspectives over others.

In his analysis of the media, Benjamin Ginsberg concludes, and Noam Chomsky concurs, that the ideological spin presented in the mass media is not so much a result of direct interference from certain groups, as it is that those groups and the mass media share the same interests and therefore cannot help but be in line with one another. It doesn't hurt, however, that upper-income groups constitute the majority of not only idea promoters, but idea *consumers*, and therefore the media, in pursuit of advertising revenue, tends to emphasize positions supported by, and appealing to, such upper-income groups. As a result, such viewpoints are heavily overrepresented, which helps to account for the fact that heavy media users, regardless of their income bracket, tend to agree with concerns originating in upper-income groups.

Such overrepresentation is evident in everything from the choice of "topics covered, the style of coverage, and, in the case of network television, the types of reporters and newscasters who appear on the screen." (Ginsberg 1986: 140) As Chomsky specifies, "it would be an error to suppose that practitioners of the art are typically engaged in *conscious* deceit" (2003: 18, emphasis in original), rather the increasing alignment of editorial content with advertising concerns reflects the increasing reliance on advertising revenue, and "[O]ne of the crudest forms of

censorship by advertisers is the 'refusal to sponsor' in television" (Qualter 1985: 155). More and more media outlets are producing not only casts of characters, but storylines and life-style choices that agree with the advertising focus of that television show's commercials. There is nothing new in this link between the focus of television shows and the advertisers it attracts – the Superbowl tends to attract more beer commercials than feminine hygiene product ads, for example; the alarming change is that the relationship is increasingly being reversed – whereas certain television spots used to attract a certain type of ad, now certain television shows *are geared toward* attracting highly sought-after commercial dollars. As teenagers are now the single most important demographic with disposable income, more and more of the entertainment industry leans towards promoting products that will appeal to teen interests. With the costs of running major media outlets rising ever-higher, it is not surprising that the need to win the big advertising contracts is becoming more of a priority. Qualter points out why it is that individuals ought to be concerned with a mass media at the mercy of corporate sponsorship: "The major social impact of advertising lies in the dependence of the media on advertising revenue, and therefore on the values implicit in a competitive market philosophy." (1985: 186)

While most individuals may be able to point out those obvious manipulations of their emotions in advertising (AT&T commercials, for example, are notorious for making women cry with their depictions of long-burned family bridges being rebuilt), or blatant appeals to sexuality (what do bikini-clad women have to do with beer?), the *real* secret to advertising, and that which makes Qualter compare it to propaganda,

lies in its subtle reinforcing of societal boundaries in "the values implicit in 'life-style' commercials, with their class, occupational, ethnic and sex stereotypes." (1985: 186) Bank commercials frequently showcase affluent, young, white couples seeking loans for their new home; beer commercials generally show young, college-age - also white - men; life-insurance is almost always aimed at healthy, vibrant, white elders; panty-hose are hocked to young, attractive, white-collar white women, etc., etc. By showcasing almost exclusively white, affluent people, these products are not only aimed at this specific demographic, but reinforcing in people's minds that this is the only category that can aspire to such commodities, security, etc. According to Ellul, this acts as "psychological standardization - that is, to use a way of life as the basis of unification and as an instrument of propaganda." (in Qualter 1985: 126)

One of the reasons this is relatively unchallenged, both in the media and in the general public, is that, "[A] commercially sponsored mass media, aligned with the ruling forces in society, cannot be expected to question seriously the social/economic structure of that society. The idea of democracy seems to imply some principle of 'fairness', which would allow all sides to a controversial issue to present their case in the media. The value of this principle is negated when the issue is not put up for public debate at all, when the media avoid the controversy by suppressing the question." (Qualter 1985: 165) A media constantly reinforcing the dominance of, for example, affluent white people, is by extension, unlikely to point out the problems in such a group. For example, Barry Glassner points out that "[U]nderreporting of black victims also has the effect of making white victims seem more ubiquitous than they

are, thereby fueling whites' fears of black criminals, something that benefits neither race." (1999b: 113) Author and media analyst Carol A. Stabile explains why advertising revenue-dependent media participate in, and perpetuate, such stereotyping: appealing to "the business imperatives of commercial media, a crime wave, moral panic, or moral crusade entails a level of serialization of news stories that can be used to temporarily boost and maintain circulation or audience share. Thus, for media dependent on advertising dollars, serialization (particularly in the area of the news, which unlike a decent melodrama cannot guarantee that an enticing scandal will occur each week) represents a significant business strategy." (2001: 273-74) While white-collar crime – too often defined as being 'victimless,' despite the fact that its offences include fraud (tax, mail, securities, credit, etc.), bribery, embezzlement, etc., all of which affect *someone* – is generally agreed upon by sociologists and criminologists alike as being "more widespread, more serious, and more damaging to society" (Croall 1992: 3) than other, more obvious crimes like burglary, rape or murder, the visuals offered by such crime scenes, and the emotional impact to be seized upon by violent crime further increases the likelihood that the former will not get much air-time in comparison.[96]

Even if the media weren't dependent on fickle advertisers, challenging the state-corporate media machine is too costly to be undertaken often enough to impact seriously on the mass media: "The very structure of the media is designed to induce conformity to established doctrine. In a three-minute stretch between commercials,

[96] For more on white collar crime, its prevalence, impact and the judicial system's response to it, as well as comparisons with more obvious criminal behavior (drug use, rape, murder, i.e. violent crime), please see Croall 1993; Weisburd *et al.* 2001; and Glasbeek 2002.

or in seven hundred words, it is impossible to present unfamiliar thoughts or surprising conclusions with the argument and evidence required to afford them some credibility. Regurgitation of welcome pieties faces no such problem." (Chomsky 2003: 10) Explaining that prestige comes only with conformity, Chomsky finds himself once again in agreement with Qualter, who specifies of those wishing to change the media industry that, "they know quite well the rules of the game and appreciate that while they may publish whatever they wish, they can probably publish some things only once. Their discretion is self-imposed, but none the less effective." (1985: 156)

If advertising constraints and personal ambition weren't enough to censure the press, the very structure of the press does much to limit what is accepted and what is not: as mentioned by Chomsky, seven hundred words or a three minute segment does not provide enough time to delve into new and complicated issues without resorting to stereotyping and accepted dogma. Besides presentation limits, the very fact that the news 'appears' at certain, set times of the day imposes an episodic approach to the stories presented. The demands of producing the news 'on time' also tend to increase news networks' reliance on certain accepted, easily accessed and obviously (or assumed to be) legitimate and accurate sources: institutional sources such as those in the government are easily available to the journalist facing a deadline – the information received from such sources is generally coherent, organized and presented to allow for quick retrieval of 'soundbites' or quotations. As the public is familiar with these sources, little background information is required, and the

information is assumed to be correct (more often than not). Such source identification remains a "major variable in the credibility and persuasive power of propaganda" according to Qualter, and it is in this thinking that "[B]eyond examining the content, a complete analysis of propaganda must begin with the source." (1985: 129) In the documentary *OUTFOXED: Rupert Murdoch's War on Journalism*, former Fox News Producer Clara Frenk remarked how the conservative consultants employed by Fox News were all well-known individuals, extremely accomplished in their respective fields, whereas the liberal consultants tended to be either unknown or unreliable[97]. Surely this discrepancy does not go unnoticed in the public, who watches conservative commentator Sean Hannity, a "good looking, kind of clean-cut all-American kind of guy," while his liberal counterpart, Alan Colmes, is "a little squirrely looking, frankly (…) it sends a subtle message, I think." (O'Donnell, in Greenwald 2004: 37)

As mentioned, one of the many ways in which this combination of structural constraints (deadlines, time/space limits, concentrated ownership, media indexing) results in a restricted perspective of the world is that such reliance reproduces accepted stereotypes and normalizing judgments, leaving precious little room for dissent or debate. As Edward Said surmises, "[O]ne aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media's resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds." (2003: 26) While there is much

[97] See especially pp. 28-39 of the transcript for a more detailed discussion regarding the discrepancies between qualifications of conservative and liberal guests on Fox News. (Greenwald 2004)

debate as to the exact impact that media exposure has on an individual's opinion formation[98], I would tend to agree with both Qualter, who found that heavy media exposure results in a common framework of perception, and with George Grubner, who coined the term "mean-world syndrome," applying it to heavy media users. According to Glassner's understanding, Gerbner's term means quite simply, "[W]atch enough brutality on TV and you come to believe you are living in a cruel and gloomy world in which you feel vulnerable and insecure. In his research over three decades Gerbner found that people who watch a lot of TV are more likely than others to believe their neighborhoods are unsafe." (1999b: 44) As "the most frequent news story is about an accident or a calamity[99], our reader [or viewer] takes a catastrophic view of the world around him" (Ellul 1965: 145)[100], according to Gernber's theory, heavy media users suffering from the "mean-world syndrome" "may accept and even welcome repressive measures such as more jails, capital punishment, harsher sentences – measures that have never reduced crime but never fail to get votes – if that promises to relieve their anxieties. That is the deeper dilemma of violence-laden television." (Gerbner, in Glassner 1999b: 45) According to Alan Kerckhoff and Kurt Black, "the belief in a tangible threat makes it possible to explain and justify one's sense of discomfort." (in Glassner 1999b: xx) It is perhaps in part due to this need to

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[98] It is generally agreed upon that there are too many variables to take into consideration to hope to come to any conclusive answer regarding mediated opinion, and that all we can hope to assume is that, "Some kinds of communication on some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects"." (Berelson, in Weimann 1992: 106) Please see also Qualter 1985, Chapter 7, particularly p. 168 for more on this subject.

[99] And indeed it is – this is not simply 'liberal alarmist' critique of the media – between 1990 and 1998, while the American murder rate declined by 20 percent, the number of murder stories on major networks increased by 600 percent. (see Glassner 1999b: xxi)

[100] For an interesting study pertaining to the cultivation theory of media effects as it relates to media violence and fear of crime, please see Romer *et al.*'s 2003 article "Television News and the Cultivation of Fear of Crime".

explain away some of the modern individual's discomfort with a world over which he/she has decreasing control[101] that certain easily identifiable (read stereotypical, dogmatic) characteristics are relied upon in the news. Analyzing the ways in which serial killers like Jeffery Dahmer and John Wayne Gacy were described in news reports about them, Jenkins found that they were overwhelming identified as *gay* serial killers – as though that information somehow explained the 'killer' part of their personality: "Emphasizing that such individuals were gay serial killers tended to confound homosexuals with pedophiles and to support contemporary claims that homosexuality represented a physical and moral threat to children." (Jenkins, in Glassner 1999b: 39) Perhaps this is evidence of an Establishment that is uncomfortable with a 'growing' population of homosexuals demanding equal rights[102]; regardless, the disproportionate coverage that serial killers' *homosexuality* receives in the news reflects that the child pornographer, or the pedophile represents, as columnist Ellen Goodman observes, "an "unequivocal villain" whom reporters and readers [find] "refreshingly uncomplicated."" (in Glassner 1999b: 32) As we shall see in the case of the socio-political environment post-9/11, this "refreshingly uncomplicated" villain often takes the form of the "swarthy foreigner", aka the Arab.

One of the reasons, as hypothesized by Glassner, that both journalists and the general public alike seem to rely so readily and so heavily on "unequivocal villains,"

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[101] More on this existential crisis of being will be discussed in the conclusion of this text.

[102] I highlight 'growing' as I do not mean to indicate that homosexuality is either on the rise or to imply that it is epidemic in growth – that there are now more homosexuals than before is neither provable nor relevant to their wanting equal rights. Due either to increased numbers or visibility or both, there *appears* to be more homosexuals now than say, thirty years ago. Again, it is neither here nor there.

is that the familiar battle between good and evil is one that helps everyone "make sense of some other phenomenon they are having trouble covering in its own right." (1999b: 24) In the western media, a madman who guns down four police officers receives a lot more coverage than the under-funded budget of the local police department, yet in the wake of such a tragedy, the fact that the police department is under-staffed is sure to come up. When an emergency room patient dies before receiving medical attention or because there is no bed available for him/her, the public is outraged as much by such malpractice as by the grossly understaffed and under-equipped state of their hospitals. However, "[S]ocieties differ both in the types of dangers they select and the number. Dangers get selected for special emphasis (...) either because they offend the basic moral principles of the society or because they enable criticism of disliked groups and institutions." (Glassner 1999b: xxvi) The task at hand is to identify which dangers are made to stand for others; as Glassner asks in his controversial book entitled *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things*, "If the mystery about baseless scares is how they are sold to a public that has real dangers to worry about (...) The question is, how have we gotten so mixed up about the true nature and extent of these problems?" (1999b: 23) We must pursue this line of questioning further still, and ask (regardless of *what* the fear is *of*), *why* is fear being 'sold' to the public?

CHAPTER THREE

President Richard Nixon once famously stated, "People react to fear, not love. They don't teach that in Sunday school, but it's true." (in Glassner 1999b: xxviii) Trying to explain the function of the study of moral panic in identifying coercion, Carol A. Stabile commented that fear "is a notoriously difficult emotion to pin down or measure. Like dreams, to a large degree, *fear is subject to condensation and displacement*." (2001: 260, my emphasis) It is this malleable quality of fear that renders it so very useful for governments trying to maintain efficient and stable populations, which is, after all, the goal of disciplined society: "Without the discipline and sense of camaraderie which sustains a military unit, civilian morale must be held together by more intensive psychological control. One powerful unifying theme is fear and loathing of the enemy." (Qualter 1985: 175) It is not enough to simply terrify your people though, you must *direct* their fears towards specific ends, and either amplify or dissipate them depending on the ends desired[103]. The manipulability of fear follows that of propaganda, in the sense that slight, or *pre*-propaganda prepares the individual for a lifetime of following, and heavy, or *overt* propaganda points the individual in a certain direction, "[A] large dose of fear precipitates immediate action; a reasonably small dose produces lasting support." (Ellul 1965: 86) The mobilization of fear therefore tends to run along two general lines: an immediately identifiable enemy (for example, The Arab), or a general one (The Other). The magician's art of

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[103] The directing of such fear towards certain ends is pedagogically clear in World War I and II posters: civilians were entreated to plant victory gardens *or their soldiers would starve*; to save coal *or their soldiers would freeze*; to save on tin and lead *or their soldiers would have no ammunition*; to buy war bonds *or the war would be lost!!*... For more information on the development and use of war posters, or for examples of how they are re-used today, please see Bonnell 1997; Kate 2000; Maher 2002; Samuel 2001; Wright 2003.

misdirection – defined by Glassner as when a magician makes "an object seem to vanish [by directing] the audience's attention away from where he hides it" (1999b: 88) – is what allows the government to direct the will of the propagandized individual towards ends addressing either that general or specific evil. By redirecting people's very real (and, more often than not, legitimate) fears along certain avenues, the government guides the people towards certain (for example) policy options that then seem to *naturally* respond to and address these altered and redirected fears[104].

Again, it is important to remember that causal relationships are not easily established between obvious outcomes (the passing of legislation, for example) and the official reasons given for them (the supposed overwhelming public support for such legislation). Not only is fear difficult to pin on a single cause/issue (I don't go out at night *because I am afraid of getting mugged*), the reasons for it are multiple and vary across individuals, time and space (I've been mugged before; I am a single woman; I live in a bad neighbourhood; I suffer from 'mean world syndrome'; I'm scared of the dark; I am distrustful of the police; I am paranoid-delusional; etc.). Furthermore, "[P]roblems with conceptualizations of fear are exacerbated by the actions then ascribed to such fears, particularly public support for repressive policies. Broadly speaking, it is assumed that people give their consent to the official reaction

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[104] While the specific reasons for such redirection I will leave for others to speculate, one perspective is common enough to warrant mention. As Barry Glassner warns, "largely unfounded fears that receive star billing in the media and political campaigns, and extravagant efforts undertaken to counter them, allow people to ignore, avoid, or pretend away, other fears that are uncomfortably close at hand." (1999a: 301) Michael Moore's comedy *Canadian Bacon* humouressly emphasizes the remarkable utility that such redirection of fears may serve: "One week, Mr. President. Give me one week, and I'll have Americans burning maple leafs so fast *they won't have time to think about their smog-filled lungs, rising interest rates or their dwindling savings accounts*." (Rotholz and Moore 1995, my emphasis)

to the threat – that is, people agree that strict measures are called for in response to the crisis at hand, whether this response entails crime policies or stricter rules in schools – and that the moral panic produces "an apparent *cross-class consensus* on crime"." (Hall *et al.*, in Stabile 2001: 260-61, emphasis in original) Moral panics can therefore be said to have very much the same impact as heavy media use, in the sense that broadly felt fear serves as the same uniting force as heavy and constant propaganda. Ulrich Beck, specifying what he saw as the developing risk society, stated that, "The movement set in motion by the risk society (…) is expressed in the statement: *I am afraid*! The *commonality of anxiety* takes the place of the *commonality of need*. The type of the risk society marks in this sense a social epoch in which *solidarity from anxiety* arises and becomes a political force." (in Hier 2003: 3) The appeal of the use of fear to govern is that fear easily anchors overt propaganda, and can, as such, quickly mobilize support.

While Glassner asserts that the "unfortunate hallmark of fear mongering [is] the tendency to trivialize legitimate concerns even while aggrandizing questionable ones" (Glassner 1999b: 9), he specifies that "[E]ven concerns about real dangers, when blown out of proportion, do demonstrable harm." (Glassner 1999b: xvi) As Beck summarizes, the problem with such manipulation and maintenance of fear is that "[M]anufactured uncertainty means danger lurks everywhere and no one does anything about it. … It boils down to a question of concern to all of society: the *politicization of the question of security*." (in Hier 2003: 16, emphasis in original) Glassner qualifies this politicization by specifying that "immense power and money

await those who tap into our moral insecurities and supply us with symbolic substitutes" (1999b: xxviii), and that is not only why (in this case) Americans are so fearful, but why their fears are so misplaced. The comfort to be gained, supposedly, from risk management – the "identification, assessment, elimination or reduction of the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss" (Rose 2000: 333) – goes hand in hand with the profits to be made from managing such. This in part explains why, in the case of drug use, harsher sentences, more prisons, and reductions of appeals are more popular than recovery or pro-active education programs; not only are the benefits of long-term programs more difficult to appreciate in the midst of crisis – and "[P]erceptions of heightened risk evoke images of panic" (Cohen 2002: xxvi) – but the lobbying groups pushing for more prisons (which are generally privately owned and run as profit-making enterprises) are extremely powerful and successful in the United States.

Such lobby groups are particularly successful because not only is *fear* notoriously slippery, but the *perception of risk* is as well: "It is not clear whether it is the *risks* that have intensified, or our *view* of them. Both sides converge, condition each other, strengthen each other, and because risks are risks in *knowledge*, *perceptions of risks and risks are not different things, but one in the same*." (Beck, in Hier 2003: 7, my emphasis) Beck clarifies why risk perception is so easily manipulated: "Risks (…) generally remain *invisible*, are based on *causal interpretations*, and thus initially exist *only in terms of the* (scientific or anti-scientific) *knowledge* about them. They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized

or minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly *open to social definition and construction*." (in Hier 2003: 8, my emphasis)

In his analysis of government and control, Nikolas Rose specifies that risk thinking "is concerned with bringing possible future undesired events into calculations in the present, making their avoidance the central object of decision-making processes, and administering individuals, institutions, expertise and resources in the service of that ambition. Understood in this way, *risk thinking has become central to the management of exclusion* in post-welfare strategies of control." (Rose 2000: 332, my emphasis)[105] The management of exclusion of which Rose speaks is crucial for understanding how the modern disciplinary society functions – the spread of 'the tentacles of the state' if you will, results from the perception that only with foreknowledge of deviant actions can citizens – and the state – be protected from such actions. This results in a public acquiescence of invasive steps[106] taken by the government *on behalf of its citizens* in order to gain access to that information. But this is not simply information regarding the specific characteristics of typical deviants, the 'usual suspects' of deviance (the pervert, the murderer, the anti-social,

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[105] Rose in fact offers a startling example of such exclusion: speaking of insane asylums from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "[W]hile such asylums were originally built on the outskirts of towns, urban sprawl has turned their sites into valuable suburban land. In Britain at least, the solution has been to sell these sites, together with their buildings (often now subject to environmental protection orders and hence unable to be demolished) to private developers. The buildings themselves are to be turned into luxury apartments, the gardens landscaped, the ominous water towers turned into unique architectural features. But what of the walls and gatehouses? In a reversal that would be laughable if it were not so sad, these are no longer promoted as measures to secure the community outside from the inmate. They are advertised in terms of their capacity to secure the residents of these luxury conversions from the risk posed to them by that very community. (…) High walls, closed circuit video cameras, security guards and the like can now be reframed and represented as measures that will keep threat *out* rather than keep it *in*." (1999: 248-49, my emphasis)

[106] This of course being 'the extension of the disciplinary gaze' alluded to in the conclusion of Chapter 1 of this text.

etc.), but this information also "concerns an array of factors that – formally via research or informally via professional beliefs – are associated with an increased likelihood of undesirable conduct (housing conditions, employment history, abuse of alcohol or drugs, family circumstances…) It is *these* factors that become the focus of the risk gaze, and that are increasingly organized and packaged by structured risk assessments (…) and the like that are communicated to other professionals (…) with consequences far removed from those surrounding the initial consultation, encounter, or occasion which led to the collection of the information in the first place." (Rose 2000: 332, my emphasis) Serial killer profiling has for example, lead to the statistically sound assumption that very often serial killers strike in their own neighbourhoods. While many criminals have surely been caught because of such profiling research[107], such information can also be assumed to have lead to innocent persons being detained due to the simple unlucky coincidence that they share that neighbourhood and perhaps some other, equally innocuous characteristics of the criminal in question (for example general height, hair colour, disposition, etc.). It is therefore not so much that such profiling *occurs* that is problematic (although it certainly can be, as we shall see), as the consequence it has in the *pre-emptive* exclusion from society, or inclusion in detrimental categories, that so identified individuals must suffer: "In the circuits of exclusion, control is not merely a matter of constraining those who are individually pathological; it is about the generation of 'knowledge that allows selection of thresholds that define acceptable risk' and

[107] For more on this, please refer to Rossmo 1998 or 1996.

generates practices of inclusion and exclusion that are based on that knowledge." (Erickson and Haggerty, in Rose 2000: 333)[108]

It is along these lines that Hier contends "[I]n a culture of suspicion and fear, characterized by an individuated, distanciated, uncertain world, the context in which everyday *cultural* stereotypes of the stranger present themselves as ambivalent becomes increasingly more differentiated in the form of bureaucratic *enemy* stereotypes signifying *risk factors* to be avoided." (Hier 2003: 18, my emphasis) Increasingly, and certainly in the post-9/11 environment, the cultural stereotype of The Other has been associated with The Arab, which is now a category institutionally synonymous with The Terrorist, where perhaps before it was *generally* correlated without being *required* to be[109]. The delimitation of who and what constitutes a threat is not controlled at a single level, but is generated from within society; the 'moral economy of harm,' as Hier calls it, is thriving on people's fears, and it is "[W]ithin this new territory of exclusion, [that] a whole array of control agencies – police, social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, mental health professionals – seek to link up in circuits of surveillance and communication in a perpetually failing endeavor to minimize the riskiness of the most risky. They form a *multiplicity of points* for the collection, inscription, accumulation and distribution of information relevant to the management of risk." (Rose 2000: 333, my emphasis) Such

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[108] Indeed, as David Lyon points out of the new racial profiling in the United States, "With approximately 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, it is not clear how this "narrows" the categories of suspicion, but this is just the point: it does not." (2003: 50-51)

[109] Even libertarian Bill Maher, supposed 'voice of common sense' in the United States, very representatively of the American (administrative) psyche, contends that, "while it's true that most Muslims or Arabs are not terrorists, almost all terrorists are Muslims or Arabs." (2002: 45)

multiplicity of control points for access to society supports Foucault's contention that disciplinary power is not supported by, nor embodied by, a single institution, but results rather from an active network operating on and including every level of social life, from the home (where the concerned parent may send his child to a psychologist), to the school (to the counselor), to the jail (psychiatric care *in perpetuum*)… As Hier states, while there has always been fear and an organized response to it, "the most significant sociological developments to accompany the ascendancy of the risk society involve *shifts in social control processes* and *the nature of the targets* of social reactions to fear." (Hier 2003: 4, my emphasis) It is not by accident that Hier chooses the word 'target'.

The Other

The determination of who and what constitutes a risk to society is a complicated process, encompassing a multitude of institutions and just as many considerations regarding not only *why* someone or something is considered riskier than any other, but also *how* that determination can be *used*: enemies, or the risky, are not chosen simply because they are evil, though they certainly may be, but because their being labeled as such serves a purpose. According to peace activist Thich Nhat Hanh, "We are taught to think that we need a foreign enemy. Governments work hard to get us to be afraid and to hate so we will rally behind them. If we do not have an enemy, they will invent one in order to mobilize us."" (in Z 2004: 2)[110] It is not so

[110] Essayist Gore Vidal, recounting the many uses the 'War on Drugs' served the Reagan administration, comments, in a way very much reminiscent of Z's perspective on this constructed enemy: "Drugs. If they did not exist our governors would have invented them in order to prohibit

much that governments need to terrorize their populations in order to subvert them to detrimental policies, rather that such terror is easily seized upon as, of all things, a stable rallying point around which the populace can gather and focus their energies, allowing the state and other various institutions to implement more easily further disciplinary measures *for the sake* of that same population's *continued* stability: "enemy stereotypes are decisive temporal constructions which are understood to present an immediate affront to both personal and group safety. As the antithesis to 'security', the threat posed by 'the enemy' abolishes all individuality and *lends itself to the construction of a defensive ascription under the guise of communal security.*" (Hier 2003: 16-17, my emphasis) The fear generated from internal or external risks allows for such extension of disciplinary measures, which are hailed by a grateful population. The point, then, of utilizing fear (whether that fear is created, or merely sustained, by the regime in power) is that it actually helps to calm an otherwise always potentially unstable mass that – especially in our modern age, as I shall argue later – needs to undertake action to solve identifiable wrongs. As Sean P. Hier puts it, "the presence of the enemy as the antithesis to security stimulates the pursuit of a sense of community" (2003: 18). The use of fear then, is that "[B]y identifying some malevolent group that can be attacked, the collective can be convinced their actions will be successful." (Hawdon 2001: 427) Just as propaganda acts to fulfill within the modern subject the need to participate in democracy (which one cannot hope to do, as

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them and so make much of the population vulnerable to arrest, imprisonment, seizure of property, and so on." (2002: 54)

we have seen), fear serves to make the modern subject feel effective, which he/she is not.[111]

Edward Said, trying to make sense of the longevity of the school of Orientalist thought, determined that such inherently oppositional thinking was indicative of a human tendency common to all cultures. According to his analysis, "the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another, different and competing *alter ego*. The construction of identity (…) involves the construction of opposites and "others" whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from "us." Each age and society re-creates its "Others." Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of "other" is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest involving individuals and institutions in all societies." (2003: 332) This perspective is interesting on two levels; on the one hand, Said obviously supports a Foucaultian notion of identity as historically determined and of knowledge as being historically dependent as well; on the other hand, while his distinction here is made between "us" and "others" *nationally*, as between, for example, the Western and the Oriental, this distinction applies just as easily, to the

[111] This may seem to contradict the point made that discipline is used to make efficient and productive individuals more so – this is very different from making *effective* individuals, in that these individuals, while they may innovate, may not *effect* change unless it is approved by those institutions and systems of which they are part. Ellul, rather pessimistically, summarizes this point, stating that, "[W]e are living in a time when systematically – though without our wanting it so – action and thought are being separated. In our society, he who thinks can no longer act for himself; he must act through the agency of others, and in many cases he cannot act at all." (1965: 27) It is in this sense that I mean that fear allows individuals to feel effective, in that they can demand of their government that protective measures be put in place. When such measures are enacted, the modern individual feels satisfied of the role he/she has played.

"others" that are among "us" already, be they the criminally insane, visible minorities, homosexuals, or single mothers, etc.

Aldous Huxley once famously stated that, "[T]he propagandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human." (in Z 2004: 48) While this may seem extreme, "during wartime, countries frequently produce cartoons, posters and other art that attempt to dehumanize their enemies by "exaggerating each feature until man is metamorphosized into beast, vermin, insect. … When your icon of the enemy is complete you will be able to kill without guilt, slaughter without shame." (Keen, in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 168-69) Citing a chilling example of the success of the "first unwritten rule of war," which is namely "dehumanizing the enemy" (Tristam, in Z 2004: 49), author and social commentator Mickey Z quotes U.S. Lieutenant William Calley, the officer in charge of the My Lai massacre that took place in Vietnam in March 1968, who stated in his defense that, "[I]n all my years in the Army I was never taught that communists were human beings. We were there to kill ideology carried by – I don't know – pawns, blobs of flesh. I was there to destroy communism. We never conceived of people, men, women, children, babies." (Calley, in Z 2004: 135) It is not as though such dehumanization has changed – when Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh was sent to Iraq during the Gulf War, McVeigh wrote to a journalist that he, like every soldier, had been "falsely hyped up." (in Vidal 2002: 79) As acclaimed American essayist Gore Vidal recounts, McVeigh "was startled to "find out they are normal like me and you"", so complete was the "ritual media demonizing of Saddam, Arabs, Iraqis" (*Ibid*).

In Ralph Ellison's novel, *Invisible Man*, he wrote, reminiscent of Shylock's infamous appeal: "I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids – and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me." (in Glassner 1999b: 127)[112] Clearly, it is not that Ellison's "invisible man" lacks corporeal form, but rather that the form he is allowed to occupy, indeed is *forced* to occupy, is delimited *for him* by another. The Iraqis that McVeigh was sent to fight were stereotyped just as heavily as Ellison's invisible man, or Shakespeare's Venetian Jews, and are made to stand for something else, to occupy that position of enemy against which the population might unify. The enemy stereotypes that serve as rallying points around which diverse social institutions and viewpoints may converge "must be understood to originate with, or emerge from, everyday cultural stereotypes of the stranger. As Beck explains, enemy stereotypes represent a form of 'bureaucratic stranger' which is brought into focus through the institutions of civil society. That is, the categorically incomprehensible cultural construction of the stranger, as discourses centering on *cultural differences* are transferred to *safety discourses* focusing on the 'risk factors' *ingrained in enemy stereotypes*." (Hier 2003: 17, my emphasis)

In his visceral critique of American interventionism in the Middle East, Vidal notes that, "[F]or several decades there has been an unrelenting demonization of the

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[112] For Shylock's infamous plea for racial equity, please see *The Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Scene 1 in Shakespeare 1911: 233.

Muslim world in the American media." (2002: 4) While such demonization has perhaps resurged since the Nixon-Kissinger administration, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, Edward Said would doubtless contend that the West has always "gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self." (2003: 3) It is not by accident that he chooses the word 'underground,' for the study of Orientalism has always been concerned in part with learning to control those dangerous tendencies of the Oriental – his rampant sexuality, his clever deceitfulness, his lazy and infectious lifestyle, etc.[113] According to Said, "the very designation of something as Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative judgment" (2003: 207), and presumably continues to. The label 'Oriental' has always smacked somewhat of the connotations evident in statements given by the likes of Lord Cromer, who was credited at the time with having 'made' Egypt: "I content myself with noting the fact that somehow or other the Oriental generally acts, speaks, and thinks in a manner exactly opposite to the European." (Cromer, in Said 2003: 39) The construction of the Oriental as a backward, lazy and dangerous animal was in part what justified the West's colonial intervention in the East[114]. A testament to Qualter's assertion that "it is all but impossible to maintain two separate propaganda strategies. Domestic and enemy audiences will each eventually discover what is being said to the other" (1985: 173),

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[113] Please see Chapter 1 of Section 1 of Said 2003, particularly p. 38, for the 'exact' differences in character between the European (also American) and the Oriental, as well as Chapter 1 of Section 3, particularly pp. 207-08.

[114] As we shall see, this justification is still used today: much discussion regarding current American military intervention in the Middle East centers on the modernizing aspect of the missions – once terrorist regimes are replaced with 'democratic' ones, it is expected that these countries join 'the modern world'. More on this will be said in the Chapter 4 case study of post-9/11 America.

the Oriental was told it was the West's duty to tame and elevate him to civility[115], while domestic audiences were assured of this same duty through the dissemination of ideological master narratives such as 'The White Man's Burden'. Following Foucault's notion of ever-widening fields of knowledge under the disciplinary gaze, it was "knowledge of subject races or Oriental [that made] their *management easy and profitable*; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control." (Said 2003: 36, my emphasis) While the overt control purposes and subversive tactics used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may no longer be accepted, it is the continued uncritical use of Orientalist texts *of that time* as reference points *today* that helps to explain why the field of Orientalism remains essentially unchanged, just as colonial and condescending, even if "the field today cannot reproduce people like" the great Orientalists of the imperial age, such as Cromer and Balfour, or von Grunebaum and Halpern. (Said 2003: 297)

Said's objection to Orientalism was not simply that it selected and stereotyped an Other against which to establish a cultural identity, but rather that this selected Other then had its newly-assigned identity locked into place, thereby assuring the permanence of the European identity: "My objection to what I have called Orientalism is not that it is just this antiquarian study of Oriental languages, societies, and peoples, but that as a system of thought Orientalism approaches a heterogenous,

[115] In fact, aside from 'raising' the Oriental to Western 'civility', it is also supposedly through the West that Orientals learn their own history: "we are reminded of the doubtless nonpolitical fact that Orientalists "are largely responsible for having given Middle Easterners themselves an accurate appreciation for their past." (Halpern, in Said 2003: 300)

dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence" (2003: 333) Not only did this historical falsification mask complexities intrinsic to both cultures, but "[E]ven more important, from my standpoint, it hides the *interests* of the Orientalists." (*Ibid*) In his introduction to the 25th anniversary edition printing of his most celebrated work, Said noted that "There has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women's rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple and agreed-upon concepts that one either does or does not find, like Easter eggs in the living room." (2003: xix) He called these terms and concepts "supreme fictions", which, like the distinctions of 'Orient' and 'West', are used unquestioningly in the construction and maintenance of (cultural) identity ('us' versus 'them'), and "lend themselves to manipulation and the organization of collective passion" (Said 2003: xvii). Part affirmation, rejection, and identification with the Other, these fictions have "never been more evident than in our time, when the mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust, and resurgent self-pride and arrogance – much of it having to do with Islam and the Arabs on one side, "we" Westerners on the other – are very large-scale enterprises." (*Ibid*) The most important element to note in all this, is that Orientalism represents a *positional* superiority that never relinquishes the upper hand, no matter the nature of the relationship the West claims to the Orient: savior, educator, scholar, colonizer, contractor called in to rebuild… Indeed, Denys Hay calls this the 'idea of Europe', and specifies that this

positional superiority, the "collective notion identifying "us" Europeans against all "those" non-Europeans" (Said 2003: 7) is the major cultural component of European identity, which has always served as the justification for, and impetus to, conquer and crush/civilize. Orientalism, as a respected school of thought, then stands as an example of cultural hegemony at work, in the sense that it enfolds within it a great many institutions, modes of thinking, relationship patterns, etc., all circulating within several fields of discourse, all of which relate to one another in a self-justifying, self-referential manner. It is in this sense that Said can say of Orientalism that:

> "[it] is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious "Western" imperialist plot to hold down the "Oriental" world. It is rather a *distribution* of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an *elaboration* not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of "interests" which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but maintains; it *is*, rather than expresses, a certain *will* or *intention* to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven

> exchange with various kinds of power, shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what "we" do and what "they" cannot do or understand as "we" do). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is – and does not simply represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with "our" world." (2003: 12, emphasis in original)

Hier's text on moral panic allows us to make sense of this conception of 'the Other' and relate it to the functioning of fear in society by understanding that the threat posed by 'the Other' is linked *narratologically* to *culturally defined* notions of risk. By tying 'danger' to ideology, 'the Other' is made to represent more than merely the unknown stranger who may mug you, and this riskiness is amplified by the Other being made to represent something more than just an immediate threat to physical safety – the anticipated attack must be perceived to be against our ideals, our foundational character. The Other represents not only actual threat, but *symbolic* threat – the attack on the World Trade Towers was not simply the toppling of a few buildings, after all, but was perceived by many as an attack on the nerve center of the capitalist system; the Oklahoma City bombing was characterized as an attack on the Heartland; the same can be said for single moms, who symbolize an attack on

decency[116]. Hier clarifies: "[t]he discursive conflation of the dangerous Other with the symbolic signification of harm precipitates the development of an *apparatus of security* and the *symbolic fortification of an inclusive sense of collective safety*. Not only does this make rearticulation of 'the threat' more amenable to definition and regulation, but it legitimates amplification of the threat insofar as the object of rearticulation almost always takes the form of normative ideological constructions of fear or danger." (2002: 323, my emphasis) It is along these lines that, regarding single moms, Republicans were not only able to propose (although not pass) "illegitimacy ratios" in Congress related to funding whereby states with lower illegitimacy rates would get more federal education funding[117], but were able to push the debate regarding the decline of family values *generally*, opening the way for legislated restrictions on gay marriage and adoption rights.

While Glassner states that "fear is constructed through efforts to protect against it" (1999a: 301), Hier contends that the moral panics sometimes generated from that fear result in regulatory projects that simply reinforce the original sentiment of fear, which engender more regulatory projects, and so on, in a vicious circle. (2002) We see this in the public's demand to be kept informed of terrorist threat after 9/11, a demand met by the government with its Homeland Security Advisory System[118], which in fact has only scared people more, and has resulted in not only a

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[116] Please see Glassner 1999b, Chapter 4 "Monster Moms", p. 94 specifically.
[117] *Ibid*
[118] This designates the infamous five-colour alert system developed by the Department for Homeland Defense which, according to its website, "is designed to target our protective measures when specific information to a specific sector or geographic region is received. It combines threat information with vulnerability assessments and provides communications to public safety officials and the public." (see DHD website)

growing level of dissatisfaction regarding the functioning of current safeguards against terrorism, but has also generated calls for more such safeguards. However, as "panic narratives as political resources reduce the field of regulatory intervention to the extent that a tangible object is designated for immediate intervention" (Hier 2002: 330), by having such a threat system, the government appears to be handling an otherwise intangible threat, and once again, the public feels as though it has been consulted in the goings-on of government[119]. But while the end result of a panic might be new legislation and the creation of new legislative bodies, how is it that everyday fears of the stranger result in a panic that marks them as targets for legislative intervention?

Moral Panic

In his introduction to the 30th anniversary edition of his seminal work on moral panic, Stanley Cohen bemoans how the term has been used so consistently negatively that it now "evokes the image of a frenzied crowd or mob: atavistic, driven by contagion and delirium, susceptible to control by demagogues and, in turn, controlling others by 'mob rule'." (Cohen 2002: xxvi-vii) He argues against the perception that the very use of the term 'moral panic' implies that societal reaction is disproportionate to the actual seriousness of the threat, and that this societal reaction is always exaggerated or unjustified compared to the events that engender it. Almost offended by such a (mis)understanding of moral panic, Cohen contends that while fear may be used more and more in the media and in government policies, contrary to

[119] Bill Maher, in fact, cynically sums up the political advantages of such systems, stating that "A new bureaucracy and a color-coded warning system seem like steps in the right direction, and I'm sure both programs tested very well with the focus groups." (2002: 20)

what McRobbie and Thornton find, moral panics are *not* being constructed on a day-to-day basis, which would not only render the term useless (as 'panic' by definition is short-lived and rare), but would also result in a public suffering from panic fatigue[120] (Hier 2002: 315). Disagreeing with the idea that panics are irrational and sensational, Cohen is adamant that by calling a movement a 'moral panic' we not assume that it is based either on "fantasy, hysteria, delusion and illusion or being duped by the powerful." (Cohen 2002: xxvi) While it is certainly true that "widespread fears almost necessarily preexist moral panics, these fears must be articulated and given direction." (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, in Hawdon 2001: 422)

It is this guiding of existing fears, this channeling of them along certain lines that constitutes one of the bases for moral panic. While simple panic – a visceral fear – can occur for a variety of reasons, a panic does not assume 'moral panic' proportions until allocation of blame has been laid. Some fundamental perversion of society's basic moral code must be pinpointed, and the violators of such must be "unambiguously unfavorable symbols" (Cohen, in Hier 2003: 5). These 'folk devils,' an assignation to which I will return shortly, become the anchoring points of a panic discourse that "must be understood to tap into popular sentiments at the phenomenal level of everyday consciousness, carrying a universal appeal pertaining to something which is uncritically and unproblematically received as problematic." (Hier 2002: 322) The too-often occurring serial murders of sex trade workers, for example, do not begin moral panics in society in part because (a) sex trade workers are not

[120] 'Panic fatigue,' as defined by Jenkins in Geraci and Gutfeld, sets in "after [you've been] constantly scared by imaginary fears, [and] you can no longer realize a real, rational risk. When a plausible danger is present, you don't pay attention" (Geraci and Gutfeld 1996: 54).

representative of some greater moral good in society in the same way that, for example, JonBenet Ramsey (a blond-haired, blue-eyed little girl from Boulder City, Colorado) is; (b) sex-trade workers are *already* in violation of society's greater moral code; and (c) sex-trade workers lack advocates who also occupy positions in society associated with the upholding of moral fiber (for example, grieving parents – though surely they must be – law-enforcement officials, or even teachers). It is the distinction both between acceptable victims (WASPy little girls) and unacceptable victims (hookers), and between acceptable perpetrators (insert visible minority of choice) and unacceptable perpetrators (certainly not respected, religious parents from Middle America) that brings up the fact that "the social construction of moral deviants serve[s] to affirm the boundaries of the normative social order through claims making activities of public guardians." (Hier 2003: 4) Those 'public guardians' watching over the gates of public order and morality include everything from public institutions (the Church, for example), to the media (both conservative and liberal), to claims makers (advocacy and lobby groups – Mother Against Drunk Driving, for example, or the Million Mom Marchers on Washington) It is the complex interaction of these guardians with the public, "set in the context of socio-political change and an ensuing climate of 'cultural ambiguity'," (Hier 2003: 5-6) that can result in moral panic. Indeed, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda found, "without the 'stable, patterned structures' of politics, mass media, crime control, professions and organized religion, no moral panics could be generated or sustained." (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, in Cohen 2002: xxx) Often, "a war metaphor that "conveys [the] image of [a] threatening other that will destroy freedom and other sacred rights" [is used]. If

this language is successful, the group solidarity necessary for a moral panic will emerge." (Elwood, in Hawdon 2001: 427)[121] In the War on Drugs begun under the Reagan administration and continued by the elder President Bush, as we have seen, by situating the American public 'at war' with drugs – and drug users – the administrations placed the blame for the traffic in drugs squarely on the shoulders of drug users, which subsequently placed legislative emphasis on punitive measures rather than on rehabilitative ones. In this case, it was the moral deviance of drug users that was responsible for everything that was going wrong in the United States in the mid-to-late eighties: violent crime, unemployment, single moms, etc., etc…

According to anthropologist Mary Douglas, while at the beginning of moral panics blame may bounce from one group to another, it always targets groups who are *already* the subject of social anxiety, and "[T]hough anyone can accuse, not all accusations will be accepted. To be successful an accusation must be directed against victims hated by the populace. The cause of harm must be vague, unspecific, difficult to prove or disprove." (in Jenkins 2000: 25) In the case of drug use, the complexity of issues involved in addiction – the multitude of reasons why someone might become a drug user – are such that they negate the possibility of affixing causality in any satisfactory way. While several factors combined may indicate a *likelihood* of eventual use, the impossibility of correlating any one trait specifically to drug use makes it the perfect target of panic: anyone is susceptible, and because everyone

[121] Orwell seemed to agree in the overarching, unifying force of the *idea* of war: "It does not matter whether the war is actually happening, and, since no decisive victory is possible, it does not matter whether the war is going well or badly. All that is needed is that a state of war should exist." (1977: 192)

seems equally so (not true, but politically useful), it *must* be their own fault, since they obviously *choose* to become users. Their violation of the social code of moral order is then doubly offensive, as they could choose to be otherwise but do not, and are therefore monsters instead of (merely) criminals. The importance of targeting sections of the population that are already questionable is therefore highly relevant: they already have suspiciously anti-social tendencies that run against the moral grain of the majority – that they then turn out to be the perpetrators of *x* merely confirms our deepest suspicions about them. The obviously moral dimensions of the September 11 attacks, and the reason why they lend themselves – in part – to an analysis of moral panic, are visible in statements made by the likes of Ann Coulter, celebrated American right-wing commentator and author, who blasted that "We should invade their countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to Christianity." (Moore 2003: 176; Rampton and Stauber 2003: 145-46) Your average American, in the wake of 9/11, may agree that religious conversion is the only safeguard against future attacks, as it would then (supposedly) assure a commonality of morals, which is assumed to be missing between Islam and Christianity.

In the wake of such unspeakably tragic events, to call the upsurge in public demand[122] for government action 'moral panic' somehow seems insufficient, if we agree with its having pejorative connotations, to deal with such a shattering blow to

[122] Here we must again be careful not to equate public policy with public demand for it, particularly as concerns the moral panic. As Carol A. Stabile reminds us, "[I]n the end, the notion of causality underlying the moral panic – which implies that fearful people consent to law and order policies – substitutes the media's simulacrum of consent for its reality." (2001: 265) As we briefly saw with opinion formation and the impact of the media on such, too much is involved in opinion formation to make any such causal claims.

the American psyche. Cohen rightly nuances such a term, refusing the 'mob mentality' implied by its previous use, instead calling for an understanding that "[Q]uestions of symbolism, emotion and representation cannot be translated into comparable sets of statistics. Qualitative terms like 'appropriateness' convey the nuances of moral judgment more accurately than the (implied) quantitative measure of 'disproportionate' – but the more they do so, the more obviously they are socially constructed." (2002: xxix) The socially constructed nature of moral panics is made evident when we accept such a qualitative understanding of the scale of moral panic, one which to me seems highly sensitive to the very real fears felt during such times. In beginning his study on the subject, Cohen in fact defines his term on page one of his text, specifying that such a period occurs when:

> "A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a *stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media*; the moral barricades are *manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people*; *socially accredited experts* pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more *serious and long-lasting repercussions and might*

produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself." (2002: 1, my emphasis)

Depending on the force of those 'manning the moral barricades', and the success of the mass media in 'riding the wave' of the panic – that is, sustaining it through seriality and stereotype – "A scare can continue long after its rightful expiration date so long as it has two things going for it: it has to tap into current cultural anxieties, and it has to have media-savvy advocates behind it." (Glassner 1999b: 177) Again, as propaganda cannot merely be based on fantasy but must offer at least a somewhat recognizable version of reality, the media cannot 'hype-up' *just anything*, but must tap into existing and real fears – whether those fears be exaggerated, through generalization or ignorance, or not. It is not that people are scared of burnt toast, but of the *cancer* that it is linked to, that causes the government and private industry to invest in cancer research, which finds ever more causes of cancer, which spurs more financial support, and so on. The great success of the pharmaceutical industry is in making *treatment* (medication) seem the solution, rather than *prevention*. Again, this brings us back to the point that the reason why people can be kept afraid of things is that there is a huge industry backing the maintenance and expansion of such fears, whether they be valid or not. (Glassner 1999b)

Regardless of questioning the validity or exaggerated nature of the public's fears, it remains that people are afraid. Whatever the cause, "the articulation of moral panic remains dependent on the ability of various discursive formations to *unambiguously attribute causality and responsibility to folk devils* which are

understood to embody a more general state of social/moral harm." (Hier 2002: 329-30) We must be careful to understand that "although moral panics center on a particular folk devil, the locus of the panic is not the object of its symbolic resonances, not the folk devil itself. Rather, folk devils serve as the ideological embodiment of deeper anxieties, perceived of as 'a problem' only in and through social definition and construction." (Hier 2002: 313) Hier contends that such deeper anxieties stem from the tension implicit in modern, every-day living, a tension that we have seen explained by Ellul as being *within* the individual, in a very Nietzschean sort of way: trying to come to terms with the fact that he/she wants to act, *needs* to act, but cannot, the modern individual is dissociated from him/herself in a way that Marx only hinted at. More to the point, what the modern subject *thinks* he/she cannot *act*, and those who act *cannot* think (still according to Ellul). The selecting of those acts that will constitute deviance is society's attempt to pinpoint those instances of interaction that render communal living uncomfortable – the labeling of homeless persons 'rough sleepers' makes them carry the burden of guilt for their situation, just as their ousting from New York makes the everyday living of capitalist America that much easier now that it need not face its failures. In this sense, "deviance is created by society (…) that *social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance* and by applying those rules to particular persons and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is *not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender'. The deviant is one to whom the label has successfully been applied" (Becker, in Cohen 2002: 4, my emphasis). It is with this understanding

that Cohen asserts that moral panics are "condensed political struggles to control the means of cultural reproduction (…) [that allow] us to identify and conceptualize the lines of power in any society" (2002: xxxv). What this means for the student of deviance is that one must not take for granted the labeling of such groups, but must look instead to uncover *whom* such power to label serves; why is it that certain groups are singled out as deviant, and in relation to moral panic, why are such folk devils conceptualized as evil personified? Why is it that heretofore tolerated (although not accepted) groups become instantly recognized as unambiguously negative?

Hier offers us an explanation, or rather an analytical framework with which we can hope to uncover some of these reasons in relation to a specific moral panic. Hier ties together moral panic with moral regulatory projects, which is something that is implied by the understanding of deviance as morally constructed and defined to serve specific ends. Where Hier is explicit, however, is in linking together moral regulatory projects with apparatuses of security in a moral economy of harm concentrating its efforts on risk: "Through a dialectical process of signification (discursively articulated in terms of 'us'/'them'), moral panics operate as political technologies vis-à-vis the discursive construction of an apparatus of security, and they are concentrated on a more immediate form of regulatory intervention." (Hier 2002: 329) Such moral regulation is defined by Corrigan and Sayer as referring to a "'project of normalizing, rendering natural, taken for granted, in a word, 'obvious,' what are in fact ontological and epistemological premises of a particular and historical form of social order' (…) as a mechanism of state legitimation, moral

regulation serves to facilitate the consolidation of state power by having certain epistemological social arrangements appear to the citizenry as both natural and inevitable." (in Hier 2002: 324) Hier expands upon this by pointing out the socializing aspect of panic narratives, which, as they operate through regulatory mechanisms (through formal and informal institutions alike) change as their regimes of truth do; that is, they are historically – temporally and spatially – contingent forms of socialization, whereby what is deviant in Canada in the early twentieth century was not necessarily so in the United States, nor have Canadian definitions of deviance remained unchanged over the course of the last century. Each morally repugnant folk devil, then, serves the needs of the time and the community. During the Cold War, Russians/Communists served the needs of the American populace, but it is not coincidental that after the fall of the Soviet Union, American cinema chose as its next arch-nemesis the Arab/Muslim extremist.

Hall *et al.* argue that moral panic "is an envoy of the dominant ideology, geared towards the consolidation of hegemony conceived of through the discursive regulatory apparatus of 'law and order' (...) [and is] one way in which the state [is] able to penetrate below the surface of civil society by tapping into shared anxieties concerning social order and legal transgression in an ultimate attempt to secure consent by drawing attention away from, and thereby 'policing,' real crises in the capitalist mode of production" (in Hier 2002: 321)[123]. If we agree, can we therefore consider moral panics to be, as well as genuine expressions of societal malaise,

[123] Please see Barovick and Dickerson's February 11, 2002 *Time* article on the omissions of President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address for just such 'smokescreens'.

'smoke screens' for governmental control? Of course, but they are more than merely tools of conspiracy theorists – moral panics are as effective as they are because they touch such a large part of the population on such a visceral level: moral panics occur "when "experts," in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors *perceive* the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk "with one voice" of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media representations universally stress "sudden and dramatic" increases (in numbers involved or events) and "novelty"" (Hall *et al.*, in Stabile 2001: 259). As they (are at least seen to) imply broad societal agreement as to cause, explanation, effect, etc., moral panics serve, just like ideology and propaganda do, as uniting elements in disparate populations. As such, moral panics *cannot help* but be useful for governments to seize upon in order to redress something perceived to be amiss in the running of society. That a government should ignore the opportunity to not only make its citizens feel safe, but to involve their efforts (calls to arms, appeals for legislation, etc.) in the re-securing of the state would be negligent.

Master Narratives

What these chapters have attempted to do is make evident all those means by which the government (and by this I mean the dominant power structure) and society as a whole ensure the reproduction of their power relations. As we have seen, the important roles that narrative, ideology, propaganda and fear play in our society – in the formation and *securing* of our self-identity, of the identity of our state – render them powerful tools for manipulating the public into maintaining and reproducing

those power relations currently dominant. It is important to distinguish that by 'dominant power' I do not mean the Bush administration specifically, but rather Corporate America and Big Business, who have been 'running the show' in tandem for some time. As democracy and industrialization have grown up together in the West, that capitalism should be the dominant mode of social reproduction, and therefore have its imperatives privileged, should come as no surprise. Discipline grew up with these same institutions, or rather out of them, and as such, those technologies of power extending capitalist control obviously affect disciplinary society, which seeks always to make itself more efficient, more productive, more responsive to changes in demand.

Societal discipline, ingrained in us through the conditioning we receive as students, soldiers, factory workers, etc., functions more broadly than through the specifics of the factory whistle, the wristwatch or the timetable; our dominant ideologies, communicated to us through both overt propaganda (civics classes, for example) and through more subtle means (implicit messages in stylistic and content control of the media, for example), help maintain hegemonic stability through various discursive narratives that construct for us a world that makes sense. The narrow confines of these sense-making discourses not only allow for us to play our disciplined role (and disciplinary, for we are always both) but *dis*allow us to question it. This does not mean, obviously, that individuals go about their daily lives like the unthinking automatons of Stepford, but rather that even as questions are raised and methods/means of governing contested, this is done "almost exclusively within the

framework determined by the essentially shared interests of state-corporate power." (Chomsky 2003: 75) *Of course* there is debate, and indeed there should be, as again Chomsky asserts: "Debate cannot be stilled, and indeed, in a properly functioning system of propaganda, it should not be, because it has a system-reinforcing character if constrained within proper bounds. What is essential is to set the bounds firmly. Controversy may rage *as long as it adheres to the presuppositions that define the consensus of elites*, and it should furthermore be encouraged within these bounds, thus helping to establish these doctrines as the very condition of the thinkable thought while reinforcing the belief that freedom reigns." (2003: 48, my emphasis) The importance of the language used to frame the bounds of the thinkable, made frighteningly visible in Orwell's 'Newspeak', are yet another way in which dominant ideology plays its trump card of controlling discourse: in discourse analysis, "the inscription of social power within language can be traced in lexical, syntactic and grammatical structures – so that, for example, the use of an abstract noun, or a switch of mood from active to passive, may serve to obscure the concrete agency of a social event in ways convenient for ruling ideological interests." (Eagleton 1991: 196) This is why understanding the decision to discontinue the use of the word 'sniper' in the American media after the debacle of 'Sniper's Alley' in Sarajevo in the late 1990s, and instead place the emphasis on the American soldier's *skill* by calling him a 'sharp-shooter,' are key to understanding the construction of ideological discourse in mediated narratives. The same can be said for the 'freedom fighters' or 'seperatists' of Chechnya, who after the events of September 11 were increasingly called 'terrorists,' or for the renaming during the Vietnam conflict of 'search and destroy'

missions to 'sweep and clear' in the wake of the 'bad publicity' that the war was getting both at home and abroad[124]. Obviously, some of theses terms are changed 'from above,' meaning that the administration in power either directly instructs a change in terminology or simply ceases using the outdated term, but most often these changes are made 'from below' – this means that "media interpretation (...) is more a reflection of the views of the groups and forces to which the media are responsive – usually segments of the upper-middle class – than it is a function of the wishes of [others]." (Ginsberg 1986: 134) Through self-censorship and anticipatory compliance, such vocabulary changes are made in the media, and by dint of repetition, such terminology becomes integrated into discourse and comes to replace old terms, until only the new remain. In very much the style of 'Newspeak', the regular and systematic use of selected terminology acts to bind the realm of the thinkable within certain ideologically acceptable confines, thereby instituting a hegemonic conceptualization of not only events themselves, but the *reasons* for them, and this therefore limits the logical responses to those same events.

Robert Fulford, explaining the power that narrative has to construct such a logically determinant and enclosed world view, specifies that while the narrative form is diverse and serves many purposes, societies tend to have a handful of great, overarching 'master narratives': works of history that collect and collate countless facts, figures, events, characters and codes of conduct, all to arrive at meaningful patterns that guide society through "sweeping stories that will inspire and instruct us

[124] Please see Stanley Kubrick's war movie classic *Full Metal Jacket* for the scene in which word comes down from high command that such terminology changes are to take place – the scene would be funny if it weren't so frightening.

all." (1999: 30) The Bible has provided one such master narrative, as did the White Man's Burden in colonial times, as did the 'discovery' of the Americas by Europeans until, as we have seen, quite recently. The master narrative differs from other stories in that "it swallows us. It is not a play we can see performed, or a painting we can view, or a city we can visit. A master narrative is a dwelling place. We are intended to live in it." (Fulford 1999: 32) Fulford's master narrative seems strikingly similar to Ellul's propaganda, which according to Ellul, "tends to make the individual live in a separate world; he must not have outside points of reference." (1965: 17)

These master narratives of our society, accepted as our History, are a history "so potent that sometimes its stories [become our] governing myths" (Fulford 1999: 33), and as such always speak and are spoken of "with the confidence of unalterable and unassailable truth" (*Ibid*). According to Fulford, one of the reasons why the Bush narrative was so unquestioningly accepted and disseminated by mass media is that "[W]hen President Bush made war on Iraq, he compared Saddam Hussein with Hitler – because Bush understood that Hitler's part in history was known to just about everyone." (1999: 35)[125] The comparison appealed to both the media's structural demands that complex issues fit time constraints necessitating simplification – and to a public that could reference a new evil with the West's most recent and well-known "source of righteousness and moral certainty," namely World War II (Fulford 1999: 34).

[125] The part of all this that would be absurd if it weren't so lamentable is that while Fulford is speaking of the elder Bush, I am not, and yet the analysis remains pertinent in both instances.

Once the enemy is successfully labeled evil, "[A]ll we are left with are blurred covers of *Time* and *Newsweek* where monstrous figures from Hieronymous Bosch stare out at us, hellfire in their eyes." (Vidal 2002: x) The vilification of Hussein satisfied that 'first unwritten rule of war': dehumanization. As he was compared to Hitler, the most infamous monster of our time, Hussein became the perfect ideological counterpoint to liberal, democratic America, permitting the righteous West to go against the dangerous, theocratic Arab. The vilification of Iraqis was so key to the War because while it is naturally "always necessary to give men ideological and sentimental motivations to get them to lay down their lives (…) in our modern form of war the traditional motives – protection of one's family, defense of one's own country, personal hatred for a known enemy – no longer exist." (Ellul 1965: 142) Barry Glassner, trying to explain why Americans were suddenly so convinced of the evilness of the Iraqi regime, one their government had so recently supported, found that a comprehensive propaganda campaign against the Iraqis was undertaken by an American *pr* firm at the behest of the American and Kuwaiti governments:

> "A high-profile story and set of photographs about Iraqi soldiers destroying incubators in Kuwait hospitals and leaving babies to die, for instance, turned out to have been planted by the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States. (…) They were fed to the media by an American public relations firm, Hill and Knowlton (headed by Bush's former chief of staff), which the Kuwaitis paid $11.5 million. To this day there has been little national discussion of the possibility that the American people were duped by

publicists who recognized that we "would be *more likely to fight because of atrocity stories than because one feudal fiefdom was invaded by another*," as Arthur Rowse, a former editor of *U.S. News & World Report*, put it." (Glassner 1999b: 155, my emphasis)[126]

Explaining the role that propaganda plays in preparing and maintaining the view of the world that permits – and even necessitates – armed conflict, Ellul asserts that "[M]an must be plunged into a mystical atmosphere, he must be given strong enough impulses as well as good enough reasons for his sacrifices, and, at the same time, a drug that will sustain his nerves and his morale. *Patriotism must become "ideological."*" (1965: 143, my emphasis) The demonization of 'the Other', as we have seen, provides the ideological peg around which can circulate various regulatory and interventionist policies seeking to eradicate the supposed risks posed by this 'Other'. In a scathing critique of the media's role in recent military conflicts, Gore Vidal notes of this demonizing process that "[O]nce our media has invented a cartoon image for a national villain or hero, it does not take a benign view of anyone who contradicts its version." (2002: 125) This was made ridiculously clear in Bush the younger's infamous "you are either with us or against us" speech, an example if ever there was one of "a style of authoritative intervention which assumes the form of a highly emotive and rhetorical discourse that appeals to the established sentiments of stigma and prejudice." (Hier 2002: 322) History provides us with a frighteningly

[126] Similar incidents have been noted in other conflicts, notably the demonization of the Japanese during the Second World War, which was so complete that it eventually hindered domestic support for American-lead rebuilding efforts of Japan after the war. The dehumanization of the Japanese was in fact so successful that "the *New York Times* ran a photo showing a flamethrower being used to kill Japanese with the headline: "Clearing Out a Rats' Nest"." (Z 2004: 95)

astute analysis of why such rhetoric succeeds: awaiting trial in Nuremberg following World War II, Nazi Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering was visited by psychologist Gustave Gilbert in his prison cell. Responding to Gilbert's comment that the common people did not seem very thankful for the war, Goering answered:

> " "Why, of course, the *people* don't want war," Goering shrugged. "Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece? Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the *leaders* of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship."
>
> " "There is one difference," Gilbert pointed out. "In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only Congress can declare wars."
>
> " "Oh, that is all well and good," Goering responded, "but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. *All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger*. It works the same way in any country."" (in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 136-37, my emphasis)

Such patriotic fervor is more than simple rhetoric, however: If dissenters or even people who are not fully convinced of the hows and whys of war can be successfully

labeled 'traitor' – which, as we shall see in Chapter 4, has been a favorite tactic of the likes of the Republican vanguard, namely people like John Ashcroft, Ari Fleischer, Dick Morris, Bill O'Reilly and Ann Coulter – then the battle is half won. As Ellul states, "the opposing faction must become negligible, or in any case cease to be vocal. Extreme propaganda must win over the adversary and at least use him by integrating him into its own frame of reference." (1965: 11) This is why presidents, along with other claims makers and gatekeepers/agenda-setters, "seek the opportunity to define situations and construct the reality they want the public to accept" (Kieve, in Hawdon 2001: 422), for it is the delimitation of this reality that allows the subsequent definition of deviants (or traitors).

"In time of war, everybody agrees that news must be limited and controlled, and that all propaganda not in the national interest must be prohibited. From that fact grows a unified propaganda." (Ellul 1965: 238) In the case of President Bush's post-9/11 America, "[U]ncritical reporting is itself a type of frame. The homogenized messaging offered during the crises and the ensuing "War on Terror" only highlighted the notion of the Bush administration's policy of "one is either with us or against us."" (Hayden 2003: 13) This limiting of discourse along binary lines plays several roles, most evident of which "amounts to a process of world-building by building largely uncontested public credibility for the social imaginary of the Bush Administration." (Hayden 2003: 14)[127] This binary-bound discourse is not merely the

[127] Again, it is important to remember that the appearance of public consent does not necessarily mean that such consent exists. As Stabile reminds us, gauging public consent through polling means or otherwise is questionable at best, if not outright useless: "For media critics, to take constructions of public opinion as evidence of consent is both intellectually and politically dangerous, whether these

propaganda of a repressive regime, but is so heavily relied on because of the reason for its success: such binary oppositions respond to a need within the public. As Fulford surmises in his discussion on the importance of narratives, "we require that plots be made the way we think plots have always been made, with heroes and heroines, and villains, and a side we can take." (1999: 124) While he is here speaking of stories and films, it easily applies to society outside of the confines of storybooks, particularly in times of crises: "The democratic attitude is frequently close to that of a university: there is no absolute truth, and it is acknowledged that the opponent has some good faith, some justice, some reason on his side. It is a question of nuances. *There is no strict rule – except in time of war – about Good on one side and Bad on the other.*" (Ellul 1965: 240, my emphasis)

This need of individuals to perceive themselves as Good and 'the Other' as Bad is particularly evident in times of crises, whether that crisis be war, as it is now, or in times of panic or social change. As Hawdon's theory of deviance cycles explains, "moral boundaries are more intensely enforced when rates of social mobility slow and the deviance structure is altered so that once tolerated behaviors are defined as deviant." (2001: 440) Economic downturns can therefore spark such new delimitations of society's 'Other'. When President Truman faced a post-war economy in shambles, "Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg told [him] that he

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constructions are based on polling or the passage of legislation. In the first place (…) this ignores the fact that the polling industry is indeed an industry and that its practices therefore are structured by its economic and political interests." (2001: 263-64) Possible utility of polling is further hampered by the structural limitation of the means by which polls are taken: "surveying instruments aim for broad generalizations that can be easily quantified and numerically represented. The goal being homogenization, polls are not intended to represent or capture any of the heterogeneity of diverse populations." (2001: 264-65)

could have his militarized economy only *if* he first "scared the hell out of the American people" that the Russians were coming. Truman obliged. The perpetual war began." (Vidal 2002: 158)[128] Chomsky offers an analysis of Reagan's solution to the recession economy he faced in the early 1980s. According to Chomsky,

> "The public relations apparatus – surely the most sophisticated component of the Reagan administration – was faced with a dual problem in 1981: to frighten the domestic enemy (the general population at home) sufficiently so that they would bear the costs of programs to which they were opposed, while avoiding direct confrontations with the Evil Empire itself, as far too dangerous for us. The solution of the dilemma was to concoct as array of little Satans, tentacles of the Great Satan poised to destroy us, but weak and defenseless so that they could be attacked with impunity: in short, Kremlin-directed international terrorism. The farce proceeded perfectly, with the cooperation of the casuists, whose task was to give *a proper interpretation to the term "terrorism," protecting the doctrine that its victims are primarily the democratic countries of the West*." (2003: 114, my emphasis)

In so controlling the discourse surrounding the reasons for once again building up the American war machine, Reagan was given a near *carte blanche* with which to do whatever he wished, including develop the infamous Star Wars BMDs and TMDs. The parallels to be drawn between his use of global events and dynamics and Bush's are shocking. As an infuriated Gore Vidal so concisely puts it, "[E]ver since the Soviet Union so unsportingly disbanded in order to pursue protocapitalism and

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[128] Again, Moore's *Canadian Bacon* puts this situation bluntly: "Mr. President, do you want more of that, or fifty years of Cold War prosperity because Joe Shmoe American is scared shitless the world's gonna end before the next commercial?" (Rotholz and Moore 1995)

double-entry bookkeeping, our warlords have been anxiously searching for new enemies in order to justify an every increasing military budget. Obviously, there is Terrorism to be fought. There is also the war on Drugs, to be fought but never won." (2002: 151)

While accusations have abounded as to the government's responsibility for the attacks of September 11, they are neither here nor there for the purposes of this thesis. My intention has simply been to demonstrate that governments, *all* governments, along with societal institutions in general (including the family, the hospital, the Church, school, etc.), make use of a variety of technologies of power *at their disposal* and *already functioning* to maintain society's relations of power, in order to extend and enrich that power, pursuing ever-more disciplinary controls over a population that is made to think it is all in its best interest (which it may well be), and that such controls have in fact originated in their demands for them:

> "In the democratic system, the necessary illusions cannot be imposed by force. Rather, they must be instilled in the public mind by more subtle means. A totalitarian state can be satisfied with lesser degrees of allegiance to required truths. It is sufficient that people obey; what they think is a secondary concern. But in a democratic political order, there is always the danger that independent thought might be translated into political action, so it is important to eliminate the threat at its root." (Chomsky 2003: 48)

As we shall see in Chapter 4 with the case study of post-9/11 America, the Bush administration's success in creating a causality trail necessitating the prosecution of a 'War on Terror' has been dependent upon the regime's ability to (in no particular order): (a) tap into existing social anxieties; (b) propagate on different social registers a regime of truth permitting only certain conclusions through, among other means, the bounding of debate; (c) manipulate a mass media ripe for such (mis)use; (d) vilify its enemies (both domestic and foreign); (e) make use of a legislative legacy permitting such government expansionist undertakings; and (f) ride a 'scare wave' that it perpetuates through various institutional means, and all in order to establish firmer disciplinary control over a populace that, unless so unified and controlled, 'everything divides'.

CHAPTER FOUR

There is a popular school of thought that holds that in today's globalized world, the continued relevance of the Westphalian state is uncertain. When, for example, transnational firms can, through intra-firm trading, sub-contracting and various electronic banking methods, effectively circumvent the modern state – its labour laws, minimum wage standards, taxation system, etc. – those areas left strictly to government control are arguably few, and those that remain, according to this thinking, are severely weakened[129]. If governments have only the most peripheral and artificial control over their economy, and therefore to some extent over their citizens' employment and consequent well-being, what remains under direct state control, or is at least assumed to be, is the people's security. While the security narrative has always been key to a state's legitimacy, in our current age, when globalization limits economic independence, when multilateral involvement requires open borders, and when conflict – be it warfare or terrorism – affects civilian populations in a way never before seen[130], such a narrative has perhaps never been more important: "If the state is not capable of providing security, however that security is to be defined, the continued legitimacy and even existence of the state itself must necessarily be questioned (…) The power and importance of the security narrative has generally been conceived of the 'self' against the 'other'." (McDonald 2002: bit 2) If the power of the security narrative, and most importantly *its manipulability*, is not to be underestimated, then "security is a psychological rather

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[129] For examples of such thinking, or re-thinking of the role of the State, please see Bislev 2004; Kahler 2004; Putzel 2005.

[130] See for example Barker: 115, regarding *terrorism*-related civilian casualty rates, and Waldman 2005: 60 for *war*-related civilian casualty rates.

than material state. In other words, security is about *feeling* rather than *being* secure. As such, governments must seek to create conditions in which this feeling of security is engendered in order to retain legitimacy (…) Seen in this light, the creation of threat, regardless of the material significance of the threat itself, is a useful tool for governments to maintain legitimacy." (McDonald 2002: bit 6, emphasis in original) Fear of a *tangible* threat can more easily be mobilized in favor of government policy rather than fear of the *in*tangible – while people may be just as afraid of being mugged as they are of dying of cancer, it is likely that even smokers will refrain from walking down dark alleys… In this sense, in the government's attempt to protect the 'self' from the 'other', fear of the tangible is more useful politically than fear of the intangible, and it therefore follows that such fears may be focused on a tangible devil, regardless of whether or not the threat from that devil is real, or whether this 'other' devil is, in fact, 'other'.

According to McDonald, "government or regime legitimacy can be assisted through recourse to an identity politics predicated on fear." (2002: bit 8) Michael Moore, notorious activist and acclaimed film-maker, directed in 1995 a political satire. The film, entitled *Canadian Bacon*, told the story of a peacetime US president suffering from low approval ratings. The film's dialogue, although farcical, demonstrates this 'government legitimacy based on fear' discussed by McDonald:

> "President: How 'bout a little credit? I'm the only president that hasn't gotten us into a war!
>
> General: I think that's his point sir. You have yet to send our boys into battle.

President: Send them where? Nobody's bothering us.

Secretary of National Security: Send them … anywhere, sir? Guaranteed 30 point boost in the polls…

President: Well I'm not going to start a war just to, just to increase my popularity. … What can I do for 20 points?" (Rotholz and Moore 1995)

Eventually in the film a confrontation with Canada is invented by the president's administration, and the genuine fear that develops in the American people, following "leaks" by government sources relating the nefarious intentions of the Canadians, gives the president the "boost in the polls" he was looking for. In the film, solidarity and support, created through a government narrative defining the security threat from an 'other', results in Americans identifying both with the president, and each other. Fear that drives this type of solidification of identity can take several forms, one of which is panic. While the government may not necessarily be involved in the *development* of a panic (moral or otherwise), certainly governments may *use* an existing situation of (moral) panic to further policy aims, as we can argue is the case in post-9/11 America.

As seen earlier, Cohen defined moral panic as occurring when a "condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media … it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself." (2002: 1) McDonald, in his analysis of the role of fear in

government policy, quotes David Campbell, who "argues that the provision of security in the United States has similarly been linked to identity politics in which fear of a vilified other was central to the constitution of the self and the legitimacy of governments." (McDonald 2002: bit 4) Whether or not the Bush administration was responsible for the events of 9/11 we will leave to conspiracists to debate; the fact remains that the attacks were very real, and given Cohen's definition, they would constitute that "emerging event" that comes to "be defined as a threat to societal values". The ensuing (assumed) consent the American people have given the government to do what it will in the name of re-securitizing the United States (passing the PATRIOT Act, increased military spending, Arctic drilling, withdrawl from the ABM to pursue BMD[131], the creation of the US Department for Homeland Security, to name but a few examples) seems to indicate that American reaction to 9/11 would qualify as a moral panic, as it has resulted in changes "in legal and social policy", in the way America perceives itself, and in the portrayal of the events themselves, their victims and their perpetrators in a highly "stylized and stereotypical" fashion. In order to counter the perceived risk to the American way of life, Americans seem to have allowed their governments a free hand in ruling. However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, "[I]t is not clear whether it is the risks that have intensified, or our view of them. Both sides converge, condition each other, strengthen each other, and because risks are risks in *knowledge*, perception of risks and risks are not different things, but one in the same." (Beck, in Hier 2003: 7,

[131] The United States has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, signed by the U.S.S.R. and the United States, in order to pursue the development of the infamous and highly contested ballistic missile defense shields, which include both NMD (national missile defense) and TMD (in-theatre missile defense).

emphasis in original) The government therefore, in attempting to create a narrative of fear to breed consent of the people for policies that they might not otherwise support – indeed, as we will see in the case of 9/11, policies were passed that the people had already rejected a few years earlier – is essentially managing risk. To what extent the perception of that risk allows the government to do what it will depends on the success of the government's narrative.

That consecutive American administrations, regardless of political leanings, have found it convenient and useful to engage in such risk definition and risk management is testament to the utility of the security (and fear) narrative. Presidencies as seemingly divergent as Jimmy Carter's and Ronald Reagan's reveal, upon closer inspection, startling similarities despite their supposed ideological divide. It would appear that on certain issues, mainly concerns resting on questions of fear and security, such as border integrity and related immigration issues, fiscal independence, military capability, and most recently the threat of terrorism, longstanding security policy options have been pursued, *in much the same manner*, regardless of which party is controlling the White House, Congress or the Senate. For example, contrary to popular belief, the 'Star Wars' ballistic missile defense shield system, made notorious under President Reagan and most recently resuscitated by the younger Bush administration, was in fact a security policy option pursued by each successive presidency during the Cold War, regardless of the leanings of the political party in power[132]. It is in part this repeated use of such a security narrative to pursue

[132] Please refer to http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch2/index.html for a brief history of the American ballistic missile defense program.

certain policy options that has established the legislative and technological precedents for the current Bush administration's seemingly sweeping reforms. Given the fact that in many circles President George W. Bush[133] is criticized (inaccurately) as having remilitarized security and remade the United States as a surveillance nation, it is instructive to examine the similarities between the Clinton and Bush administrations' use of the security narrative, not only given the perceived ideological gulf between their administrations, but because their pursuit of such a narrative is so shockingly similar. In light of the fact that, contrary to public perception, Bush did not single-handedly militarize security and surveillance in the United States, but rather made use of the legislative legacy left him by his predecessor, it is instructive – both to understanding the pursuit of a security narrative, and how such pursuit is near universal because of its easy applicability regardless of personal politics – to briefly examine the Clinton administration's responses to the acts of terror that occurred 'on their watch', if only to set the stage to better understand how the Bush administration has used the groundwork laid by Clinton (and his predecessors) to enact their own risk management policies. As we shall see, in neither case was it a simple 'power-grab' by the government, taking advantage of a terrorized public, but rather the policy options enacted in the name of security have, for the most part, been (convincingly or not) justified as *facilitating* and making *efficient* law enforcement tactics and technologies for the betterment of society – an objective that clearly meets disciplinary power's goals.

[133] Hereinafter referred to as simply Bush.

The Clinton administration's response to the Oklahoma City Bombing, as well as the public's reaction to the resulting policy changes, is analogous, though differs in scale, to the Bush administration's response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. While it is my aim to point out that security concerns, as well as the benefits of pursuing a security narrative, preclude outright divergence from certain policy options based on such a narrative – regardless of ideological stance – it goes without saying that the Oklahoma bombing, and Clinton's presidency, are very much different from Bush the younger's White House and 9/11. It is my goal to trace the historical development of certain pieces of legislation and problem definitions that helped lay the groundwork for Bush's later pursuit of the 9/11 security agenda. Because of the remarkable similarity of the social contexts these administrations dealt with (both administrations were mired in scandal at key moments during their leadership; both suffered through national crises; both were involved in international armed conflicts pursuant to these crises; and both were perceived at various times of their leadership as epitomizing their party's ideological stance), the comparison between these two facilitates the mapping of the development, maintenance and use of security narratives predicated on fear. Because they were successive, these administrations – perhaps better than any other comparison I might make, such as between the Kissinger-Nixon and the Ashcroft-Bush White Houses – illustrate pedagogically clearly the evolution of such a security narrative, and also help demonstrate that while there is nothing strictly new about the technologies involved in the 'new' security-state being 'constructed' by Bush, the *way* in which such technologies are being used is new, and the *legitimacy* to be found in public support for certain security policy options that was lacking under

Clinton is now (supposedly) present under Bush. The Clinton response to Oklahoma is important to note not only because it allows an understanding of the continuity of the security narrative, but also because it shows how very different the situation now is. The juxtaposition of these two cases is intended to open up discussion as to *why* things have changed, if indeed they have, and *how*[134].

Oklahoma

At 9:01 am on Wednesday, April 19th, 1995, a bright yellow Ryder truck that was parked in the drop-off zone outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City exploded. The seven thousand pounds of explosives detonated with such force that "every one of the structures in a sixteen-block area surrounding the blast was damaged." (Michel and Herbeck 2001: 231) By the time the ruined building was torn down in May of that year, and the remaining corpses unearthed, a total of 168 people had died, including 19 children. The death toll of the worst act of terrorism on American soil to date exceeded that of the 148 Americans killed in combat during the Gulf War (Michel and Herbeck 2001: 234).

[134] It is vital that the reader not construe the use of the fear narrative in the United States as originating with Clinton – this narrative goes as far back as written history allows us to trace. The Clinton administration's use of the security narrative is instructive particularly because of the linearity it helps demonstrate, not because it is particular to the Clinton administration *as such*. The Kissinger-Nixon administration, as mentioned, pursued very similar policies, though not nearly so successfully, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Israeli delegation at the 1972 Olympics. Besides the length of time that passed between the Kissinger-Nixon and the Ashcroft-Bush administrations, the social contexts of the two are not nearly as conducive to direct comparison. Nixon was still embroiled in the Vietnam debacle, the feminist movement was on the rise, McCarthyism was still very much alive, and Hoover's FBI was incredibly unpopular due to its… laxity in adhering to civil rights. As technology plays a key role in the Bush administration's prosecution of the War on Terror, comparison with an administration still working with punch-card computers seems disingenuous.

In part due to the similarity with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (for which a Ryder truck had also been used), in part due to the similarity of the method used with methods usually associated with terrorism elsewhere (car bombs), and in part due to "the human inclination to attribute all that is evil to forces far away, beyond one's familiar surroundings" (Deflem 1997), media and security personnel immediately began speculating on the assumed Middle Eastern origins of the perpetrators of the attack on America's Heartland. Despite the fact that the bombing coincided, *to the day*, with the two-year anniversary of the Branch Davidian tragedy in Waco, Texas, this potential link was dismissed by reports that the link was "a 'more far-reaching' theory than the fact that American planes had 'bombed Libya nine years ago'" (*Chicago Tribune*, in Deflem 1997) that month. Indeed, shortly after television crews arrived on the scene, before any formal investigations had begun, former Oklahoma Congressman Dave McCurdy was quoted by CBS as confirming that there was "very clear evidence" linking the attacks to "fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups." (in Deflem 1997)[135] CNN actually aired the names of three men of Middle Eastern origin who had been detained for questioning, despite the security threat this revelation posed for the men and their families (Alter 1996: 55). No presumption of innocence was accorded to the potential killers, nor indeed to anyone of Arab descent. Hate crimes increased, and hate speech so filled the airwaves of Oklahoma City's talk radio[136] that less than a week after the bombing, the Oklahoma

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[135] The "Muslim link" is still very much debated in even mainstream media and in public discourse. Timothy McVeigh, executed for the bombing in June 2001, is often spoken of as 'the fall guy' in a mainstream conspiracy reminiscent of the grassy knoll... Please see Vidal 2002.

[136] An example of one such talk radio call that was aired had the caller stating that "The truth is that not all Muslims might be terrorists, but all terrorist attacks against us are done by Muslims" (Spratt 1995), a position that, as we have seen, remains popular. (see Maher 2002)

State Senate voted unanimously to adopt a resolution urging the sponsors of several of the more popular hate-mongering shows to pull their spots. (Fischer 1996: 46) Following President Clinton's castigations of the media's "loud and angry voices … spreading hate" (*Ibid*), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began investigating short wave licensees that aired the messages of several hate groups and extremists.

However, while the President may have objected to outright declarations of hate and unfounded accusations, his Cabinet was functioning on very much the same assumptions as the media. Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the *New York Times* that in the hours following the bombing he "had sent Arabic interpreters to aid the police investigations" (in Deflem 1997), which obviously made sense only if the attackers were Arab. Indeed, in his first public address after the bombing, President Clinton himself stated that the bombing was an "attack on the United States, our way of life and everything we believe in." (*Ibid*) According to Dr. Mathieu Deflem, a sociology professor specializing in terrorism at the University of South Carolina, Clinton's statement "expressed and confirmed the anti-American character of the bombing and it at least implicitly insinuated that guilt lay outside America's borders." (1997) Clinton further stated that the search for the terrorists was "not a question of anybody's country of origin … not a question of anybody's religion." (in Deflem 1997) If his earlier statement was unclear as to the foreign origins of the terrorists, his disclaimer removed all doubt. The psychological necessity for many Americans to blame Arab groups for the bombing was made evident when Weldon Kennedy, the

FBI agent in charge of the bombing site, was asked whether or not the description of suspects as being 'white males' precluded them from being of Middle Eastern origin, and Kennedy responded "Certainly not." (in Deflem 1997)

Within two days of the bombing, Michigan Militiaman and decorated war veteran Timothy McVeigh had been arrested and charged. Despite the discovery that that the terrorist was "not a swarthy foreigner who plotted his villainy in a nerve center in Tripoli, Libya, or Brooklyn, N.Y., but a crew-cut native son with good cheekbones and a firm jaw whom we ourselves had trusted and trained to defend our country," (*Chicago Tribune*, in Deflem 1997) the policy changes enacted by the government following the bombing were aimed principally at foreigners. This, in part, reflected the legislation's origins in debates following the World Trade Centre bombing in 1993, whose mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, had in fact been foreign-born, but also reflected the belief that such an evil, depraved crime "was the product of another culture unfathomably different from our own." (Alter 1995: 55) The Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, presented to Congress that February had dealt principally with international terrorism, but in the wake of the Oklahoma bombing seemed ill-equipped to deal with domestic terrorism. The final draft of the Antiterrorism Amendment Act of 1996, however, seemed just as focused on foreign nationals as it had before: besides provisions were included for tougher penalties for persons caught carrying out or planning terrorist acts in the United States; the adding of chemical markers for easy tracing of purchase point of certain key elements possibly used in explosives; and a ban on fundraising in the U.S. for known terrorist

organizations, among other antiterrorism measures. Alongside these banal points were others, clearly aimed at foreign nationals and nations, such as those facilitating the use of secret evidence in extradition and deportation trials, along with a general easing of deportation procedures. Bans of aid and the sale of defense goods to countries deemed by the president to not be "cooperating fully" with U.S. antiterrorism efforts[137] were also included, and a new immigration reform was begun. Justification for such sweeping reforms, as they were seen at the time, was eloquently explained by a *New York Times* reporter, who stated that while "Americans apparently died at the hands of other Americans (in Oklahoma City) we should not let ourselves be diverted from the other menace to America's civil society – Muslim extremists." (in Deflem 1997)

While the media, and people in general, may have been justifying such reforms based on a racial definition of terrorism, the President was making both an emotional appeal and an ideological one to justify pushing through legislation asking for roving wire taps, 1,000 additional law enforcement officials, military assistance in domestic cases of terrorism (in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act), immigration restrictions and the easing of the burden of proof on law enforcement officials, among others[138]. From heroization of victims, to demonization of the criminals, President Clinton brilliantly maneuvered what was essentially a racial construction of terror into an ideological battle for the free world, thereby justifying his infringing on civil

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[137] Clinton "Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"
[138] *Ibid*; see also Idelson 1996; "Clinton Administration Counter Terrorism Initiative" http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/adm-anti-terror-otl.html

liberties and the slamming shut of the borders of the world's self-proclaimed freest country.

In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, President Clinton labeled it "an appalling act of cowardice,"[139] stating that a great "evil" had been done, and vowing that this "sin against humanity"[140] would not go unpunished. Such apocalyptic language as "in the wake of evil, goodness will prevail"[141] is to be expected when a nation faces such large-scale tragedy. Also to be expected is the labeling of such an attack "a *senseless* act of violence" (*Ibid*, emphasis added), despite the fact that at least Timothy McVeigh would argue his attack was meaningful[142]. As well as heroizing the emergency personnel and good Samaritans who partook in the rescue efforts, President Clinton heroized the victims, labeling them "Simple soldiers of the everyday", who were "not cut down in a great battle, they were just ordinary Americans"[143]. In so doing he heroized an entire nation of average American citizens who now saw their everyday acts as being part of a new global war between the forces of good (freedom and democracy) and evil (militant fanaticism and tyranny).

In speeches eerily echoed six years later by his successor, President Clinton vowed, "We will find the people who did this. When we do, justice will be swift,

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[139] Clinton "Proclamation 6786 – Victims of the Oklahoma City Bombing"
[140] Clinton "Proclamation 6789 – National Day of Mourning for Those Who Died in Oklahoma City"
[141] Clinton "Defeating the Forces of Destruction: A National Security Priority"
[142] Indeed, McVeigh eventually clarified, in a series of letters to famed essayist Gore Vidal that, "borrowing a page from U.S. foreign policy, I decided to send a message to a government that was becoming increasingly hostile, by bombing a government building." (in Vidal 2002: 19) As Vidal recaps, McVeigh "declared war on a government that he felt had declared war on its own people." (2002: 96)
[143] Clinton "The President's Radio Address"

certain and severe." (in Spratt 1995) He congratulated the nation on coming together and proving that "while the American spirit can be terribly tested, it cannot be defeated,"[144] and ironically enough, appealed to that same spirit of resolve when asking the American people to approve, *in the name of freedom*, an antiterrorism bill that would limit theirs: "So let us honor those who lost their lives by resolving to hold fast against the forces of violence and division, by never allowing them to shake our resolve or break our spirit, to frighten us into sacrificing our sacred freedoms or surrendering a drop of precious American liberty."[145]

As the Oklahoma bombing was eventually revealed to have been an act that specifically targeted certain departments of the *Federal* government, President Clinton was careful to articulate his policy changes, which strengthened the government's powers, in patriotic and security-related terms: "Sometimes it takes a terrible tragedy to illuminate a basic truth. In a democracy, government is not "them" versus "us". We are all "us". We are all in it together. Government is our neighbors and friends helping others pursue the dreams we all share, to live in peace, provide for ourselves and our loved ones, give our children a chance for an even better life."[146] Indeed, as a report in the *Christian Science Monitor* maintained, "Government bashing seems no longer chic. A recent *Washington Post*-ABC nationwide poll found that since Oklahoma City, anger at government is down, satisfaction with government is up." (Schorr 1995: 18) It was in this climate of fear

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[144] Clinton "Defeating the Forces of Destruction: A National Security Priority"
[145] Clinton "Remarks on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"
[146] Clinton "The President's Radio Address"

and hesitance to criticize the government that the Clinton administration was able to lay the legislative foundation for later reforms and international intervention.

Despite the fact that 1998 is more remembered in U.S. politics for the Monica Lewinsky affair and the beginning of the President's impeachment trial, 1998 was in fact a watershed year for the United States' antiterrorism efforts. In July of that year, President Clinton created the post of national coordinator for security, infrastructure and counterterorrism. The position, filled by national security expert Richard Clarke – the very same individual later vilified by the Bush administration and mainstream media (particularly FOX News)[147] for his testimonial before the 9/11 Commission – was presented as necessary in order to coordinate efforts between the forty-plus US agencies and offices involved in antiterrorism efforts. Federal spending on antiterrorism had in the three years since Oklahoma increased by over 2 billion dollars (up from 5 billion to 7), with Clinton pushing for nearly 300 million more, including funds to begin stockpiling drugs in case of chemical or biological attacks (Landay 1998: 4). In a moment of near-clairvoyance Clinton, at the request of Clarke, called for "first-response teams of medical, law-enforcement, and disaster-relief personnel in 120 metropolitan areas to detect and contain chemical and biological attacks," (*Ibid*) seemingly foretelling the anthrax scare that would terrorize the country some six years later.

[147] Please see Greenwald 2004, pp. 31-37 for more on FOX News Channel's attack on Richard Clarke, which in fact demonstrates all the elements discussed in this thesis: fear, propaganda, loyalty and treason, the Other, security, media bias, etc.

On August 20, 1998, right around the time that Monica Lewinsky was to testify before Kenneth Starr's grand jury, and a mere three days after he denied, before the American public, any wrong doing regarding Ms. Lewinsky, President Clinton informed his fellow Americans that their army was bombing the Sudan and Afghanistan because of the "imminent threat they presented to our national security."[148] While it is George W. Bush who popularized in 2001 the term "rogue states", it was in fact a term used by President Clinton as early as 1996, when he pushed Congress to produce what eventually became the Antiterrorism Amendment Act of 1996. Such rogue states were those persisting in financing or giving other aid to known terrorist groups, and for which the President had a clear warning: "Countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens (…) There will be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will defend our people, our interests and our values." (*Ibid*) The President justified this most timely attack stating, "Our target was terror. Our mission was clear – to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today." (*Ibid*) In a pre-emptive strike prompted by "compelling evidence that the bin Laden network of terrorist groups [were] planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other freedom-loving people", the President "decided America must act." (*Ibid*) In very much the same vein, in a move many have since come to suspect was meant to further shore up support for the President during the impeachment voting process, Operation Desert Fox was begun on December 16th of that same year. Another pre-emptive strike aimed at degrading Saddam Hussein's ability to produce weapons of mass

[148] "President Clinton's Speech on Terrorist Attacks "

destruction, the 4-day assault in fact resulted in Iraq withdrawing from negotiations with UN weapons inspectors.

It is rather shocking to realize that much of what the Bush administration has been castigated for in the aftermath of 9/11 was in fact begun under President Clinton: he instituted harsh legislation aimed at immigration restrictions; greatly increased law enforcement powers; created a federal body to coordinate antiterrorism efforts; led an international coalition against terror (the 1996 Summit of Peace*makers* in Egypt – note it is not the Summit of Peace*keepers*); and began questionably motivated bombing campaigns in the Middle East, all the while justifying his actions in the name of those victims of both the 1993 World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City bombings. Using apocalyptic vocabulary, President Clinton created an international and domestic environment made up of victims, heroes, goodness and evil, free and peace-loving peoples against "crackpots"[149] and "fanatics and killers."[150] He did not, however, get his roving wire taps, establish his pharmaceutical stock-piles, institute racial profiling, withdraw from international treaties, indebt the country while re-militarizing the nation, and rewrite the Constitution (as Bush is accused of having at least implicitly done). While there are many reasons for this, two of the most important ones to take note of are the fact that the Oklahoma City bombing, as terrible as it was, had not nearly the national nor international impact of the events of 9/11. Nor did the Oklahoma bombing begin a string of related international attacks (either by or against terrorist organizations). It is the gravity

[149] Clinton "Remarks at the University of Central Oklahoma in Edmond, Oklahoma"
[150] "President Clinton's Speech on Terrorist Attacks"

(and visibility) of the 9/11 attacks, combined with their international effects, that have allowed the Bush administration to pursue those policy options either not obtained, or not considered, by the Clinton administration. The horror of the events, as well as their international repercussions, have played the key role in the maintenance of a security narrative predicated on fear that has given the Bush administration the leeway necessary to extend the legislative legacy left him by his predecessor(s).

Hier specified that in moral panics "government authorities channel existing social anxieties towards a specific target (folk devil) in a fairly direct fashion *for the purpose of imposing a sense of moral order or social control on situations or events that are perceived to lack such a property*." (Hier 2003: 8, my emphasis) The horrific nature of the first foreign attacks on American soil since Pearl Harbor had a psychological impact on the American people that cannot be underestimated. No one can claim that the events of September 11 were anything less than shattering for the American people, creating an atmosphere of extreme fear, anxiety, insecurity and even paranoia. The shaky presidency of George W. Bush was suddenly thrust into the spotlight, and "[T]he President, far from being the "moron" his most moronic adversaries claim, shrewdly capitalized on this atmosphere as the months piled up." (Rich, in Didion 2003: x) While an in-depth analysis of the narrative of fear put forth by the Bush administration is far too great a project to address here, a simple overview will provide the reader with enough information to see the management of risk that occurs in the governance of modern societies. This overview should provide ample evidence to demonstrate the emergence of the "solidarity from anxiety" (Hier

2003: 3), discussed in Chapter 3, that characterizes such a narrative of fear, which is both indicative of, and formative of, American identity discourse post-9/11.

September 11, 2001

On a day now infamous, terrorist hijackers crashed two commercial passenger jets into the World Trade Center Towers, while a third jet crashed into the Pentagon, and a fourth was retaken by its passengers before finally going down in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, en route to the Capitol. The first highly lethal foreign attack on mainland America since 1814, when British and Loyalists forces burned Washington, the September 11 attacks were not only the worst on American soil *ever*, but were one of the single most devastating *globally*, the death toll exceeding 2,900 people. Panic gripped the nation as people watched in shock as workers from the towers leaped to their deaths, then in horror as the towers crumbled on rescuers. A total of 343 firefighters *alone* died when the towers fell[151], to say nothing of the law enforcement officers, paramedics and other rescue personnel, never mind the workers at the Pentagon, or the passengers and crews of the downed jets. New York City was shut down as the Island of Manhattan was engulfed in smoke. For the first time ever, civilian air travel was completely suspended for several days as more attacks were expected[152]. Several other cities also partially suspended or limited air travel, such as

[151] All fatality numbers taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11 .
[152] Please see Donnelly's article, "The Day the FAA Stopped the World", for more on the aviation restrictions following 9/11, a link for which was provided on p.9 of the September 24, 2001, issue of *Time* (Canadian Edition). See also "Press Briefing by Attorney General, Secretary of HHS, Secretary of Transportation, and FEMA Director".

in the U.K., where civilian flights over London were prohibited for several days following the attacks[153].

It took weeks to extinguish the fires that burned in the rubble, and nearly nine months to clear the more than 1.5 millions tons of debris from the site. Countries around the world sent delegates to visit 'Ground Zero', and international aid agencies such as the Red Cross participated in later rescue and retrieval efforts. Immediately following the attacks, in his Address to the Nation, President Bush warned that the U.S. would "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."[154] He later famously stated, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[155] While no terrorist group immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks, in part based on both domestic and foreign intelligence reports, and in part due to the approval of the attacks stated by al-Qaeda leaders, Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization was fingered for the atrocities.

Echoing the Clinton administration from years earlier which had stated, "Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorists,"[156] President Bush issued several ultimatums to the Afghani Taliban regime during the weeks following the attacks[157], and almost immediately sent troops

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[153] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11 for a detailed breakdown of the timeline and major events following 9/11.
[154] Bush "Address to the Nation 09/11/01"
[155] Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
[156] "President Clinton's Speech on Terrorist Attacks"
[157] "By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder. And tonight the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American

to the Persian Gulf to prove U.S. threats were serious. After weeks of failed negotiations between representatives of the Taliban regime and the U.S. administration, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7th, 2001, and involved a U.S.-led coalition bombing of Afghanistan. By the time the full force of the coalition was involved in the war, more than 18 nations were directly involved in the conflict, including, among others, the United States, Britain, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and Jordan[158], and eventually the coalition included Afghani forces led by the Northern Alliance. Part of the reason the negotiations had failed was that the Taliban regime refused to extradite bin Laden without clear evidence linking him to 9/11. The Bush administration also refused the Taliban-proposed compromise of extraditing bin Laden to a neutral third country to be tried in Islamic court[159]. America treated the refusal to extradite bin Laden – also exercised by the Taliban in 1998 when al-Qaeda bombed American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as in October 2000[160] when the same group bombed the U.S.S. Cole, a missile destroyer, off the coast of Yemen – as support for the attacks and for al-Qaeda. Given such implicit involvement in the attacks, the United States government felt compelled to retaliate.

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citizens you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion." Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/

[158] Please see http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/joint.htm for a list of all countries involved in the Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

[159] Please see Maholtra's September 13, 2001 cnsnews.com's article "Taliban Won't Extradite Bin Laden without Evidence".

[160] Please see "Taleban 'will not extradite' bin Laden".

Still reeling from a tragedy of international proportions, less than two weeks after the towers crumbled the nation was addressed by a president declaring his intentions to go to war. Selling the American people on going to war for the first time, officially, since World War Two proved an easy feat. Just as former President Clinton had roused the troops by appealing to a sense of civic pride, President Bush began his tirade against international terror with an inspiring statement: "My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union – and it is strong."[161] What followed was a speech promising retribution, vowing "Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done."[162] While Clinton had also promised "swift, certain and severe" justice (in Spratt 1995), his presidential speeches following the Oklahoma bombing had initially concentrated on the families of the victims, whereas almost immediately following 9/11, the tone of President Bush's speeches made no bones that while there was a place for grief, sadness had given way to "a quiet, unyielding anger"[163] that would see the country rebuild its army with the promise of forty *billion* dollars in order to win a war that would "not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."[164]

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[161] Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

[162] *ibid*

[163] Bush "Address to the Nation 09/11/01"
The President also, as early as September 15, 2001, remarked in his "Radio Address to the Nation" that the world should "Make no mistake: underneath our tears is the strong determination of America to win this war."

[164] Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

"As we mobilize for this national crusade, please remember this when your courage is tested: you are Americans. You're the product of the freest society mankind has ever known." (President Ronald Reagan, speaking on the War on Drugs, in Hawdon 2001: 429)

Just as former President Clinton had warned Americans that their battle against terrorism would not be won overnight[165], President Bush promised "Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign," one in which "every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war" would be committed to "the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network."[166] This terror network, Americans were now told, as they had been in the wake of Oklahoma, had targeted America because of what it represented: the best the world had to offer in freedom, democracy, and liberty, all of which the terrorists were supposedly opposed to[167]. The terrorists were *evil*, just as the perpetrators of Oklahoma had been, and had to be beaten by the forces of the *civilized* world: "This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is *civilization's*

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[165] Clinton "Remarks on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"
[166] Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
[167] "America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy and basic human values; because we're the most open society on earth" "President Clinton's Speech on Terrorist Attacks"
This sentiment has been repeatedly asserted by President Bush, and can be found in any number of his speeches, including in his "Radio Address of the President to the Nation". The sense that "They can't stand freedom; they hate what America stands for" (Bush "Remarks by the President Upon Arrival") is even more strenuously insisted upon, appearing as a theme in even the President's most recent inaugural speech, among others. Please see Bush "President Delivers State of the Union Address"; "President Freezes Terrorist' Assets"; "International Campaign Against Terror Grows", and the inaugural speech "President Sworn-In to Second Term".

fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom."[168] If the President hadn't already stated 'you are with us or against us' explicitly, his categorization of the 'civilized world' as being uniformly against the attacks clearly drew lines in ideological sand.

Unlike the Oklahoma bombing, however, the events of 9/11 had unfolded on television[169] in the cultural and financial nerve center of the country, and not in a removed town, albeit one in the American Heartland. Therefore President Bush's task of coaxing the average American to connect with the tragedy forcefully enough to acquiesce to his demands for policy changes was made all that much easier: viewers all over the country had watched as people leaped to their deaths from one hundred stories up. All over the country, people had received panicked cell phone calls from passengers on the doomed jets, and desperate messages of love from their friends and relatives in the towers who faced certain death. Perhaps that is why President Bush's addresses dealt less with emotional appeals speaking of victims than did those of former President Clinton. Perhaps it is purely a question of scale: due to the sheer number of people killed in the attacks, everybody knew someone, somehow, who had died on September 11th. Doubtless it is some combination of both of these, and more. Either way, President Bush's speeches clearly called (and *still* do) for violent retaliation in a way that even former President Clinton's *early* post-Oklahoma speeches hadn't.

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[168] Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" (my emphasis) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

[169] "The time delay between the assaults on the fist and second of the twin towers ensured that television crews had time to get equipment in place for the spectacle to be viewed with fullest effect." (Lyon 2003: 19)

Similarly, the American people appeared to call for action with an urgency that had been lacking in the Oklahoma case. Whereas legislation after Oklahoma took over a year to enact, following the 9/11 attacks, it took less than *six weeks* to draft and pass a bill cleverly entitled the 'Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001', or, as it is more commonly known, the USA PATRIOT Act. If the changes proposed under the Clinton administration had been perceived at the time as being too sweeping by many civil rights organizations, this 342-page monstrosity of a bill – that amended nearly every other piece of legislation in America[170] – cannot be called anything other than catastrophic for these same groups. While the President claimed, "No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith,"[171] of the 29 terrorist organizations initially targeted by the administration, 21 were Muslim or Arab (McGeary 2001: 36)[172]. The President also stated that, "A new terrorism task force is tightening immigration controls to make sure no one enters or stays in our country who would harm us. We are a welcoming country, we will always value freedom – yet we will not allow those

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[170] As Michael Moore blasts in his bestselling book *Dude, Where's My Country?*, "The Patriot Act is mostly about amending existing laws. There are 342 pages where it never really says what it is doing but rather refers you to hundreds of other passages in other laws written over the past hundred years. So, in order to read the Patriot Act, you need to have all the other laws written in the past century in order to see what sentence or phrase the Patriot Act is changing." (2003: 105) The full text of the Act is available from http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.pdf

[171] Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

[172] The rest, interestingly enough, are principally either communist or Marxist-Leninist. *All* of the names of organizations or individuals initially listed in the President's "Executive Order on Terrorist Financing" issued on September 24, 2001, were Muslim or Arab. Despite White House attempts to distance themselves, at least in words, from such Islamophobic positions, shortly after the President made his speech, Vice President Cheney appeared as the keynote speaker at the annual meeting of CPAC (the Conservative Political Action Committee), where "vendors at exhibition booths sold Islamophobic paraphernalia such as a bumper sticker that said, 'No Muslims – No Terrorism.'" (Rampton and Stauber 2003: 147-48) Such implicit endorsement of racist profiling, as well as the various policies enacted after 9/11, contradict the President's wise words.

who plot against our country to abuse our freedoms and our protections."[173] Supporting this 'new' stance on immigration, the PATRIOT Act allows for the (further) use of secret evidence in *secret* trials, whereby *non-citizens* (read: immigrants, refugees, asylum-seekers) may not know why they are being *indefinitely* held[174]; and the use of such secret evidence in the seizing of property belonging to *foreign* nationals. Based on the determination of the Attorney General *alone* that such non-citizens are a threat to national security, they are to be detained with no legal counsel offered[175]. The release of the detainees' names is prohibited[176]. Roving wiretaps[177], initially sought after by the Clinton administration, are permitted according to the new Act, as are the now-infamous 'sneak-and-peek' warrants for law

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[173] Bush "Address to the Nation 11/08/01"

[174] "Section 412 does not direct the attorney general to notify the noncitizen of the evidence on which the certification is based, or to provide him with an opportunity to contest that evidence" (Chang 2002: 64) It is also interesting to note that the release of individuals arrested on immigration violations (even common visa-related problems), even if those individuals have *agreed* to leave the country or have been *ordered* to in INS proceedings, may be delayed indefinitely on the attorney general's word that to do so would endanger national security, *even if* the individual is not suspected of terrorism or terrorist-related activity.

[175] "Because the Sixth Amendment extends only to criminal proceedings, the government has no obligation to provide noncitizens with free legal counsel in immigration proceedings or in habeas corpus proceedings related to INS detention." (Chang 2002: 65) Even if counsel *were* provided, the Bush administration has "also issued an interim agency rule that allows the Department of Justice to monitor privileged communications between federal detainees and their attorneys" (Chang 2002: 15), effectively crippling the defense anyway. While the piercing of attorney-client privilege has sometimes been done in exceptional cases in the past, as it was from time to time while Clinton was President, judicial approval was required – "reasonable suspicion" by the attorney general is now enough. (Bachrach 2004: 159)

[176] When sued to release the names of detainees, the government responded that "releasing the names of INS detainees and material witness detainees – even those who have been cleared of ties to terrorism – could harm its investigation because terrorist groups might be able to fit information that appears innocuous into a larger "mosaic" and use the information to thwart the government's antiterrorism efforts." (Chang 2002: 79-80) Laughingly, if you like dark humour, the government continued, stating that "releasing the names of the detainees could harm their reputations." (*Ibid*) Interestingly, "the federal courts that ordered disclosure of the detainees' names did so to vindicate the rights of U.S. citizens' right to know, not aliens' right not to be disappeared." (Cole 2002-2003: 9)

[177] "roving wiretaps – a single warrant for a suspect's telephone must include any and all types of phones he or she uses in any and all locations, including pay phones. If a suspect uses a relative's phone or your phone, that owner becomes part of the investigative database. So does anyone using the same pay phone of any pay phone in the area." (Hentoff 2003: 20)

enforcement personnel[178]. As well, warrantless library, medical and financial records searches are now permitted. In fact, much of what was sought by the Clinton administration but refused either by the courts, the public or by Congress based on constitutional grounds[179], has been approved by the passing of the PATRIOT Act. Despite *current* widespread disenchantment with the Act[180], at the time it passed 98-1 in the U.S. Senate, and 356-66 in Congress (Chang 2002: 43; Moore 2003: 104). On September 9th, 2003, a Gallup poll revealed that 75% of Americans were not worried about potential PATRIOT Act-related civil rights violations[181]. Interestingly, in spite of this apparent lack of concern by the public, every candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for the 2004 presidential election made criticism of the Act part of their platform.

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[178] 'Sneak-and-peek' searches are 'explained' in Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, and are conducted with no notice of the execution of the warrant until well *after* the search has been conducted. This new 'delayed notice' search is not restricted to terrorist-related investigations, but notably extends to *any* criminal investigation, in direct violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which specifies that the subject of a search must be notified in writing of such *as the search is being conducted*. Section 213 not only delays notice, but does away with the requirement of providing subjects of such searches with receipts for any materials (objects, papers, disks, etc.) taken during the execution of the warrant. Subjects may therefore not even know anything has been taken until advised of it when the release of the warrant is authorized. (Chang 2002: 51-52) Even once subjects are notified, judicial gag orders forbid the disclosure by the suspect not only of material confiscated (if any) but that the search has taken place at all.

[179] Clinton had in fact asked for roving wire-taps, which were refused by Congress; black and smokeless powder (commonly used in explosives) were exempted by Congress from required chemical taggants for tracking purposes (presumably because this would increase the costs of two common ingredients in much industry); longer statute of limitations to pursue terrorist cases was denied, as was the banning of certain weapons, based on Constitutional grounds (Clinton "Statement on signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996") See also Idelson 1996; Marquand 1995.

[180] "Three states (Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont) and 248 cities (including New York City, Eugene, Oregon and Cambridge, Massachusetts) have passed resolutions condemning the USA PATRIOT Act for attacking civil liberties." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USA_PATRIOT_Act These states and cities have proclaimed themselves 'civil liberties safe zones', declaring their support for civil liberties. (Hentoff 2003: 143-44) Additionally, several senators and congressional representatives have since openly spoken about their regret for supporting the bill, most notably Bob Barr, Republican congressman from Georgia, who remembers it as "The most troubling vote I ever cast in eight years." (in Bachrach 2004: 108)

[181] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USA_PATRIOT_Act

As well as those pieces of legislation overwhelmingly voted in by the Senate and Congress supporting the President's war on terrorism, antiquated laws not enforced in decades are resurfacing; one such law requires immigrant men from over 25 countries (all but one of them Arab or Muslim) to register with the federal government. Of the 32,000 who had complied by winter 2002, more than 3,000 faced deportation procedures for relatively minor offences.[182] Added to this are also presidential decrees, such as those determining that terrorists and captured Afghanis and Iraqis are in fact not subject to the protections guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions, as they are considered 'enemy combatants' rather than 'prisoners of war'[183]. The Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta detention centers in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where an unknown number of prisoners[184] face, at the (we hope) worst, indefinite imprisonment or, at the best, *military* tribunals of secret evidence with no defense counsel, have raised concerns both nationally and internationally, about civil

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[182] "A question of freedom". See also Cole, 2002-2003: 8.

[183] "President George W. Bush announced that he categorically determined that the Guantanamo detainees were not entitled to the protections accorded prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions" (Cole 2002-2003: 1) because, as Vice President Dick Cheney stated, "Somebody who comes into the United States of America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent Americans – men, women, and children – is not a lawful combatant … They don't deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the normal judicial process." (Cheney, in Cole 2002-2003: 3) See also Bachrach 2004: 159; Rose 2004: 135.

[184] "And then there are those who exist in some sort of terror limbo – the prisoners of Guantanamo Bay. (…) Sixteen hundred and eighty people – including three children ages thirteen to sixteen – are incarcerated there indefinitely. No charges, no sentence to serve, no lawyers, no nothing. Is it any wonder there have been 28 suicide attempts among those imprisoned there?" (Moore 2003: 111) While it is unclear where Moore obtained his figures (no sources are provided in his text), David Rose's *Vanity Fair* article on the subject maintains that, in January 2004, there were 660 detainees (2004: 90), and 32 suicide attempts; as well, detainees seem to suffer from a new and rare condition known as S.I.B., "manipulative self-injurious behavior" – decidedly *not* suicide attempts, according to Gitmo's chief surgeon – and at the time Rose's article was published, there had been 40 such incidents in addition to recognized suicide attempts (the rate of which has dropped drastically since the S.I.B. diagnosis has been recognized). (Rose 2004: 91)

and human rights violations, but as has been repeated over and over by the Bush administration, American *citizens* have nothing to fear.[185]

Just as the Clinton administration had further strengthened the apparent legitimacy of antiterrorism legislation by tying it to newfound bipartisan cooperation within the government[186], so too did President Bush. In fact, in his first radio address to the nation after 9/11, Bush specified that "the political parties and both Houses of Congress have shown a remarkable unity, and I'm deeply grateful. A terrorist attack designed to tear us apart has instead bound us together as a nation."[187] In his declaration of war, the President thanked his government for coming together, stating, "All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless America"."[188] In a brilliant example of political maneuvering, the President later essentially blackmailed his government into cooperating even more fully, when he stated in an Address to the Nation that the "government has a *responsibility* to put *needless* partisanship behind us and meet new challenges – better security for our

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[185] For an interesting discussion regarding the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy of rights now 'emerging' in the United States, please see Cole 2002-2003. It would appear that as long as you are a *white* U.S. citizen you have nothing to fear: 'When Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the charges against Lindh, a reporter asked why Lindh was being tried in an ordinary criminal court rather than before a military tribunal. Ashcroft explained that because Lindh was a United States citizen, he was not subject to the military tribunals created by President Bush" (Cole 2002-2003: 2). While California WASP John Walker-Lindh (or Suleyman al-Lindh, as he now calls himself), captured *while fighting* with the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001, was tried in criminal court, American-born-and-raised Jose Padilla has been detained in military prison since his arrest in June 2002, on *suspicion* of planning a terrorist attack. (Bachrach 2004: 160; Cole 2002-2003: 2; Wright 2003: 78)

[186] "I also would like to point out that Presidents can advocate and the executive branch can enforce the laws, but this would not have happened but for the remarkable convergence of Republicans and Democrats in the Congress." Clinton "Remarks at the University of Central Oklahoma in Edmond, Oklahoma"

[187] Bush "Radio Address of the President to the Nation"

[188] Bush "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

people, and help for those who have lost jobs and livelihoods in the attacks that claimed so many lives"[189], implicitly telling the Democrats to step down their opposition. Should there have been (staunch) opposition by any member of government following such a speech, it might have been interpreted as unpatriotic, which in the delicate political climate following 9/11 was the equivalent of anti-Americanism. In fact, when certain senators and representatives voiced concern over potential White House-endorsed civil rights violations, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned: "To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve." (in Z 2004: 88-89)

Several other Clinton-begun reforms were pursued, besides the roving wire-taps and use of secret evidence in deportation trials. Just as former President Clinton had appointed Richard Clarke as national coordinator for security, infrastructure and counterterrorism[190], President Bush also appointed a security coordinator, but one with a vastly broader set of powers and a huge jurisdiction over which to apply them. Tom Ridge was sworn in as Secretary of the Department for Homeland Security (DHS), whose full-time duty was the protection of the American people. When appealing to Congress to approve his new federal department, President Bush recalled the last substantive federal governmental reorganization, which had occurred under President Truman in the 1940s[191]. While it is perhaps coincidence that the last great restructuring of the federal government had happened during World War Two, shortly

[189] Bush "Address to the Nation 11/08/01", my emphasis
[190] Please see Landay 1998 for an interview with Clarke detailing his responsibilities and plans.
[191] Bush "Homeland Security Proposal Delivered to Congress"

after more than 2,400 Americans had died at Pearl Harbor, the similarities between the two situations were by no means left unexploited. In several speeches, President Bush made emotional appeals comparing the plight of the American people facing modern terrorism with the threat of fascism, Nazism, communism and the looming Cold War in the 1940s[192]. The comparison between himself and Truman, long considered one of America's greatest presidents, was no accident. In a political climate sensitive to such allusions, it worked, and President Bush got his new department[193].

Under the jurisdiction of the DHS falls the Coast Guard, Border and Customs services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security Administration, as well as the INS, among others. The DHS's four main divisions are responsible for: 1) Border and Transportation Security, 2) Emergency Preparedness and Response, 3) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures (including the famous stockpiling of drugs begun by Clinton at Clarke's recommendation[194]), and 4) Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Clarifying just what would fall under the DHS's jurisdiction, the President stated, "The Department would comprehensively assess the vulnerability of America's key assets and critical infrastructures, including food and water systems, agriculture,

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[192] For one such example, please see Bush, G. W. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People 09/20/01" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

[193] Bush in fact had initially announced, on September 20, 2001, the formation of an Office for Homeland Security, of which Senator Ridge became the Director. Bush later created, through executive order, a Homeland Security Council. He appealed to Congress to approve the elevating of the position to Cabinet level – thus awarding the Department equal footing with others, such as the Departments of Defense, Transportation, Commerce, etc. Please see "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People"; "Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security"; "Homeland Security Council Executive Order".

[194] Please see Landay 1998.

health systems and emergency services, information and telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, the chemical and defense industries, postal and shipping entities, and national monuments and icons."[195] In other words, *everything*. In a move that surprisingly slipped by unnoticed, in signing the Homeland Security Act, Congress had also given the President the "authority and flexibility to move people and resources to where they are needed without bureaucratic rules and lengthy labor negotiations."[196] In retrospect, the Clinton administration's attempt to merely dialogue between the various security agencies seems grossly naive.

In the same breath that the government assured people that terrorists were preparing chemical and biological attacks that "could send tiny microscopic "junk" into the air," and that people should consequently prepare their homes for such inevitable attacks, they also advised that people should "in all cases, remain calm."[197] How was such a terrified population to "remain calm"? In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Americans faced the Anthrax attacks (October 2001)[198]; the crash of American Airlines Flight 587, which occurred on November 12, 2001 and which for weeks was thought to be the result of yet *another* terrorist attack, but in fact was not; and over the next few years a series of natural disasters struck the country: apocalyptic flooding and forest fires ravaged the west coast of the United States,

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[195] Bush, G.W. "Message to the Congress of the United States"
[196] Bush, G.W. "Dept of Homeland Security Radio Address"
[197] *Ibid*
[198] Interestingly, despite official White House rhetoric that the Bush administration was neither racist, nor gearing its policies based on stereotype, regarding the anthrax attacks, "despite the growing evidence pointing at a domestic source, the White House remained convinced "that anyone that evil could not be American," as President Bush put it." (Waisbord 2002: 214)

while four hurricanes hit the Florida coast in 2004 *alone*. The people responded how they always do in times of crisis: they rallied around the president. Ron Faucheaux, editor of *Campaigns & Elections* magazine specifies that while "[F]or the most part, Americans tend to rally around their president at stratospheric levels" during times of crises, this is "not so much as a reward or success but out of a perceived need for national unity" (in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 144). Also, as is often the case with incidents of terrorism, the information obtained by the public is made available to them through government channels, if only because that is where the information resides. Because something like this had never happened in the United States, "[N]ews organizations – together with their sources – lacked a readymade "script" to tell their stories, a frame to help them and their audiences comprehend the seemingly incomprehensible" (Zelizer and Allan 2002: 1), the fact that the information made available to them came from official sources – and only official sources – made them all the more susceptible to manipulation: "Whereas mainstream journalists do not always subscribe overtly to official views on terrorism, the field of meanings in which they choose to operate inevitably leads them to produce only certain interpretations" (Karim 2002: 104). The media's extreme dependence on the government for information, particularly in those first few days after all air traffic was suspended and highway travel restricted, and relating to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with the emotional resonance of the events themselves resulted in a press with a very particular ideological bent. Whatever the reason, it remains that the President benefited from his highest approval ratings to date, and while he was being applauded in the media for "[H]is resolute leadership", and an admiring press commented on

how much he had changed "in the eyes of those who once thought him gauche or inadequate"[199], the people followed where he lead. Again, it is worth quoting Rich's astute observation: "The President, far from being the "moron" his most moronic adversaries claim, shrewdly capitalized on this atmosphere as the months piled up." Rich continues, "This White House is famously secretive and on-message, but its skills go beyond that. It knows the power of narrative, especially a single narrative with clear-cut heroes and evildoers, and it knows how to drown out any distracting subplots before they undermine the main story." (Rich, in Didion 2003: x-xi)

Discourse

In the months following the attacks, President Bush's speeches made use of imagery and binary oppositions in such a way that the chill of the Cold War seemed upon the world once again. The President spoke of the "barbaric" threat of "murderous ideologies" to the "civilized world"; of mothers' futile attempts to protect their children from the "tens of thousands of trained terrorists still at large" in a 'terrorist underworld"; of the elaborate plans of terrorist strikes against the power plants and water treatment facilities of American cities; of thwarted plans to bomb embassies abroad; of American hostages and their executions; of the inevitability of the war on terror, and of the need for money, money, money to counter all these constant and ever-present threats to the American way of life[200]. The U.S. Postal

[199] "The difference a year makes". Interestingly, Gore Vidal reminds his readers that surges in presidential approval ratings often occur after the worst fiascoes: "Bush's approval ratings soared [post-9/11], but then, traditionally, in war, the president is totemic like the flag. When Kennedy got his highest rating after the debacle of the Bay of Pigs, he observed, characteristically, "It would seem that the worse you fuck up in this job the more popular you get."" (Vidal 2002: 20)

[200] Please see Bush "President Delivers State of the Union Address"

Service mailed a postcard to each and every US address detailing how to screen mail for bombs or biological contaminants: labels such as "Personal" or "Confidential" were to be suspected, as were unexpected pieces of mail, or ones with "excessive postage"[201]. Government pamphlets were handed out by Cub Scouts at Major League baseball games detailing how average citizens could "participate in preparing their families so that we – as a nation – are all better prepared"[202] for the assumed inevitable attacks that were just around the corner. Thirty million dollars *a day* were spent on the War on Afghanistan by the President's *own* account[203], and according to Mickey Z, "[T]he United States spends more than one million dollars *per minute* on war" (2004: 119, my emphasis). A similar amount was requested by the Bush administration *indefinitely* for the ongoing war on terror[204]. This enormous sum was to be paid "because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay."[205] With this defense in mind, and relying on the current climate of fear paralyzing debate and spurring action, the Bush administration pushed through tax cuts, increased military spending, the re-deployment of a ballistic missile defense shield (which required the withdrawal from several international arms treaties), the creation of a new Cabinet-level

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[201] To view the postcard, please see http://www.cola.org/storage/postcard.pdf

[202] See Department for Homeland Security website for more information. Publication entitled "Are You Ready?" www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

[203] Bush "President Delivers State of the Union Address"

[204] As both Bush and members of his Cabinet have repeatedly stressed, this war on terror is likely to take years, or as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, "It undoubtedly will prove to be a lot more like a cold war than a hot war. If you think about it, in the Cold War it took fifty years, plus or minus. It did not involve major battles. It involved continuous pressure. … It strikes me that that might be a more appropriate way to think about what we are up against here." (in Moore 2003: 102) As Moore clarifies, "Wow – a war without end." (2003: 102) The President himself has repeatedly appealed to the American public for patience, warning from even September 15, 2001, that "You will be asked for patience; for, the conflict will not be short. You will be asked for resolve; for, the conflict will not be easy. You will be asked for strength, because the course to victory may be long." (Bush "Radio Address of the President to the Nation")

[205] Bush "President Delivers State of the Union Address"

department, welfare reform, Arctic drilling[206], and a host of other measures that had previously been presented to Congress, and had been turned down. Now these passed, in the initial panic and confusion of the immediate aftermath of 9/11, with hardly a question. Next to no opposition was noted, neither officially (in government) and certainly not in the media.

Media

As syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman commented, "When terrorists struck on September 11, there was only one side. No editor demanded a quote from someone saying why it was fine to fly airplanes into buildings. No one expected reporters to take an 'objective' view of the terrorists." (in Schudson 2002: 39) News institution Dan Rather echoed the sentiment of the 'everyman' when he stated on the Late Show with David Letterman that "When my country is at war, I want my country to win" (Moore 2004: 85); Fox News's Neil Cavuto put it more succinctly: "Am I slanted and biased? You damn well bet I am!" (*Ibid*) The role of journalism in post-9/11 America has been flipped on its head, as is demonstrated by one of Fox News's mantras: "be accurate, be fair, *be American*." (Ailes, in Schudson 2002: 39, my emphasis)[207] Whereas "patriotic journalism" was once considered oxymoronic, "[S]everal networks carried on-air banners, logos, or graphics of US flags flying,

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[206] For example, "Alaska senator Frank Murkowski used fear of terrorism to press for federal approval of oil drilling in the Artic national Wildlife Refuge, telling his colleagues that U.S. purchase of foreign oil helped subsidize Saddam Hussein and Palestinian suicide bombers." (Rampton and Stauber 2003: 139) See also Didion 2003: 6)

[207] While it may seem obvious that an American journalist must needs be *American*, in journalism the goal is supposedly objective detachment. As Waisbord explains, the significance of the new 'American' journalism is that "[W]hereas journalists who participate in anti-abortion or environmental demonstrations are roundly criticized, hardly anyone in the mainstream media raised questions about a journalism tightly wrapped in the flag." (2002: 208) For a related article, please see Hammond's 2000 study on propaganda and moralism in war reporting.

while some journalists and news anchors began wearing red, white, and blue ribbons or flag pins on their lapels" (Zelizer and Allan 2002: 11), and "[I]nvestigative inquiries into the verity of official truth-claims have been few and far between, just as have been perspectives from outside a narrow range of "experts" (almost exclusively elite, white, and male) sources. In the current climate, those journalists committed to pushing beyond such platitudes were more than likely to have their "loyalty" called into question, their motives challenged. By this rationale, the task of reproducing Pentagon propaganda became a patriotic duty, at least in the eyes of those fearful that critical reporting would undermine the public interest." (Zelizer and Allan 2002: 12) While James Madison had written in the Federalist Papers in 1788 that "new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines, by which violent factions … have usually wrecked their alternate malignity on each other" (in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 179), that journalists should be attacking one another with accusations like the ones Dan Frisa threw out against the "leftist media", which according to him were undercutting "the authority of President Bush during America's darkest hour, proving themselves even more cowardly than the terrorist murderers who are the only beneficiaries of such contemptible conduct" (in Zelizer and Allan 2002: 14), simply facilitated the shutting down of debate. Republican shining star Ann Coulter went so far as to say that liberals were betraying the nation by questioning the president's course of action. Contrary to the Constitution, which specifies that treason must be *intentional* [208], Coulter asserted that it *didn't matter* if liberals "are either traitors or idiots, *the difference is irrelevant*." (in Rampton and Stauber 2004: 184, my emphasis) Bill O'Reilly, Fox News's "man of the people", even argued that "it is our

[208] Please see Dorf 1967: 89 for details regarding Article III, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution.

duty as loyal Americans to *shut up*" (Greenwald 2004: 18, my emphasis). The President's now infamous 'you are either with us or against us' speech had had the desired effect: "Journalist Michael Kelly declared that any opponents of war in Afghanistan were "on the side of future mass murders of Americans. They are objectively pro-terrorist. … That is the pacifists' position, and *it is evil*."" (in Rampton and Stauber 2004: 194, my emphasis) "Inquiry into the nature of the enemy we face, in other words, was to be interpreted as sympathy for the enemy." (Didion 2003: 14)

Regime of Truth

People, afraid for their lives, devoured information on the events of 9/11. But again, as we have seen, "[M]ass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think *about*." (McCombs and Shaw, in London 1993: 4, my emphasis) "A Pew Center study on how people got their information about the events of September 11 indicated that 81% got their information from television media." (Hayden 2003: 12)[209] Given the

[209] Craig A. Hayden notes that "While the events of September 11th may not have sparked a nation-wide reckoning of how our democratic society is functioning, it has made our relationship with certain channels of information distribution more evident. What *is* apparent is that this type of event lays bare the structural dependencies embedded in our level of information about the world – the hierarchy, if you will, of the how we get to know what we know." (2003: 2) Significantly, "[A] survey conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* found that nearly 70 percent of Americans were getting most of their information about the war from the all-news cable channels such as Fox News Network, CNN and MSNBC." (Rampton and Stauber 2003: 174) That America is getting its information from such sources is extremely important to the war effort if we realize that "[R]ound-the-clock live coverage often comes at the expense of detail, depth and research. (…) viewers receive very little background analysis or historical context. While Operation Desert Storm was underway in 1991, a research team at the University of Massachusetts surveyed public opinion and correlated it with knowledge of basic facts about U.S. policy in the region. The results were startling: "The more TV people watched, the less they knew … Despite months of coverage, most people do not know basic facts about the political situation in the Middle East (…) our study revealed a strong correlation between knowledge and opposition to the war (…) people who generally watch a lot of television were substantially more

power of media frames, particularly those that make use of media indexing, the source of information for these news broadcasts is incredibly important. CNN, a subsidiary of GE Electric, which makes, among other such components, the guidance systems for the American military's smart bombs, was scrolling the words "WAR ON AMERICA" in its ticker at the bottom of its screens moments after the second tower had fallen, before any responsibility had been claimed by al-Qaeda, indeed before most of the world knew whether or not the crashes had been accidental. That was a very powerful message indeed, especially delivered so early on in the unrolling of events. Apparently, such framing by the media had its desired effect. Bush's regime of truth was taken up so seemingly readily by the population not only because they were afraid, and because the narrative offered them by the government made sense of a senseless situation, but because this regime was so successfully put forth: Americans were bombarded by the great plethora of government publications such as "Are You Ready?"; by the endless press releases issued by the Department for Homeland Security; by the President's speeches that painted the image of an America always at risk and consequently always on alert; by the daily pronouncements concerning exactly which level of alertness the country was on (red, orange, yellow…); by the government sanctioned 'guides to terrorism' that appeared on the homepages of popular online news agencies, such as MSN and Fox News, etc. All these media diffused on different registers (different reading levels, different graphicness of imagery, publications ranging from tabloids to scholarly journals, etc.)

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likely to 'strongly' support the use of force"" (in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 175-76) The impact such television dependence has had on the current conflict is demonstrated by the fact that Fox viewers are *three times* more likely than PBS viewers to believe that WMDs have been found in Iraq. Please see Greenwald 2004: 69-71 for more results of comparison polls between Fox News and PBS.

the same message: the enemy was identifiable, he was here to stay, and so was the war. This propping-up of Bush's regime of truth follows closely Ellul's assertions regarding the efficacy of total propaganda: "Repeated so many times, being driven in so many different forms into the propagandee's subconscious, this truth, transmitted by propaganda, becomes for every participant an absolute truth, which cannot be discussed without lies and distortion." (1965: 249) These near-mystical abilities that Foucault attributed to these 'regimes of truth' are such that "[K]nowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the power to *make itself true*." (Hall 1997: 49, emphasis in original) In relation to the justification for the war on Iraq, ""I made up my mind," [Bush] had said in April, "that Saddam needs to go." This was one of the many curious, almost petulant statements offered in lieu of actually presenting a case. I've made up my mind, I've said in speech after speech, I've made myself clear. *The repeated statements became their own reason.*" (Didion 2003: 36, my emphasis)

Key to the Bush administration's narration of events was the framing of the war, as we will see, as a 'defensive' action. While this perhaps made sense in the conflict with Afghanistan, more work was required to make people believe that a viable threat emanated from Iraq: as cynically stated by Michael Moore, "How to sway the American public from its initial reluctance to go to war with Iraq? Just say "mushroom cloud" and – BOOM! – watch those poll numbers turn around!" (2003: 44) By portraying itself as the (innocent) victim of an (imminent) attack, the American administration was, according to Mickey Z, not only assuring public

support for its cause, but was covering its bases[210], for "[N]ot only are you claiming innocence and the role of a victim, you might even be excused for responding angrily … maybe even with a little too much force." (2004: 9) Recent history supports this, as according to Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan's former Defense Secretary: "In the end, we won the Cold War, and if we won by too much, if it was overkill, so be it." (in Z 2004: 55)

As though sheer repetition could make the statements true and valid, so Bush endlessly repeated the same points – that Osama bin Laden was linked with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which were in danger of being developed and proliferated by Saddam Hussein – and in time, many people stopped questioning these statements: they had been *made* true by their repetition by, for example, people in the media, as Rampton and Stauber explain: ""CNN's live coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom will continue, right after this short break." Every time this phrase came out of a reporter's mouth or appeared in the corner of the screen, the stations implicitly endorsed White House claims about the motives for war." (2003: 180-81)[211] According to Michael Moore, "And just what exactly was the reason for the war with Iraq? We were so thoroughly whopperized that polls showed that half of all

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[210] Author H. Bruce Franklin comments that "There are some fairly obvious needs being met by the images of American POWs tortured year after year by sadistic Asian communists. (…) We, not the Vietnamese, become the victims as well as the good guys." (in Z 2004: 58) It is perhaps no accident that Senator John McCain's POW stories have recently been produced into a TV movie widely available on basic cable. After the multiple scandals of Americans abusing prisoners at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, to remind the American people of the horrors that their own soldiers have suffered, or might suffer, is a powerful psychological manipulation.

[211] Such innocuous support of official doctrine supports Bilig's analysis of the role of the media: "Aside from personal and institutional expressions, journalism fostered uncritical patriotism through endless coverage of "banal nationalism", that is, everyday reminders of the nation." (in Waisbord 2002: 206)

Americans wrongly thought that Iraqis were on the September 11 planes, and, at one point, nearly half believed that the U.S. had found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, when no such discovery had been made." (2002: 77)

The choice to call the war on Iraq "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was not accidental: as we have seen, such terminology plays a key role in the framing of narrative. As Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, part of the role of the state is to propagandize the individual to accept the state's rule, if only to facilitate the efficiency of that same rule. In the case of war, as Ellul so eloquently clarifies, "Naturally, it was always necessary to give men ideological and sentimental motivations to get them to lay down their lives. But in our modern form of war the traditional motives – protection of one's family, defense of one's own country, personal hatred for a known enemy – no longer exist" and it is therefore necessary that "[M]an must be plunged into a mystical atmosphere, he must be given strong enough impulses as well as good enough reasons for his sacrifices, and, at the same time, a drug that will sustain his nerves and his morale. Patriotism must become "ideological." " (1965: 142, 143) In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it was not difficult to mobilize support for retaliatory action, but it was necessary to *maintain* an atmosphere of *continued* anxiety in order to mobilize support for *expansive* military action: "To influence a society's institutions and collective conscience, the panic must be sustained. To sustain the panic, the public must be convinced that the problem still exists but some success has been made in curtailing it." (Hawdon 2001: 430) The Bush administration did just this, as we have seen, in several ways: by diffusing on different social registers the myriad of potential (and imminent) threats to American homeland

security[212]; by 'othering' that threat, as we shall see, and also by framing military action in noble language – by selling war as a *cause*.

Propaganda

> "For some people, war is terror, disaster, and death. For others, it's a PR problem." (Solomon, in Z 2004: 76)

As Rampton and Stauber explain, "[D]oublespeak often suggests a noble cause to justify the death and destruction. Practically speaking, a democratic country cannot wage war without the popular support of its citizens. A well-constructed myth, broadcast through mass media, can deliver that support even when the noble cause itself seems dubious to the rest of the world." (2003: 118) The myth put forth by the Bush administration in order to justify waging war on Saddam Hussein's Iraq was twofold: first, as we have seen, the link between Iraq and WMDs was drilled into the collective American psyche from as early as January 2002[213]. Secondly, the goal of the mission was changed midway through the conflict. As happened in Afghanistan, where the stated intent of the war changed, after the debacle at Tora Bora, from 'smoking out' the terrorists to 'liberating' Afghani women[214], in Iraq the

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[212] In Michael Moore's documentary *Fahrenheit 9/11*, in a scene particularly representative of this sentiment, the residents of Tappahannock, Virginia – all 2,016 of them – express concern and fear regarding their potential as targets of terrorist attack – they do, after all, have a Wal-Mart – and several citizens comment "When I look at certain people, I wonder, "Oh my goodness! Do you think they could be a terrorist?"", and "Never trust nobody you don't know. And even if you do know them, you really can't trust them." (Moore 2004: 58-59)

[213] Please see "President Delivers State of the Union Address"

[214] Rampton and Stauber use several illustrative examples to drive home their point of the political punch these terminology choices pack: "The "code names" used to designate wars have also become part of the branding process through which war is made to seem noble. Rather than referring to the invasion of Panama as simply a war or invasion, it became "Operation Just Cause." (Note also the way

stated goal of the mission was altered from ousting a weapons-of-mass-destruction-toting madman, to democratizing the region. As Hawdon explains, "punitive policies excel at defining the problem, not highlighting success at solving it. If increasing numbers are being punished, the problem must be growing, not subsiding. Consequently policy makers often define a group who has been cured of the disease to avoid creating too many "outsiders"." (2001: 430) In this case, the Northern Alliance might be considered just such a 'cured' group who has 'seen the light', so to speak, and might also help to explain why the Bush administration was so keen to have elections in Iraq. Hawdon continues: "Therefore, a rehabilitative objective is often added to the proactive/punitive policy statements. (…) Consequently, moral panics are created by aggressively punishing the enemy; they are sustained by aggressively helping the victims." (*Ibid*) It was with this in mind that the mission was named 'Operation Iraqi Freedom'.

The democratizing mission of the war on Iraq raises again Ellul's specter of democratic propaganda. Because, Ellul asserts, "democracy cannot be an object of faith, of belief: it is expression of opinions. There is a fundamental difference between regimes based on opinion and regimes based on belief" (1965: 244), claiming to have a 'democratizing' goal is to use democracy as a myth around which to galvanize support, both domestically and abroad. To do so means that we must acknowledge that it is a weapon of propaganda, and consequently, we must concede

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that the innocuous word "operation" becomes part of the substitute terminology for war.) The war in Afghanistan was originally named "Operation Infinite Justice," a phrase that offended Muslims, who pointed out that only God can dispense infinite justice, so the military planners backed down a bit and called it "Operation Enduring Freedom" instead." (2003: 119)

that "the people that we subject to our propaganda are not those whom we want to see become democratic but whom we want to defeat." (*Ibid*)[215] The significance of all this in relation to the war effort is that "[W]hen a government builds up the democratic image in this fashion, it cannot isolate the external and the internal domains from each other. Therefore the people of the country making such propaganda must also become convinced of the excellence of this image." (1965: 245) It is this aspect that forces the government's hand: it limits the extent to which propaganda can lie, and therefore "the repercussions on a democratic population of the myth developed by its government for external use must be analyzed; these repercussions will lead primarily to the establishment of unanimity" for "no other voice must arise at home that would reach the foreign propaganda target and destroy the myth." (1965: 246) Consequently, "the government, if it wants its propaganda to be effective, will be forced to reduce the possibility of the minority's expressing itself – *i.e.*, to interfere with one of democracy's essential characteristics (…) propaganda is by itself a state of war; it demands the exclusion of opposite trends and minorities – not total and official perhaps, but at least partial and indirect exclusion." (1965: 247) Napoleon in fact is credited with having said that "it wasn't necessary to completely

[215] Ellul is adamant that his reader understand that propaganda, of any sort, touting any message, espousing any ideology, be considered totalitarian because it is *totalizing*: regardless of intent, "the objects of propaganda tend to become totalitarian because propaganda itself is totalitarian." (1965: 245) Therefore, "we do not prepare it [the country being propagandized to accept democracy] to become a democratic nation, for on the one hand we reinforce or continue the methods of its own authoritarian government (…) We are simply asking for the same *kind* of acceptance of something else, of another form of government." (*Ibid*, emphasis in original) Interestingly, Gore Vidal notes that '[I]t is nicely apt that the word *terrorist* (according to the OED) should have been coined during the French Revolution to describe "an adherent or supporter of the Jacobins, who advocated and practiced methods of partisan repression and bloodshed in the propagation of the principles of democracy and equality."" (2002: 73)

suppress the news; it was sufficient to delay the news until it no longer mattered." (Lee and Solomon, in Z 2004: 120)

By the time it was discovered that capturing bin Laden would not happen, the purpose of the war in Afghanistan had become the liberation of women; by the time the American people knew there were no WMDs in Iraq, Saddam Hussein had been captured and the purpose of the war had shifted to democratizing the country. That the media colluded so willingly with the government's framing of the narrative of war is evident in the 'patriotic journalism' that emerged so blatantly after the attacks: "To the extent that this convergence of patriotism and professionalism was sustained, spaces for voices of criticism, let alone dissent, were decisively curtailed." (Zelizer and Allan 2002: 15) The government, therefore, did not have to rely on strict censure as the main thrust of its war efforts, and while it certainly has made use of censure from time to time, and although it has been reprimanded regarding such censure, not much has come of these objections. For example, it was only after extreme pressure was exerted that the Bush administration finally allowed then-National Security advisor Condoleezza Rice to appear before the 9/11 commission, and when the text was finally published, the government reserved the right to censor certain findings – a right that it exercised, omitting, according to many, substantial information from the final report[216]. Furthermore, "Vice President Cheney refused so many requests from Congress's general accounting office for information about his secret meetings with energy executives that for the first time in history the agency sued the

[216] See for example, Edmonds's 2004 "Public Letter to 9/11 Commission Chairman from FBI Whistleblower"

administration." (Navasky 2002: xvii) The White House has from the very start taken the position that "[T]his is an administration that will not talk about how we gather intelligence, how we know what we're going to do, nor what our plans are."[217] With this idea in the people's mind that "we [the administration] make decisions based on classified information, and we will not jeopardize the sources; we will not make the war more difficult to win by publicly disclosing classified information"[218], the government has been able to claim all sorts of security reasons for not disclosing, for example, the number of people being detained at Guantanamo, or those being held for immigration violations. According to Michael Schudson, such secrecy is relatively easily maintained because when journalists "are convinced that national security is at risk, they willingly withhold or temper their reports" (2002: 41), to say nothing of the journalists who were carrying guns (contrary to international conventions), as Geraldo Rivera admitted to doing, adding that he hoped to "kick his [bin Laden's] head in, then bring it home and bronze it." (in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 184) The very structure of war reporting – heavily dependent on media indexing, on official permissions, the 'pool' system which hand-picks reporters to travel with troops, etc. – disallows the development of contrary intelligence and opinion. The problems with wartime reporting are made evident in the practice of 'embedding' journalists with military units, which U.S. public relations consultant Katie Delahaye Paine remarks is "[S]heer genius", as "[T]he better the relationship any of us has with a journalist, the better the chance of that journalist picking up and reporting our messages. So now we have journalists making dozens – if not hundreds – of new friends among the

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[217] "President Urges Readiness and Patience"
[218] "President Freezes Terrorists' Assets"

armed forces." (in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 187) Not only does this encourage the identification of journalists with troops, thereby increasing their likelihood to support the troops (which Mickey Z equates with supporting "the policies that put those troops in harm's way" (2004: 89)[219]), but this also allows the manipulation of the war: "Since much of modern warfare involves the use of air power or long range artillery, the journalists embedded with troops witnessed weapons being fired but rarely saw what happened at the receiving end." (Rampton and Stauber 2003: 185) Not only does this mean that "[P]ublic attention is thus kept focused on the *violence* rather than the *politics* of political violence" (Karim 2002: 104), this allows the enemy to remain 'othered', as ""the enemy only appear[s] as a computerized target", never face to face." (Baudrillard, in Glassner 1999b: 154). Consequently, the enemy can remain whatever the dominant discourse *says* he is. If the enemy is only ever allowed[220] to be a crazed, barbaric fanatic, and journalists are never allowed to encounter an enemy combatant on equal terms, what is established in the military cannon stands.

Representation

Hall posited that "[T]he meaning is *not* in the object or person or thing, nor is it *in* the word. It is we who fix meaning so firmly that, after a while, it comes to seem

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[219] Which, according to Michael Moore, are never examined because of the very structure of embedded reporting: "there was the footage beamed directly to us from the harsh Iraqi desert, where reporters "embedded" with the ground troops were given great leeway to report without interference from the Pentagon (as we were supposed to believe). The result? Lots of up-close-and-personal stories about the hardships and dangers faced by our military – and virtually *nothing* examining why we had sent these fine young people into harm's way." (2003: 77)

[220] "The system of "embedding" allowed reporters to travel with military units – so long as they followed the rules. Those rules said that reporters could not travel independently, interviews had to be on the record (which meant lower-level service members were less likely to speak candidly), and officers could censor and temporarily delay reports for "operational security."" (Rampton and Stauber 2003: 185)

natural and inevitable. The meaning is *constructed by the system of representation.* It is constructed and fixed by the code, which sets up the correlation between our conceptual system and our language system in such a way that, every time we think of a tree, the code tells us to use the English word TREE." (1997: 21, emphasis in original) Just as the 'sniper' has been redefined in technical terms as a 'sharpshooter'[221], that the Bush administration uses the term "preemptive defense"[222] to "describe its decision to attack first, without an overt act of Iraqi provocation [could be used] to justify attacking anyone we want on the grounds that they might attack us one day. Note also the substitution of the word "defense" for "war" – a perennial use of doublespeak that dates back in the United States to 1947, when the Department of War was renamed the "Department of Defense"." (Rampton and Stauber 2003: 127) The fact that "[T]he final allowable word on those who attacked us was to be that they were "evildoers," or "wrongdoers," peculiar constructions which served to suggest that those who used them were transmitting messages from some ultimate authority" (Didion 2003: 14), means that, in the collective consciousness of the people, terrorists are *simply* evildoers, rather than fundamentalists who, while engaging in horrific *acts* that are inexcusable, might have *grievances* that are legitimate. What Didion draws attention to here is that the use of such officially-endorsed terminology on the part of 'Joe Shmoe American' to

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[221] As a copy of an April 28, 2004 Fox News memorandum to on-air staff reveals, Kubrick's *Full Metal Jacket* was spot-on in its understanding and treatment of the war: "Let's refer to the US marines we see in the foreground as "sharpshooters" not snipers, which carries a negative connotation." (in Greenwald 2004: 14)

[222] In fact, the National Security Strategy outlines "preemptive military action" by specifying that "The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration … America will act against such emerging threats *before they are fully formed.*" (in Chossudovsky 2003, my emphasis)

describe the Taliban, or bin Laden, or Saddam[223], imparts an implicit message of approval of the status quo: by using such terms over others (such as 'police action', or 'missing in action', 'collateral damage' or 'friendly fire')[224], the American public is supporting and perpetuating the dominance of the government's *framing of the issue*, the government's *narrative of fear*. By using such terms as 'evildoer' or 'wrongdoer', or even 'axis of evil'[225], Joe Shmoe American is not only constructing his *own* interpretation of events based on the framing of issues as approved by the government, but he is also *supporting* and *endorsing* such framing by *reproducing* it in his own subsequent narratives (conversations, web blogs, etc.). It is the ingrained support in the people of the supposed righteousness of the *cause* that allows for statements such as "It became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it" (Z 2004: 93) to be believed. The narrative of fear constructs an environment in which such obviously rubbish statements are held as reasonable simply because the psychological climate – of the propagandized individual – 'buys in' to the government's framing of debate, and therefore into its construction of risk. Voltaire

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[223] Interestingly, 'Saddam' is the only world leader referred to simply by his given name, which Said would surely assess smacks of orientalism in that condescending, familiarizing way: President Bush is never referred to by pundits as "George", nor is Vladimir Putin ever called "Vlad", rather both are either addressed with their title (President), or by their surname.

[224] Please see Rampton and Stauber, in Z 2004: 4; Z 2004: 119; Rampton and Stauber 2003: 119, 121, for more on this privileging of certain terms over others, and for some of the reasoning behind such choices.

[225] "The concept of an "axis," of course, evokes memories of the "Axis powers" of World War II and functions to prepare the public for acceptance of war against nations that purportedly belong to the axis. However, this use of the term is misleading. It suggests an alliance or confederation of states that pose a significant danger precisely because of their common alignments – a menace greater than the sum of the parts." (Rampton and Stauber 2003: 114) Implicit in this positioning of terrorist states and terror-supporting states as an axis, so Rampton and Stauber's analysis continues, is the affirmation that 'our' side must have the righteous certitude that the Allies surely had in WWII, and furthermore the choice to call 'our' side the Coalition of the Willing is intended to remind the public of the righteousness of the coalition of countries who initially forced the retreat of Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait in 1991.

asserted this position when he stated "Anyone who has the power to make you believe absurdities has the power to make you commit atrocities." (in Z 2004: 128)

The choice of terminology is vital to the construction of the 'other' upon whom such riskiness settles; our own notions of identity are predicated as much upon our collective response to such a 'risky other' as anything else. For example, Canadian identity is often mocked as consisting of nothing more than a vehement assertion of being *not*-American[226]. Canadians don't generally identify themselves as non-*Fijian*, or non-*Palauan*: these are not cultural identities which pose a threat to our nationhood in the same sense that our nearest and greatest neighbour does. Such constructions of self based on the 'other' are often predicated on stereotypes: in fact, American syndicated radio personality Michael Savage has argued vehemently in favor of the use of such stereotypes (specifically in the form of ethnic slurs), saying that "We need racist stereotypes right now of our enemy in order to encourage our warriors to kill the enemy." (in Rampton and Stauber 2003: 170) In the case of the American cultural psyche in the last few decades, such constructions of the enemy began shifting from the threat of communism (clearly on its way out by the mid 1980s) to the threat of the Arab. Karim remarks that "[T]here has emerged over the last three decades a set of journalistic narratives on "Muslim terrorism," whose construction is dependent on basic cultural perceptions about the global system of nation-states, violence, and the relationship between Western and Muslim societies.

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[226] Please see Brooks's "The Narcissism of Minor Differences: Reflections on the Roots of English Canadian Nationalism" (2002) for a fascinating look at such un-American identity. Such juxtaposition of a stereotyped 'other' is responsible for the runaway success of the 'Joe Canadian' beer commercials of the early 21st century: the Molson Canadian ad campaign relied exclusively on the viewer being as familiar with Canadian stereotypes as the American ones they were positioned opposite of.

The dominant discourses about these issues help shape the cognitive scripts for reporting the acts of terrorism carried out by people claiming to act in the name of Islam." (Karim 2002: 102) This shift in threat, which dare we suggest began sometime around the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s[227], was visible in the very mundane: the film *Back to the Future* for example, dealt with foreign terrorists who were not Russian, but Lebanese[228]. (Canton *et al.* 1985) For a 'real life' example (but one that is just as farcical), in 1988 when the elder Bush was vice-president, he made a trip to the Middle East, visiting Israel and Jordan, where his press corps had requested that "at every stop on the itinerary, camels be present."" (Didion 2003: 33) Edward Said would no doubt have delighted in this construction of the Oriental Arab.

The Other

When analyzing the persistence of the influence of Orientalism in official discourse, Edward Said noted that "Without a well-organized sense that these people over there were not like "us" and didn't appreciate "our" values – the very core of traditional Orientalist dogma (…) – there would have been no war." (2003: xx) Bill Maher, common sense's greatest champion since Thomas Paine, embodies this distinction when he asserts that "Islam in the Middle Ages was far superior to European civilization, having medicine, math and astronomy while whitey was shivering behind castle walls and dying at 30. *But they stopped, and we didn't. We*

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[227] "after the 1973 war the Arab appeared everywhere as something more menacing. Cartoons depicting an Arab sheik standing behind a gasoline pump turned up consistently. These Arabs, however, were clearly "Semitic": their sharply hooked noses, the evil mustachioed leer on their faces, were obvious reminders (to a largely non-Semitic population) that "Semites" were at the bottom of all "our" troubles, which in this case was principally a gasoline shortage." (Said 2003: 285-86)

[228] My thanks to Professor Yasmeen Abu-Laban for pointing out this seemingly innocuous example of racialized terror.

edited, and self-corrected. *We* had a renaissance and an enlightenment, and *they* didn't." (2002: 131, my emphasis) It is the constant referrals to "us" and "them" that allows a "them" to persist in the collective psyche, fueling the "clash of civilizations" that Huntington assures us is not only on the way, but is already here[229]. While "[B]efore September 11, polls found that about 80 percent of the American public considered racial profiling wrong", *after* 9/11, "polls reported that nearly 60 percent of the American public favored ethnic profiling directed at Arabs and Muslims." (Cole 2002-2003: 7) As we have already seen, even libertarians such as Maher have argued in favor of profiling, following the logic that such policies are based on the fact that "more of *them* are completely nuts and will do things like, oh I don't know, fly planes into buildings." (Maher 2002: 23, emphasis in original) Arguing that such profiling makes sense given al-Qaeda's popularity, Maher asserts "People don't wear Timothy McVeigh T-shirts in America[230], but Osama bin Laden is, for a people who don't have too many recent heroes, Michael Jordan, Bill Gates and Batman all rolled into one." (2002: 47) While the specifics of his statement don't bear scrutiny, the McVeigh reference is an interesting one. Used to justify racial profiling on the grounds that *white* terrorists are the exception, this comparison is one taken up again and again, as for example by *Time*'s Charles Krauthammer, who states that "As it happens, the suicide bombers who attacked us on Sept. 11 were not McVeigh Underground. They were al-Qaeda: young, Islamic, Arab and male. That is not a stereotype. That is a fact." (2002: 60) Krauthammer generously admits that "True,

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[229] For more on Huntington's famous clash, please see Huntington 1996 and 2003.

[230] In fact, they do. Terre Haute citizen Debbie Walker created quite the buzz in early 2001 when she earned enough from the sale of her McVeigh t-shirts (both in favor of, and against, his death by lethal injection) to take a Jamaican holiday. Please see French 2001 for more information.

shoe bomber Richard Reid, while young and Islamic and male, was not Arab", however we should remember that "No system will catch everyone." (*Ibid*) One of the telltale signs that such profiling is based on a (faulty) conception of 'the other' is the fact that in both Maher and Krauthammer's appeals they make reference, much like the PATRIOT Act, to the presumptive distinction between loyal citizen and non-loyal (i.e. treasonous) non-citizen, which is dangerous for a number of reasons (Cole 2002-2003). As the Oklahoma bombing proved, such distinctions are not only premature, but dangerous not only for what they include[231], but what they exclude. The maintenance of such an 'othered' threat, whereby violence and insecurity is "believed to be characteristic of other societies and excluded from the national sense of self" (Waisbord 2002: 202), is more than mere posturing, it is necessary: "Patriotic enthusiasm, however, was more than just a mere response to the fact that the attacks clearly had an anti-American intention. It emerged as the only possible way to provide reassurance to a community facing insecurity and anxiety in a global era. September 11 offered an opportunity to position patriotic identity by articulating the Other, as, most notably, theorized by Stuart Hall and Edward Said; that is, identity as a discursive process through which the Other ("the perpetrators") is defined as different and excluded from the national community. It was a moment to reinvigorate American nationalism in a post-Cold-War era, a time of fragmented and fractured identities." (Waisbord 2002: 206) It is this aspect of the War on Terror that illustrates the disciplinary function of situations of fear, and the importance of the control of their narratives.

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[231] As when "[A] suburban New York judge asked Anissa Khoder, a U.S. citizen of Lebanese descent, if she was a "terrorist" when she appeared in court over parking tickets." (Moore 2003: 111)

The Management of Risk and Its Narratives of Fear

No one can say that America is not a target for terrorism. However, "[R]isks … are based on causal interpretations, and thus initially exist only in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social definition and construction." (Beck, in Hier 2003: 8) The perception of the extent to which America is a target is therefore the result of narrative control, of risk management. The government, through a variety of different means, using imagery and ideological rhetoric, publishing its message in a variety of media, has convinced the people that they have every reason to *continue* to be scared. From the stated need to mobilize retired doctors and nurses in every community so as to plan for treatment in case of biological attack, to the 24/7 protection of 348 dams and 58 hydroelectric plants nationwide, to the establishing of a toll-free hotline for citizens to report suspected terrorist activity[232], to the granting of immunity to financial institutions that willingly report suspicious transactions[233], everything seemingly points to fear, indicating that there is good reason to have it, and good reason to trust the government to do what it must. When faced with shattering events such as those witnessed on September 11, 2001, then fed the dominant discourse on the heroism of the American people in the face of global terror, many individuals – Joe Shmoe American – may concede that their very identity is dependant upon such actions as the 'War on Terror', or the passing of the

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[232] There is, conveniently, also a website. To fill out a "FBI Tips and Public Leads" form, please go to https://tips.fbi.gov

[233] Please see April 11, 2002 press release, Department for Homeland Security. www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

USA PATRIOT Act, as they protect those very notions of identity perceived to be under attack. As Major Frank Burns patriotically declares in the television show MASH, "As I see it, unless we each conform, unless we obey orders, unless we follow our leaders blindly, there is no possible way we can remain free"[234], a sentiment echoed by President Woodrow Wilson, who claimed that "conformity will be the only virtue and any man who refuses to conform will have to pay the penalty." (in Z 2004: 75)

While of course in times of crisis, in moments of threats to national security, the government and the people expect a higher level of adherence to cultural norm, and there is a higher threshold of expected deference to authority, it bears reminding that this is not simply a power grab. That these higher expectations exist reflects the willingness of the people to rally around a government they feel is protecting them from risk. Regardless of whether or not the government is responsible for the initial risky event/situation, the actions of the government, as we have seen with both the Clinton and the Bush administrations, manipulate that situation in such a way as to allow expansion of governmental jurisdiction and power. It is vital to take note of the fact that everything from the choice of words, to the choice of enemy, to the punitive or rehabilitative policies enacted, rests on *the government seeking to make more efficient its rule*. My insistence upon this should not be read as naïveté, or blind optimism: of course there are abuses of power, of course nepotism is alive and well and thriving – to try to disavow this in a world where Dick Cheney's Haliburton is rebuilding Afghanistan virtually *alone* is ridiculous. However, as surveillance expert

[234] Reynolds *et al.* 1976 "The Novocaine Mutiny", Season 4, MASH.

David Lyon explains, "[S]urveillance is practiced with a view to enhancing efficiency, productivity, participation, welfare, health, or safety. Sheer social control is seldom a motivation for installing surveillance systems even though that may be an unintended or secondary consequence of their deployment. From the earliest days of state surveillance in sixteenth-century England, for example, the aim was to consolidate state power against others, and to maintain the position of elites, rather than to use raw informational power to keep subjects in line. *This is governance, not crude control.*" (Lyon 2003: 23, my emphasis) It cannot be denied that by the government obtaining a *national* warrant for roving wire taps, law enforcement officials are *saved the time and money* of seeking individual wire taps in each jurisdiction their suspect travels to[235]. The easing of judicial oversight requirements[236] does in fact mean that investigations can proceed at *a much quicker pace*, as does the lowering of the bar of suspicion, which means less evidence needs to be gathered before full investigations are launched[237]. Because terrorism *is* a

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[235] "Ashcroft demanded and received a radical extension of these roving wiretaps: a one-stop *national* warrant for wiretapping these peripatetic phones. Until now, a wiretap warrant was valid only in the jurisdiction in which it was issued. But now, the government won't have to waste time by having to keep going to court to provide a basis for each warrant in each locale." (Hentoff 2003: 20, emphasis in original)

[236] As regards, for example, the use of foreign intelligence, "Section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the sharing – without judicial supervision – of several categories of foreign intelligence information between officials of the FBI, CIA, INS, and a number of other federal agencies, when receipt of the information will "assist" the official receiving the information "in the performance of his official duties." (Chang 2002: 59)

[237] "The Ashcroft guidelines also authorize the FBI to conduct a "prompt and extremely limited checking out of initial leads" when the level of suspicion of criminal conduct is too low to support the initiation of either a full investigation or a preliminary inquiry, but the government has information of "a nature that some follow-ups as to the possibility of criminal activity is warranted." Because this standard is extraordinarily vague and at best only remotely connected to suspicion of criminal conduct, it is hard to imagine any political activities that are in the least bit confrontational that would not fall within its broad sweep." (Chang 2002: 118) Also, according to The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise, and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, "The nature of the conduct engaged in by a [terrorist] enterprise will justify an inference that the standard [for opening a criminal intelligence investigation] is satisfied, *even if there are no known statements by participants*

mosaic[238], particularly when dealing with groups such as al-Qaeda – which activates 'cells' when needed – that the government now has the right to *retain* data obtained from a variety of sources[239] in searchable databases, many of which are connected together[240], *does* allow them, by casting a wider net, to build a 'bigger picture' of the 'forces of evil' against which they are pitted. That the American people reacted with the force they did to the events of September 11 proved a boon for a government with, at best, a shaky hold on the country and a questionable claim to legitimacy: "The surge in patriotism brought together a highly divided country that, emerging from one of the most contentious and divisive elections in its contemporary history, was suddenly confronted with terrorism. Patriotism paved over the dissent that had surfaced during the 2000 electoral contest." (Waisbord 2002: 205) While Michael Moore may rant that "September 11 [has been used] as the excuse for *everything*. It's no longer just to pass measures to protect us from a "terrorist threat." September 11 is now *the* answer. It is the manna from heaven the right has always prayed for. Want a new weapons system? Have to have it? Why? Well... 9/11! Want to relax

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that advocate or indicate planning for violence or other prohibited acts." (emphasis in Hentoff 2003: 29)

[238] The use of multiple-source data used in establishing such a mosaic is explained by David Lyon, who states "Thus, following September 11, surveillance data from a myriad of sources – supermarkets, motels, traffic control points, credit card transaction records, and so on – were used to trace the activities of the "terrorists" in the days and hours before their attacks. The use of searchable databases makes it possible to use commercial records previously unavailable to police and intelligence services and thus draws on all manner of apparently "innocent" traces." (2003: 32)

[239] "the FBI may draw on non-profit and commercial data mining services, many of which segregate data on individuals according to their race, ethnicity, religion, citizenship status, and other characteristics." (Chang 2002: 118) Also, "[O]ur government's unblinking eye will try to find suspicious patterns in your credit card and bank data, medical records, the movies you click for on pay-per-view, passport applications, prescription purchases, e-mail messages, telephone calls, and anything you've done that winds up in court records, such as divorces." (Hentoff 2003: 47)

[240] Just such a database, for example, is RISS, the Department of Justice's Regional Information Sharing System, which is "a secure Intranet information sharing system that is accessed by over 5,600 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies." (Chang 2002: 112) Also, "the Bush administration announced that it was building a system that pools real-time traffic data from Internet providers and monitors threats to the global information network" (Farmer and Mann 2003)

the pollution laws? It's a must? Why? 9/11! Want to outlaw abortion? Absolutely! Why? 9/11! What does 9/11 have to do with abortion? Hey, why are you questioning the government? Someone call the FBI!" (2003: 113), that the government has (at least the appearance) of legitimacy allows it to pursue governance tactics and employ governance technologies that might not otherwise have been *considered* legitimate, as for example increased domestic surveillance. According to sociologists Erickson and Haggerty, "Foucault proposed that panoptic surveillance targeted the soul, disciplining the masses into a form of self-monitoring that was in harmony with the requirements of the developing factory system." (2000: 615) However, according to their studies, "[W]e are only now beginning to appreciate that surveillance is driven *by the desire to bring systems together*, to combine practices and technologies and integrate them into a larger whole." (2000: 610, my emphasis) It is not that Bush particularly *cares* what his citizens are doing behind closed doors, but rather that "[T]he state seeks to 'striate the space over which it reigns', a process which involves introducing breaks and divisions into otherwise free-flowing phenomena." (Deleuze and Guattari, in Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 608) The purpose of such striation of space – the breaking down of the individual into data that is then categorizeable – is that "[I]n these sites the information derived from flows of the surveillant assemblage are reassembled and scrutinized *in the hope of developing strategies of governance, commerce and control*." (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 613, my emphasis)

Following the logic that "America – acting alone or with its allies – still needs the freedom to protect freedom" (Franck, in Chomsky 2003: 82), the government, under the guise of national security concerns, discourages dissent, arguing instead for loyalty, patriotism (a la Ari Fleischer or John Ashcroft for example), and the need to 'do whatever it takes' to protect the country, which furthers its ability to act unhindered by lengthy debate and opposition. The policy of secrecy followed by the Bush administration[241], again under the guise of national security, facilitates this exponentially, as it further hinders opposition – how does one object to something one is ignorant of? The government is therefore given a relatively free hand in ruling, as it faces neither opposition nor dissent, and enjoys, because of the climate of fear that naturally rallies people around it, a level of popularity that further lends its actions legitimacy. The progressive "disappearance of disappearance" (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 619), due to increased levels of surveillance, assures that the government's 'new-found' (or newly extended) powers remain in place. It bears reminding that "[P]olitical technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science. (...) When there [is] resistance, or failure to achieve its stated aims, this [is] construed as further proof of the need to reinforce and extend the power of the experts. A technical matrix [is] established. By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem. Once this matrix [is] established, the spread of bio-power [is] assured, for there [is] nothing else to appeal to; any other

[241] As "[S]ecurity, we are repeatedly told, requires that information about surveillance be minimized" (Lyon 2003: 10), the administration has been adamant about not revealing mission objectives, intelligence sources, etc.

standards [can] be shown to be abnormal or to present merely technical problems. *We are promised normalization and happiness through science and law. When they fail, this only justifies more of the same.*" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 196, my emphasis) This logic is reflected in the increased technologizing of security: "the deep-seated belief in the power of technology to protect and to guarantee progress" (Lyon 2003: 85), which echoes Ellul's concept of *la technique*, is a "relentless commitment to technological progress via ever-augmented means" (*Ibid*). An example of such technological reliance is demonstrated by the fact that the government, with full popular support following the revelation that several of the 9/11 highjackers had had their visas extended just six months before the attacks, "opened up the State Department's database of 50 million visa applications to U.S. police departments." (Farmer and Mann 2003) Rather than retraining its INS agents, the government initially only ran existing visa applications through data mining programs to cull the files of 'risky' individuals. Because, as this example demonstrates, "[T]oday's surveillance is increasingly computer-assisted and technology-dependent (…) [T]his means that the reinforcement and reproduction of social inequalities are being automated." (Lyon 2003: 38-39) The de-politicizing of the issue of security means that socially-constructed categories of risk are being *programmed* into security systems. Furthermore, "[U]nder the present panic regime, it appears that anxious publics are willing to put up with many more intrusions, interceptions, delays, and questions than was the case before September 11. This process is amplified by media polarizations of the "choice" between "liberty" and "security." (Lyon 2003: 35) In the current political climate, to vote against a

particular piece of 'antiterrorist' legislation is to *side with* the terrorists, much like what Glassner describes as the trap of memorial legislation in the case of, for example, murdered children: "Policy issues are reduced to poster children and you have an up-and-down emotional vote as if you're choosing between the killer and a particular child." (Schulhofer, in Glassner 1999: 63)

Regardless of the exact details of the situations provoking mass panic, as Clinton's Oklahoma bombing aftermath and Bush's 9/11 demonstrate, the incredible utility that such a panic situation can have for furthering governance aims cannot be overlooked. Given the disparity in other politiking between Clinton, well known as being perhaps the best Democrat since Kennedy, and who is generally understood to have lead the United States in a direction as diametrically opposed as possible to that of his successor, George W. Bush, a staunch Republican known as the 'Death Penalty Governor'[242], their two administrations in fact pursued several parallel disciplinary policies. Without Clinton's antiterrorism legislative efforts, it is not clear whether President Bush would have been nearly as 'successful' in his prosecution of the War on Terror, and in his definition of the social risk facing the American public. Bush's surveillance efforts, as I hope the previous discussion has highlighted, have been located on "a continuum from care to control" (Lyon 2003: 5), a continuum on which, I hope has been made clear, *all* such disciplinary efforts may be located. Surveillance, and disciplinary governance techniques in general, are understood here to refer to "routing ways in which focused attention is paid to personal details by

[242] Please see Cockburn 2000 and http://www.cuadp.org/bush.html for more information regarding Governor George W. Bush's execution record.

organizations that want to influence, manage, or control certain persons or population groups." (*Ibid*) As Erickson and Haggerty explain, "[I]nstitutions are involved in the production and distribution of knowledge about diverse populations for the purpose of managing their behaviour from a distance. In this way, surveillance also serves as a vital component of positive population management strategies." (2000: 615) True, the current administration has pursued more aggressively certain policy options that were either not pursued in the past, or were to lesser extent, but this has in part been because never before has there been the social environment in which to legitimately pursue, and obtain, these same policy options. It can only be *now* that George W. Bush's actions make sense to the American public. While Bill Clinton was impeached (merely) for lying about his sexual encounters with an intern, Bush's administration, having been suspected time and again to have, *at the least*, *knowingly* mislead the people, has not been similarly impeached. This apparent change in the willingness of the American people to allow their leaders 'leeway', for want of a better word, can be thought of as a result of a change in the greater discourse of politics and power in post-9/11 Republican America. Foucault thought that, "in each period, discourse produced forms of knowledge, objects, subjects and practices of knowledge, which differed radically from period to period, with no necessary continuity between them." (Hall 1997: 46) That is what he intended when he said nothing existed outside of discourse: people and their reality are composed of the discourse they put forth, therefore nothing can stand in exteriority to it. The narrative of fear prevalent in the United States is a narrative that *makes sense* to Americans at this particular junction. It, like any other authoritative discourse, is self-perpetuating;

it makes sense to enough people for them to continue speaking about it, and those who resist it *also* speak about it, using its own arguments to deconstruct and de-legitimize it.

The narratives that are put forth to explain our (present and past) history to us are performative: they are not revealing a Truth, they are constructing It. The hows and whys of this construction are not easily answered: the functioning of discourse and power in society is too dispersed and complex for authorship to be pinpointed in any one voice, in any one institution. While we may concede, indeed we have to, that, because of the competitive nature of representation, certain narratives are privileged, and that the strategic framing of these narratives in the media plays a huge role in public opinion formation, we cannot forget that narratives must function within a 'cultural canon'. People will believe a narrative because it makes sense to them, because something in the way the "facts" are organized and linked together appeals to some greater or longstanding belief. It is therefore not simply a matter of changing "the fairy tale people need to get through the day. People are sheep, and can be driven to new pasture in a short amount of time." (Maher 2002: 79) Not only will people refuse narratives that break too much with cultural mores, or that "bend the rules" too much, but *within* these accepted narratives people also rebel. Therefore we cannot say that history is decided by a few men who, in planning it all out, manipulate narratives and discourse as they go. No one is outside power, no one is immune to being formed, in some way, by the dominant narratives (and their resistances) of their day. In "The Subject and Power", Foucault states that, "we have

been trapped in our own history" (1982: 329), meaning that we are socially and historically constructed subjects. If our agency as such constructed subjects refers not only to our motivations as social actors, but also to the greater discourse that has shaped that motivation, our agency as subjects then, as *narrators*, is also constructed. However, if we persist in conceptualizing "agency as outside history, as something essential and timeless in its qualities which fashions the world without itself being fashioned, then we will tend to explain history as the consequences of the actions of agents (rather than agency being created within history) and our histories will be haunted by a normative and androcentric image of agency; the so-called "great men" of history who act on the world to make history." (Barrett, in Dobres and Robb 2000: 62) In his "Eighteenth Brumaire", Marx stated this perfectly, explaining that "[M]en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." (1978: 595) While it is important to note how Bush has broken with precedence in his securing of a 'new' surveillance state, it is also important to note that there *was* precedence for his actions, and that precedence is what has *formed him* as much as *allowed him* to move forward with his disciplinary legislation.

While again, we cannot deny that "[T]his White House is famously secretive and on-message, but its skills go beyond that. It knows the power of narrative, especially a single narrative with clear-cut heroes and evildoers, and it knows how to drown out any distracting subplots before they undermine the main story" (Rich, in

Didion 2003: xi), this single narrative is not being *imposed* by the state as though in a totalitarian regime. Noting how the media responded to crises in East Timor and Cambodia, Herman and Chomsky commented that, "[N]o one instructed the media to focus on Cambodia and ignore East Timor. They gravitated naturally to the Khmer Rouge and discussed them freely – just as they naturally suppressed information on Indonesian atrocities in East Timor and U.S. responsibility for the aggression and massacres." (1988: 302-03). According to the authors, the media follow what the government says not because of imposition, but rather because of a "system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system so powerful as to be internalized largely without awareness." (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 302) The strength in a dominant narrative then lies not in its *imposition*, but rather in its *naturalization*. The question of authorship of narrative is therefore next to impossible to answer: both whoever is *tapping into* the cultural canon to formulate an acceptable narrative, and the cultural canon *itself* which naturalizes it, are responsible for the diffusion and maintenance of any dominant (hegemonic) narrative. However, the control of this narrative does not necessarily lie in the same hands that initially propelled it into the public: "One implication of this argument about cultural codes is that, if meaning is the result, not something fixed out there, in nature, but of our social, cultural and linguistic conventions, then meaning can never be *finally* fixed." (Hall 1997: 23, emphasis in original) Given that meaning cannot be fixed, and that narratives are dependant on the cultural cannon, the narrative of fear we now see ruling the American psyche will change when the cultural cannon does. This change, no doubt, will be in part due to those resistances created by that initial narrative,

although the dialectics of such resistance and change we will leave to others to discuss.

CONCLUSION

If the reader will recall, my introduction stated that my intent with this thesis was "to "map on a series of examples some of the most essential techniques that most easily spread" (Foucault 1977: 139) the disciplinary gaze of the state, in an attempt to establish that while it may be the *state's* gaze that spreads, it does so through *non*-state relations, and without anywhere near the degree of planning and control that is too often, conspiratorially, assigned to it" (Dubé 2005: 11). In order to undertake such a mapping, I intended to synthesize some of the key power relations that construct the social environment in which modern discipline shapes the general will, maintaining that the use of narratives of fear, propaganda and other such tactics of power not only do not run counter to the proper functioning of modern democracy, but are *intrinsic* to it. Such a position runs counter to the popular misconception that power is 'power over', and that politics and government are 'necessary evils'. This insistence that power is principally juridical and sovereign-based persistently holds, and is visible in the globalization debate, which is continually reassessing the role that the state has to play now that citizens can circumvent it in so many ways. The globalization debate does not however, as is popularly thought, point to the demise of the state, but rather to our persistent belief in the social contract by which we believe ourselves to be governed. Again, that "[T]he modern political science concept of power is primarily based on the notions of command and obedience and has been focused on the state's exercise of its powers of coercion in relation to individuals" (Brass 2000: 316) maintains this fiction that the state is the sole bearer of power, and this reduces questions of power to concerns regarding "*who* governs, *how much*

coercion is exercised in the process, and *how to regulate* this power and prevent its abuse of the rights of the people." (*Ibid*, my emphasis) In the case of Bush's post-9/11 America, as Naomi Klein so succinctly puts it, having such an enigmatic (read eccentric) leader 'in power' pulls the focus away from the issues at hand (such as why the country might be fighting a war that no one seems to want, and who is being made to fight it), and instead focuses it "exclusively on the admittedly odd personalities of the people in the White House." (2004) By re-conceptualizing power as negotiated, rather than imposed, "Foucault shifts out attention away from the grand, overall strategies of power, towards the many, localized circuits, tactics, mechanisms and effects through which power circulates – what Foucault calls the 'meticulous rituals' or the 'micro-physics' of power." (Hall 1997: 50) Not only does Foucault do this because power is relational, but because to focus exclusively on the 'terminal form that power takes' (the state) is to ignore that "the state, no more probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak quite frankly, this importance" (Foucault 1978a: 220) that assigning it exclusive ownership of power accords it.

Again, as stated in the introduction to this thesis, to "limit the idea of power to its more obvious political manifestations" is "an ideological move, obscuring the complex diffuseness of its operations." (Eagleton 1991: 7) Eagleton sets the stage for an understanding of Foucault's insistence on a re-conceptualization of power as relational, when he defines ideology as being "neither a set of diffuse discourses nor a seamless whole; if its impulse is to identify and homogenize, it is nevertheless scarred

and disarticulated by its *relational* character; by the conflicting interests among which it must ceaselessly negotiate. It is not for itself, as some historicist Marxism would seem to suggest, the founding principle of social unity, but rather strives in the teeth of political resistance to reconstitute that unity at an imaginary level. As such, it can never be simple 'otherworldliness' or idly disconnected thought; on the contrary, it must figure as an organizing social force which actively seeks to equip them with forms of value and belief relevant to their specific social tasks and to the general reproduction of the social order." (Eagleton 1991: 222-23) That presidencies as seemingly divergent as Clinton's and Bush's have pursued such similar governance strategies in certain situations is testament to this need to negotiate a hegemonic truce between society's competing powers. That power should be routinely conceptualized as being something 'owned' and 'made use of' exclusively by the state is clearly then an ideological move, and one which Nietzsche argued masked[243] from ourselves the subjugating and power-ridden relations that established and maintain this system[244]. Both Foucault and Nietzsche saw society, and particularly the state, as being institutions demanding conformity for the sake of such hegemonic stability. Of the state, Nietzsche had this to say: "the fitting of a hitherto unchecked and amorphous population into a fixed form, starting as it has done in an act of violence, could only be accomplished by acts of violence and nothing else – that the oldest "State" appeared consequently as a ghastly tyranny, grinding ruthless piece of machinery,

[243] "The habits of our senses have woven us into lies and deception of sensation; these again are the basis of all our judgments and 'knowledge' – there is absolutely no escape, no backway or bypath into the real world! We sit within our net, we spiders, and whatever we may catch in it, we can catch nothing at all except that which allows itself to be caught in precisely our net." (in Kirby 2003: 15)

[244] "His concern, however, is with the limitations of modern forms of communality that still maintain themselves by these means long after the original reasons for employing them have disappeared. In his view, a pervasive loyalty to an exclusive communality institutionalizes relations of domination that preserve a familiar identity by subjugating 'otherness'." (Roodt 1996: 30)

which went on working, till this raw material of a semi-animal populace was not only thoroughly kneaded and elastic, but also *moulded*." (2003: 57, my emphasis) Foucault also insisted that we shouldn't consider "the "modern state" as an entity which has developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, *under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns*." (1982: 334, my emphasis) This molding society was modern, disciplinary society.

For Foucault, industrial Western society was characterized by spaces of enclosure: the individual moved from the family, to the school, to the army barracks, to the factory, and therefore moved from one enclosed space to another, each with its own laws and codes of behavior. Behavior was *molded*: Panoptic society inculcated in the individual a sense of time and order, an awareness of being watched and as a consequence, an ability to produce efficiently. Deviant behavior was quickly surveilled and the offending individual's behavior corrected. Key to understanding Foucault's disciplined subject and disciplinary society is understanding that corrections were made *as deviance was noted*: It is not merely coincidence that dungeons and pillories gave way to 'correctional facilities' in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While George Orwell seems to have provided his readers with an extreme example of what disciplinary, anticipatory compliance might look like[245]

[245] "How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate, they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live – did live, from habit that became instinct – in the

when such surveillance was extended *past* sites of enclosure and extended everywhere, as sociologists Erickson and Haggerty point out, "his [Orwell's] emphasis on the state as the agent of surveillance now appears too restricted in a society where both state and non-state institutions are involved in massive efforts to monitor different populations." (2000: 606-07) It is Erickson and Haggerty's application of what is essentially a Foucaultian understanding of power to the disciplinary gaze that allows for an understanding, along Baudrillard's line of thinking, that the disciplinary society may have shifted from sovereignty-discipline, to sovereignty/discipline-surveillance.

According to Baudrillard the only reason that Foucault was ever able to write the history of the disciplines was that their moment had already passed: "if it is possible to talk with such definitive understanding about power [in the disciplinary sense] (…) it is because at some point *all this is here and now over with*." (1987: 11, emphasis in original) Enjoining us to *Forget Foucault*, Baudrillard noted that "he [Foucault] works at the confines of an area (maybe a "classical age," of which he would be the last great dinosaur) now in the process of collapsing entirely." (*Ibid*) However, just as Foucault's shift from societies of sovereignty to societies of discipline had been one of emphasis, retaining elements from the previous system and incorporating them, so too have we, the control society, retained both disciplinary and sovereign institutions. It is the events of 9/11, and the Bush administration's handling of them and their aftermath, that point to such a shift in emphasis.

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assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized." (1977: 3)

Philip Abrams defined 'the event' as "a portentous outcome; it is a transformation device between past and future; it has eventuated from the past and signifies for the future." (in Lyon 2003: 15-16) He added that the event was an "indispensable prism through which social structure and process may be seen" (Lyon 2003: 16), which supports Foucault's appeal for a de-centered analysis of power, as "it is not possible to do a history of power directly, but only through the spaces in which it exercises itself." (Rella 1994: 71) Foucault himself explained his focus on the event as asking ""How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?" But the important thing here is not that such changes can be rapid and extensive or, rather, it is that this extent and rapidity are only the sign of something else – a modification in the rules of formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true." (Foucault 1976: 114) He added that "[T]hese are not simply new discoveries, there is a whole new "regime" in discourse and forms of knowledge. And all this happens in the space of a few years." (*Ibid*) While specifying that such 'portentous' events signify a break with what has passed, he cautioned that we should avoid thinking of what follows that break "as the final term of a historical development" (Foucault 1997: 238), but rather that we should consider emergence to be "the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center stage, each in its youthful strength." (Foucault 1997: 239) It is with this understanding in mind that we can begin to consider the events of 9/11 as that emergence, that "leap from the wings to center stage", of the control society.

While disciplined society molded individuals through enclosed spaces of surveillance and through behavior correction when *needed*, the control society modulates the 'dividual' according to prescribed patterns, correcting behavior when deviance is *anticipated* based on that same pattern. As we shall see in a moment, "we are witnessing a convergence of what were once discrete surveillance systems to the point that we can now speak of an emerging 'surveillant assemblage'. This assemblage operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into distinct 'data doubles' which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention." (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 606) As civil liberties expert Nat Hentoff explains, under current 9/11-inspired legislation, "[O]ur government's unblinking eyes will try to find suspicious patterns in your credit card and bank data, medical records, the movies you click for on pay-per-view, passport applications, prescription purchases, e-mail messages, telephone calls, and anything you've done that winds up in court records, such as divorces." (Hentoff 2003: 47) No longer is Big Brother present on the factory floor alone (though he is surely still there) in the form of the floor manager, but He is in our computers, recording our key strokes and noting how long we spend surfing the Net (to say nothing of the websites we visit). He is also in our homes, based on what satellite service we subscribe to, which Pay Per View films we purchase, how many phone and fax lines we have, etc. It is getting harder and harder to live 'off the grid': In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, "surveillance data from a myriad of sources – supermarkets, motels, traffic control points, credit card transaction records, and so on – were used to trace the activities of the "terrorists" in

the days and hours before their attacks. The use of searchable databases makes it possible to use commercial records previously unavailable to police and intelligence services and thus draws on all manner of apparently "innocent" traces." (Lyon 2003: 32) It was by following the traces left by 'data doubles' that the authorities were able to reconstruct the final movements of the terrorists, and it is just such an example that supports Erickson and Haggerty's assertion that data doubles "transcend a purely representational idiom. Rather than being accurate or inaccurate portrayals of real individuals, they are a form of pragmatics: differentiated according to how useful they are in allowing institutions to make discriminations among populations." (2000: 614) As data doubles are, still according to Erickson and Haggerty, "increasingly the objects toward which governmental and marketing practices are directed" (2000: 613), consequently, services in the control society are tailored to us (not *for* us, which would imply some dialogue), to meet our divined-through-pattern needs[246], be they increased credit limits, or preventive detention. To quote Deleuze, "Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and discontinuous. Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt." (Deleuze) The dividuation of individuals, which Deleuze contends has been progressing since at least World War II, has resulted in the molded, disciplined individual being broken down into a data-stream to be sorted based on consumer preferences, lifestyle habits, and behavioural patterns, resulting in a situation in which there is no longer strictly (or even principally) any molding, but

[246] Please see the film *Minority Report* for an extreme, although not impossible, example of such tailoring of services. I am thinking specifically of the scene in which Tom Cruise's character walks through a shopping mall with his 'new' eyes and finds himself being addressed as Mr. Yakamoto and entreated to repeat his purchasing patterns at, in this case, The Gap. (Molen *et al.* 2002)

rather *modulation*. While the disciplined society sought to "striate the space over which it reigns" in order to accomplish disciplinary comparison on an inter-individual level, the control society "is not so much immediately concerned with the direct physical relocation of the human body (although this may be an ultimate consequence), but with transforming the body into pure information, such that it can be rendered more mobile and comparable" (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 613), thus shifting the focus of intervention to an intra-individual level.

The shift from discipline to control has done nothing but emphasize the Foucaultian insistence that power be considered relational rather than strictly juridical, and it is through the 'new' surveillance society and its surveillant assemblages that we can see this most clearly. As Hentoff explained, the activities of the 9/11 highjackers were traced using existing *non-governmental* surveillance technologies *already in place* for commercial and private use. Just as I earlier specified that the state's gaze has been extended using non-state relations, the *state's* surveillance web relies on "the dispersed systems and devices of surveillance *society*." (Lyon 2003: 37, my emphasis) Lyon further clarifies: "Others besides the state itself are enlisted into the processes of creating order, of providing incentives for certain kinds of behaviors, and of fostering new modes of cooperation between different agencies. As the organizations and associations of civil society are pulled in to fulfill the tasks of governmentality, so their methods of data processing and networking also become part of the larger surveillance picture." (2003: 106) Where the control society is taking over from the disciplinary society is "[I]n the

convergence of different and previously discrete surveillance systems" (Lyon 2003: 107), and where previously individuals could 'disappear' between sites of disciplinary control, with the continued integration of state and societal surveillance spheres, we are witnessing the "disappearance of disappearance" (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 619). Just as Foucault's power was relational, operating and extending both vertically and horizontally throughout society in a mutually reinforcing and constantly negotiated manner, so too is the surveillance assemblage, which functions, according to Erickson and Haggerty, rhizomatically: "'rhizomes' are plants which grow in surface extensions through interconnected vertical root systems", and to speak of surveillance rhizomatically "accentuates two attributes of the surveillant assemblage: its phenomenal growth through expanding uses, and its leveling effect on hierarchies." (2000: 614) *Every* social group is under surveillance of *some form* in the modern state[247], and every failure to catch deviance across such groups is treated as proof of a failure in *execution*[248], not in *expectation*[249].

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[247] "The classifications and profiles that are entered into these disparate systems correspond with, and reinforce, differential levels of access, treatment and mobility. Hence, while poor individuals may be in regular contact with the surveillance systems associated with social assistance of criminal justice, the middle and upper classes are increasingly subject to their own forms of routine observation, documentation and analysis." (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 618)

[248] Again, it behooves me to quote the brilliant Dreyfus and Rabinow, who reminded us that "Political technologies advance by taking what is essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science. (…) When there was a resistance, or failure to achieve its stated aims, this was construed as further proof of the need to reinforce and extend the power of the experts. A technical matrix was established. By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any technical problem. Once this matrix was established, the spread of bio-power was assured, for there was nothing else to appeal to; any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present merely technical problems. We are promised normalization and happiness though science and law. When they fail, this only justifies the need for more of the same." (1983: 196) Or, as Lyon says, "a kind of mechanical failure, not social injustice, is the problem." (2003: 102)

[249] "Security technologies have proliferated, and with them two central beliefs: one, the idea that "maximum security" is a desirable goal; and, two, that it can be pursued using these increasingly available techniques that are on the market." (Lyon 2003: 46)

Foucault once asked "The question, therefore, is not, Why have the prisons failed? It is rather, What other ends are served by this failure, which is perhaps not a failure after all?" (in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 195) He himself answered "One would be forced to suppose that the prison, and no doubt punishment in general, is not intended to eliminate offenses, but rather to distinguish them, to distribute them, to use them: that it is not so much that they render docile those who are liable to transgress the law but that they tend to assimilate the transgression of the laws in a general tactic of subjection." (*Ibid*) Carrying this line of thinking forward into the control society, Nikolas Rose astutely notes that "[T]he incompleteness, fragmentation and failure of risk assessment and risk management is no threat to such logics, merely a perpetual incitement for the incessant improvement of systems, generation of more knowledge, invention of more techniques, all driven by the technological imperative to tame uncertainty and master hazard." (Rose 2000: 333) As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, populations can be steered toward a particular course of action based on their perceptions of risk, which are likely to be defined by 'those in power'. If those risks can be centered around 'dangerous' sections of the population, then the knowledge of those risky individuals is key, and therefore so too is the definition of those risky categories. Waisbord reminds us that "[U]nderstanding risk means to understand how societies construct perceptions about the social distribution of risk (Who is vulnerable? Why?) and the responsibility for risk. (Who is responsible?). This construction, however, is no mere reflection of cultural fears in contemporary societies, but rather the result of the process of the governmentality of risk. What people come to understand as fearful is the

consequence of what is socially constructed to be risky. Risk assessment is a form of imposing order" (2002: 203). The social problems that such construction most obviously lead to are what Lyon terms "digital discrimination": "What may be called "digital discrimination" consists of the ways in which the flows of personal data - abstracted information - are sifted and channeled in the process of risk assessment, to privilege some and disadvantage others, to accept some as legitimately present and to reject others. Note also that this is increasingly done *in advance* of any offence." (2003: 81)[250] Increasingly, and herein lies the crux of the shift from societies of discipline to those of control, *proscription* is taking precedence over *protection* (Lyon 2003: 17). The new technologies, or the new *assemblages* of *old* technologies, that the Bush administration has made use of or is proposing to use[251] "rely heavily on the use of searchable databases, with the aim of anticipating, preempting, and preventing acts of "terrorism" by *isolating in advance potential perpetrators*." (Lyon 2003: 80, my emphasis) Gone are the days of *reactive* defensive measures, and in the spirit of the risk society that we had been easing into and now find ourselves fully immersed in, the days of *preemptive defense* have arrived.

Just as Rella specified that "it is not possible to do a history of power directly, but only through the spaces in which it exercises itself" (1994: 71), "the aftermath of 9/11 may be thought of as both revealing and producing social change." (Lyon 2003:

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[250] Please see Lacayo's 2001 *Time* article "Terrorizing Ourselves" for more on the preemptive discrimination that can be expected should national identity cards be issued, for example. Regarding such i.d. cards, human rights experts anticipate that "Poor people and people of color would be stopped the most" (Lacayo 2001: 89) and be required to produce the cards on demand.

[251] Such as the Total (or Terrorism) Information Awareness program, or TIA, which is a "data-mining program, based on similar ones in the consumer realm, designed to identify terrorists and to anticipate their activities. But the data being mined is hauled up electronic shafts from familiar veins of everyday life transactions – relating to credit, travel, telephone, internet, and email." (Lyon 2003: 89)

18) Following 9/11, three main discourses could be heard circulating in the marketplace of ideas: first, that the government wasn't doing enough; secondly, the government was doing too much; and finally, the government wasn't doing anything it hadn't already been doing. It is these last two that concern me here, for both miss the boat, so to speak. Alarmists on the Left cried out indignantly, eulogizing civil rights and freedoms, and Realists (their word, not mine) in the Center and on the Right reminded us that these civil rights and freedoms were either a myth to begin with, or weren't being put upon any more *now* than they had been in the recent past. Both sides of this question are right, and yet both are grossly insufficient in explaining our new power relation– and I believe it *is* new. Those on the Left, in their rush to demonize the Bush administration, have ignored the gradual erosion of civil liberties and personal privacy and freedom that has been occurring since before the Cold War began. Those in the Center, trying (rather nobly I think) to calm a crazed debate and bring perspective back to the situation, have ignored that the effects of 9/11 go far beyond anything has in the past. By focusing on the buildup to the security measures enacted after 9/11, many have missed that it was in fact a *build-up* – the situation has changed dramatically since the days before 9/11, and the fact that we can trace the movement of a wave does nothing to lessen the impact of its break.

Comparisons between 9/11 and the Oklahoma City Bombing, for example, that attempt to temper debate by pointing to the roots of current legislation, ignore the fact that McVeigh didn't start global coalitions, a series of international wars, nor an international peace movement the likes of which the world has never seen. Not only

did the legislation enacted post-9/11 obtain *all* the provisions, and *more*, sought after and refused in the Oklahoma legislation, but this same legislating style also spread *worldwide*. The Oklahoma bombing didn't scar the American people such that legitimation ceased to be an issue, if only for a time. And here is what, I believe, proves the 'newness' of our situation, and entrenches us firmly in the control society; democratic governments no longer need to undertake laborious efforts in order to placate their populations – legitimacy is accorded to them gratis. Of course, efforts are still made here and there for show, such as with the United States's appeals for U.N. intervention in Iraq, but as Deleuze says "everyone knows these institutions are finished (…) it's only a matter of administering their last rites and of keeping people employed until the installation of the new forces knocking at the door." (Deleuze) Modern subjects, increasingly habituated to intervention and surveillance brought about through *disciplinary measures*, have become *post*-modern subjects, ceaselessly modulated in the control state/society. As Gore Vidal so concisely puts it, "after a half-century of the Russians are coming, followed by terrorists from proliferating rogue states as well as the ongoing horrors of drug-related crime, there is little respite for a people so routinely – so fiercely – disinformed." (2002: 115)

Eagleton addresses this question of post-modern discomfort when he comments that while "[I]deology is essentially a matter of meaning (…) the condition of advanced capitalism, some would suggest, is one of pervasive *non*-meaning. The sway of utility and technology bleach social life of significance, subordinating use-value to the empty formalism of exchange-value." (1991: 37) According to Eagleton,

"this massive haemorrhaging of meaning then triggers pathological symptoms in society at large" (1991: 38), which perhaps helps to explain why and how modern propaganda differs so very much from its previous forms: Aside from technological changes and an ever-expanding audience with access to mass media, "Ellul argued that propaganda had become 'the remedy for loneliness', providing 'collective signals which integrate' the actions of the individual into the life of the community. It offered the individual the myth of a collective ideology." (in Qualter 1985: 112) While Jenkins asserts that (post) modern individuals suffer "panic fatigue", which has set in because the people have been "constantly scared by imaginary fears [and] can no longer realize a real, rational risk" (in Geraci and Gutfeld 1996: 54), Baudrillard offers us a reason why the people seem incapable of resisting such daily assaults, why they prove more and more susceptible to propaganda's influence, and why ultimately, this allows the control society to take hold: "People cannot recall last night's news because there is nothing to recall, there are only images, only signifiers to experience. The news is a collage of fragmented images, and each image spawns more, calls up more, each image is simulacrum – a perfect copy that has no original." (Sarup 1993: 165) The reason we may not grasp the moment, or the *event*, is that we do not recognize its *happening*: "The postmodern experience is one of synchronicity; it plunders the past for its images and in using them denies their historicity and makes them into a kind of eternal present." (*Ibid*)

As we have seen, in the Bush administration's framing of the War in Iraq as "Persian Gulf Part Two", it has perpetuated and perfected this orbiting in an eternal

present devoid of both past and future – a copy with no original, going nowhere. When Rampton and Stauber comment on the televising of war, they are making the same point: ""The characters are the same: The president is a Bush and the other guy is a Hussein. But the technology – the military's and the news media's – has exploded," said MSNBC chief Erik Sorenson. He compared it to "the difference between Atari and PlayStation." TV coverage, he said, "will be a much more three-dimensional visual experience, and in some cases you see war live. This may be one time where the sequel is much more compelling than the original."" (2003: 179-80) When Baudrillard protests that the media places the modern subject "into a universe of simulacra where it is impossible to distinguish between the spectacle and the real" (Sarup 1993: 165), his point is reinforced again by Rampton and Stauber: ""Have we made war glamorous?" asked MSNBC anchor Lester Holt during a March 26 exchange with former Navy SEAL and professional wrestler turned politician Jesse Ventura, whom it had hired as an expert commentator. "It reminds me a lot of the Super Bowl," Ventura replied." (2003: 181)

It is through TV being "dissolved into life, and life [being] dissolved into TV", where the "fiction is 'realized' and the 'real' becomes fictitious" (Sarup 1993: 165), combined with the modern subject becoming habituated to surveillance (through disciplinary techniques initially, then through control strategies) – as through "programmes such as *America's Dumbest Criminals* [which] have helped soften the authoritarian overtones of mass public surveillance" (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 616) – as well as capitalist society increasingly relying on *willing*

submission to surveillance for access to certain circuits of inclusion[252], that modern individuals have come to accept surveillance and control in a society where "knowledge of the population is now manifest in discrete bits of information which break the individual down into flows for purposes of management, profit and entertainment." (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 619) The modern individual submits, knowingly or not (through direct surveys, or through, for example, Air Miles-obtained data that is then mined and sold), to circuits of surveillance which were established and developed under disciplinary society, but which *transformed* that same society into one of control, in the hope of "developing strategies of governance, commerce and control." (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 613) Erickson and Haggerty are indeed correct, now more than ever, in stating that "Privacy is now less a line in the sand beyond which transgression is not permitted, than a shifting space of negotiation where privacy is traded for products, better service, or special deals." (2000: 616) In other words, if we now find ourselves in the control society post-9/11, it is because we allowed it to establish itself[253], both because we did not notice its long evolution – as in the traveling of a wave – and because it was so suddenly

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[252] "monitoring for market consumption is more concerned with attempts to limit access to places and information, or to allow for the production of consumer profiles through the *ex posto facto* reconstructions of a person's behaviour, habits and actions. In those situations where individuals monitor their behaviour in light of the thresholds established by such surveillance systems, they are often involved in efforts to maintain or augment various perks such as preferential credit ratings, computer services, or rapid movement through customs." (Erickson and Haggerty 2000: 615) For example, frequent flyers now have the option at several airports to pass through security checks more quickly if they allow the airport to store their biometric data (iris scans, fingerprints, DNA sample, for example) and flight histories. Several clothing stores now have policies requiring customers to register their postal codes in tracking software at time of purchase, supposedly to establish buying patterns which are then used to determine the locations of new stores.

[253] This seems more ominous than it is intended: Deleuze said it best when he stated that "There is no need to ask which is the toughest regime, for it's within each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another (...) There is no need for fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons." (Deleuze)

brought into play – like the breaking of that same wave – by events that were so huge that we missed the forest for the tree, so to speak.

Because I am a student of Foucault, I am reminded that this break with history cannot be located all in the events of 9/11: The Oklahoma City bombing laid much of the ground work for 9/11 legislation; events like the James Bulger case in Britain paved the way for increased surveillance, which sped up the rise of risk assessment as a dominant social control mechanism; the theory of risk management prepared us psychologically to accept preemptive defensive action; capitalism demanded efficiency of us, which required knowledge of what we do and who we are. The shift that we experienced from disciplinary society to a society of control is not all located in the event, nor is it the event *itself* that matters[254] – the break with disciplinary societies, which had been preparing itself for decades, happened when the *rules of the game changed*: we are still a world of states and citizens; still ruled by law (at least in theory); still making use of many of the same systems of socialization (propaganda, mass media, the factory); we still go to war (even if it is on a noun), but *the ways in which we interact and legitimize our actions have finally changed.* Again, this is not a categorical change, but rather a shift in emphasis, but it is in fact a new system. Where previously a certain amount of risk assessment can be assumed to have been considered in the planning of any great venture, risk assessment has become the

[254] In fact, Foucault himself expounds on this subject, emphasizing the fact that "It's not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of realizing that there are actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects. The problem is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another." (1976: 116)

dominant tactic whereby society is made orderly, on every level: adolescent boys pay more in car insurance because the likelihood of their having accidents is *statistically higher* than that of adolescent girls; property values of homes drop in neighbourhoods where correctional facilities are built simply because of the *proximity* to (already incarcerated) risky individuals. In our post-modern need to "tame uncertainty and master hazard" (Rose 2000: 333), countries now go to war based on who *might*, *maybe someday*, attack *somehow*, and this is considered legitimate by enough people that this theory is spreading, much like its symptomatic legislation. Robin Cook made the impossibility of risk assessment's goal (maximum security) laughingly clear when he stated, in his resignation as leader of the British House of Commons, that, "We cannot justify our military strategy on the basis that Saddam is weak and at the same time justify pre-emptive action on the claim that he is a serious threat." (Cook 2003: 2)

The role that the Other has to play in the formation of identity and in the galvanizing of support around stable forces and institutions has changed: where in the past society called upon such an Other circumstantially, on specific occasions, and in certain contexts to serve a specific role, as David Lyon laments in his analysis of the technologies being called upon to 'guarantee' our security in the post-9/11 environment[255], the Other has become institutionalized, and rather than having our own security guaranteed by our knowledge of 'them', their *in*security has been guaranteed by our *surveillance* of 'them'. What David Noble calls the "religion of

[255] As Lyon explains, "the security sought after 9/11 builds on post-World War II notions of security, in which guarantees of inviolability and protection are sought by technical and military means as political goals." (2003: 15)

technology" (Lyon 2003: 85) – the "deep-seated belief in the power of technology to protect and to guarantee progress" (*Ibid*) is what, in part, is leading to the categorizing of suspicion[256] and its being legislated and automated. The reliance on technology to algorithmically determine risk means that the definitions of risky behavior – the codes whereby the algorithms work – are key to understanding how these categories become "a means of discrimination which, when linked with stereotypes, produces gratuitously unequal treatment for certain groups of people" (Lyon 2003: 100), whereby "[O]rdinary citizens, workers, and consumers – that is, people with no terrorist ambitions whatsoever – find that their life-chances are more circumscribed by the categories in which they fall." (Lyon 2003: 83)

Bourdieu said "The fate of groups is bound up with the words that designate them" (in Lyon 2003: 150), and in the post-9/11 environment, stereotypes that were previously officially frowned upon have become social sorting guidelines, and this is why the new definition of 'terrorist' is so important to this new world order: "Once some activity is thought of as "terrorism", then surveillance powers aimed at such groups are justified." (Lyon 2003: 48) As Nancy Chang tells us, "Section 802 of the [USA PATRIOT Act] creates a federal crime of "domestic terrorism" that broadly extends to "acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws" if they "appear to be intended … to influence the policy of a government by

[256] For example, "The systems being developed and tested in the USA during the 2002 search for patterns of living arrangements, meetings, transactions, spending habits, behaviors, and lifestyle preferences to create a "threat index" for each passenger. Each of the prototype systems involves coordinating public and private records to create models of "normal" activity, from which aberrations may be gauged and monitored. Using neural network software and relational databases, every flight will have a prioritized passenger list showing the least to the greatest threats." (Lyon 2003: 133)

intimidation or coercion," and if they "occur primarily within in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" (2002: 44), a definition which would have included everything from the civil rights movement of the 1960s, to the women's suffragette movement of the early 20th century, to the Boston Tea Party. Of course the *point* is to have overly inclusive definitions, as we have seen with discipline, but today's monitoring assumes that *all* surveillance will produce searchable databases that will yield *correct* and *useful* information (Lyon 2003), this despite the fact that a) "suicide bombers do not strike twice" (Lyon 2003: 75), and that therefore knowing which seat they prefer on the plane and what fruit cocktail they drink might not prove useful, and b) "large databases face inherent problems. Simply running the routine comparisons that are intrinsic to databases takes much longer as data become more complex, says Piotr Indyk, a database researcher at MIT. Worse, he says, the results are often useless: as the data pool swells, the number of chance correlations rises even faster, flooding meaningful answers in a tsunami of logically valid but utterly useless solutions." (Farmer and Mann 2003)

Clearly then, the events of 9/11 can be seen, as Lyon has said, to both reveal and produce social change – much like the moral panic, which reminds us that such change often hinges on the (mis)conceptions of a risky 'Other'. 9/11, and its legislation and global impact, opened our eyes to the fact that discipline, in its discontinuous and lengthy focus on the individual *in context*, no longer applies to this society composed of dividuals who voluntarily endlessly modulate around ever-changing needs divined through pattern, consumption, and anticipated risk. 9/11

revealed the (renewed) strength of the *state*, but it is a strength dependent on the surveillance *society*, one which, like the media, finds itself – non-conspiratorially but through circumstance – dependent on the power of certain groups: "More groups are drawn into the surveillance net, and these groups have similar characteristics as sprawling definitional categories (such as "terrorist") and similar search methods are used to identify, screen, and sort them. Certainly, it seems that the economic and military power of the global north can only be augmented through the use of such systems, but it is also the power of certain groups that is reinforced." (Lyon 2003: 140)

While we may contend that the post-9/11 society is one of control, it bears reminding that such an understanding hinges on a Foucaultian conception of relational power, and of the development of a society that extended the disciplinary gaze of the state to its natural extension: everywhere. Such a conception of the 'history' of the disciplinary society allows for an understanding that 'government' and 'power' are not 'things done *to* us', but rather are maintained, elaborated, negotiated *by* us, and *for* us, in processes that establish hegemonic controls over a population – in all its variables – seeking ever more efficiency, or maximum security, if you like.

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